Administrative Law - OCA

The Township of Clearview brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of an order requiring it to immediately issue a fill permit to the respondents.

The respondents had sought to build a noise and privacy berm on their property adjacent to an unregulated aerodrome.

The application judge had found the Township's requirement to verify obstacle limitation surfaces was ultra vires.

On the motion for a stay, the Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding that the appeal raised a serious question, the Township would suffer irreparable harm as the appeal would become moot if the permit issued, and the balance of convenience favoured the Township.

The motion for a stay was granted and the appeal expedited.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement appealed a direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge that rescinded an earlier direction prohibiting the Chief Adjudicator's participation in three appeals.

The Chief Adjudicator sought a stay of the second direction pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding procedural fairness, the functus officio principle, and the propriety of the RFD process.

The court found that allowing parallel proceedings could result in irreparable harm through inconsistent results and damage to the administration of justice.

The appellant, the mother of Monica Gaumont, appealed a judgment appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as guardian of Monica's property and personal care.

Monica, age 30, has a form of epilepsy with progressive seizures that have caused cognitive regression.

The application judge found Monica lacked capacity and appointed the PGT as guardian, allowing the appellant to reapply upon important changes in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding no procedural unfairness, no error regarding the capacity finding, and no merit to arguments concerning a power of attorney or alternative guardians.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order under the Extradition Act, arguing the Minister failed to give sufficient weight to his rehabilitation and the impact of extradition on his 15-year-old daughter, for whom he is the sole parent in Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister considered these factors appropriately and made no error of law, concluding the decision was reasonable given the goals of the international extradition regime.

The appellant was penalized in disciplinary proceedings by the respondent.

Instead of appealing the decision, the appellant brought a lawsuit claiming the decision was wrong and that the respondent defamed him by publishing the decision on the Internet.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lawsuit constituted an abuse of process and a collateral attack on the unappealed discipline decision.

The appellant appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board denying a transfer from a maximum secure facility to a medium secure facility.

The appellant argued the Board erred by refusing to receive an expert report from a forensic psychologist due to late filing, which was caused by legal aid funding delays.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's refusal prevented it from conducting the mandatory inquiry under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, as the report was essential to assessing the appellant's risk and determining the least onerous disposition.

The appellant physician engaged in a sexual relationship with a patient starting in 1992 while continuing to treat her.

On January 1, 1994, a zero tolerance and mandatory revocation regime for sexual abuse of patients came into force under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The appellant continued the sexual and professional relationship until 1998.

The Discipline Committee found him guilty of sexual abuse and revoked his certificate of registration.

The appellant appealed, arguing that by 1994 their relationship was 'spousal' and exempt from the regime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Discipline Committee reasonably concluded the regime applied because there was a concurrent sexual and physician-patient relationship, and there is no categorical 'spousal exemption' under the legislation.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a trial decision finding that the age cut-off for the Intensive Education Intervention Program (IEIP) for autistic children violated the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the program's focus on children aged two to five was a targeted ameliorative program that did not discriminate on the basis of age or disability.

The Court further held that even if there was a breach, the age limit was a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter due to resource constraints and expert evidence supporting early intervention.

Claims based on section 7 of the Charter and negligence were also dismissed.

The Attorney General appealed a decision finding that the Order-in-Council process for setting the remuneration of Small Claims Court deputy judges violated the principle of judicial independence.

The Court of Appeal held that deputy judges are entitled to an independent, effective, and objective process for determining their remuneration, and that the current purely political Order-in-Council process fails to meet this constitutional standard.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the application judge erred in mandating a specific commission model, and gave the government four months to establish a constitutionally compliant process.

The appellant, Toronto Hydro, appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Energy Board (OEB) ruling.

The OEB had found an implied agreement existed between Toronto Hydro and the respondent developer prior to a statutory transition date, allowing Toronto Hydro to charge higher pre-transition rates for an electricity connection.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in finding the OEB's decision unreasonable.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the OEB's reliance on industry practice and the parties' relationship was a tenable line of analysis.

The appeal was allowed and the OEB decision reinstated.

The appellant tenant appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside an arbitration award regarding the allocation of property tax shortfalls.

The landlord had sought to recover a tax shortfall from some, but not all, eligible tenants under the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the landlord was not exercising a statutory power of decision, but rather acting within the permissive statutory framework that allowed, but did not require, the recovery of shortfalls from all eligible tenants.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the landlord's right to allocate the shortfall as it did.

The applicants sought to appeal a decision of the Divisional Court dismissing their application for judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Agriculture and Food.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that under section 6(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the matter was properly decided by the Divisional Court and could not be reconstituted as a Rule 14 application before a Superior Court judge.

The developer sought a declaration that it did not require a permit from the Minister of Transportation under s. 38(2)(f) of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act to proceed with the residential phase of a mixed-use development located near a controlled-access highway.

The application judge granted the declaration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the order, finding that the residential phase could not be considered in isolation from the commercial phase, which had already been subjected to permit conditions requiring permits for all future phases.

The Court declared that a permit was required.

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an arbitration board's ruling.

The arbitration board had concluded it lacked jurisdiction under the collective agreement to award aggravated or punitive damages for an unjust dismissal grievance.

The Divisional Court held the standard of review was correctness and that the board erred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the pragmatic and functional approach dictated a standard of patent unreasonableness due to strong privative clauses and the board's expertise in interpreting collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal concluded the board's decision was not patently unreasonable and restored its ruling.

The appellant appealed a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court directly to the Court of Appeal.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that the proper route for such an appeal is to the full panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding her entitlement to Indian status, alleging the Registrar unconstitutionally presumed her unknown paternal grandfather was not an Indian.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Registrar simply applied the Indian Act and did not employ the alleged presumption.

The Court noted the appellant could still challenge the constitutionality of the Indian Act and the Registrar's decision in separate proceedings.

The Assistant Commissioner applied for leave to appeal, raising issues regarding the standard of review by the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash the application, arguing the Assistant Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and adjourned the motion to quash to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring that the sale of Hydro One shares by the Crown contravened s. 48(1) of the Electricity Act.

Before the appeal was heard, the government withdrew the public offering and enacted new legislation repealing s. 48(1) and expressly authorizing the sale of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the legal and factual foundation of the dispute had disappeared and that the circumstances did not justify an exception to the general rule against hearing moot appeals.

The appellant, a land surveyor, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing his application for judicial review.

The issue was whether a member of the Discipline Committee whose term of office expired could continue to participate in a disciplinary hearing that had only heard preliminary motions.

The Court of Appeal held that the hearing had 'commenced' and evidence had been 'heard' through the filing of exhibits, satisfying section 26(11) of the Surveyors Act.

Furthermore, the member had 'participated in a hearing' under section 4.3 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the member to continue on the panel.

The appellant advertising company challenged a municipal by-law that completely prohibited billboard signs and third party signs on private land.

The Court of Appeal held that billboard advertising is a form of commercial expression protected by section 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court found that the municipality failed to demonstrate under section 1 of the Charter that the total prohibition was a reasonable limit, as it was not rationally connected to preserving the town's character and did not minimally impair the right to freedom of expression.

The appeal was allowed and the by-law was declared invalid, with the declaration suspended for six months.