Administrative Law - OCA

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's dismissal of his Charter application, in which he sought a recommendation that the Justice Minister award him $35 million in damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming its previous decision in Re Starz that the ORB has no jurisdiction to award or recommend damages.

The appellant, who was previously found NCRMD, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At the outset of his review hearing, the appellant objected to being addressed by his legal name and to the constitution of the Board.

The Chair gave the appellant a five-second ultimatum before cutting off his audio and video feed, proceeding with the hearing in his absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Chair acted precipitously and failed to exercise the judicial patience and restraint required under section 672.5(10)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code before excluding an accused from a hearing.

The appellant doctor appealed a Superior Court decision that reversed a Consent and Capacity Board finding that the respondent was incapable of consenting to proposed psychiatric treatment.

Following the commencement of the appeal, the respondent's NCR verdict was overturned, he was discharged from the facility, and the proposed treatment was never commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case as a decision would have no practical effect on the parties and the appellant's concerns regarding a prior capable wish could be addressed under section 36 of the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for index offences in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that concluded he constituted a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordered his continued detention without community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to address conflicts and ambiguities in the expert evidence regarding whether the appellant posed a significant threat, particularly given his lack of violent offences since 2003.

The matter was returned to the Board for a fresh determination.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the respondent College declaratory and injunctive relief for unauthorized practice and unauthorized use of protected titles.

The appellants argued that the language proficiency requirement in the Registration Regulation was discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants were barred from advancing the constitutional argument due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, as the same issue had been previously decided against them by the Divisional Court.

The respondent physician commenced an action for loss of income after his hospital privileges were temporarily restricted following an incident in the operating room.

The appellant hospital and doctors brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had not first proceeded to a hearing before the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) under the Public Hospitals Act.

The motion judge dismissed the jurisdictional challenge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the respondent had followed through with the hospital's internal dispute resolution process, which concluded with his return to full practice, and therefore he was not required to seek a hearing before the HPARB before commencing his civil action.

The appellants sought to operate a commercial paintball facility in an area zoned as a 'Private Park'.

The motion judge determined that the facility fell under the definition of a 'Place of Recreation' rather than a 'Public Park' or 'Private Park', and thus required a zoning by-law amendment as a new commercial use.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's sensible conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, an aerodrome operator, appealed a decision declaring that a municipal fill by-law applied to its landfill activities.

The appellant argued the by-law was inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because aerodromes fall under federal jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the by-law regulates the quality of fill for environmental protection and does not impermissibly trench on the core of the federal aeronautics power.

The appellants sued the City of Oshawa for negligence, alleging the City incorrectly advised them that no building permit was required for a deck, and subsequently negligently investigated and prosecuted them under the Building Code Act.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the City acted reasonably.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming the trial judge applied the correct standard of care for negligent investigation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the trial judge's award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the appellants' conduct was not reprehensible.

The appellant operated a property management business and appeared before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of property owners without a paralegal license.

The Law Society obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting him from providing legal services.

On appeal, the appellant argued he was a 'landlord' under the Residential Tenancies Act and thus entitled to self-represent.

The Court of Appeal held that even if he met the definition of a landlord, he was providing legal services to third parties and had no right to self-represent under the Law Society Act.

The appeal was dismissed, but the injunction was narrowed to allow him to appear before the board only when he is the actual owner of the property.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order under the Extradition Act.

The applicant conceded that the Minister applied the correct principles regarding sections 7 and 6(1) of the Charter and section 44 of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the Minister's surrender decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The appellant, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, appealed a Divisional Court order requiring it to produce a comprehensive record of proceedings under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA) after screening out the respondent's police complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that the Director's decision to screen out a complaint under the Police Services Act is the exercise of a statutory power of decision, as it decides a complainant's legal right to have their complaint pursued.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Divisional Court's order regarding the contents of the record was overly broad, and substituted a narrower requirement for the record of proceedings.

The appellant municipality appealed a no-fault remediation order issued by the Ministry of the Environment under s. 157.1 of the Environmental Protection Act following a fuel oil spill that migrated onto municipal property.

The appellant sought to introduce evidence before the Environmental Review Tribunal to prove that others were at fault for the spill, relying on the 'polluter pays' principle.

The Tribunal excluded this evidence as irrelevant to the environmental protection objective of the Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Tribunal's decision, confirming that evidence of third-party fault is irrelevant to whether a no-fault order should be revoked.

The appellant, operator of an adult entertainment parlour, appealed a decision upholding the validity of a municipal by-law requiring licenses for adult live entertainment parlours and their entertainers.

The appellant argued the by-law exceeded the municipality's statutory authority under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the licensing provisions were a valid exercise of the municipality's general licensing powers regarding health, safety, and well-being, as well as its specific statutory business licensing authority.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing he faced a serious risk of torture if returned to Arkansas due to solitary confinement and potential sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision to extradite without assurances was not unreasonable as the applicant presented no evidence to support his claims.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application seeking removal of his name from the provincial sex offender registry.

The Court of Appeal held that the Criminal Proceedings Rules do not apply to a provincial registry maintained under provincial law.

The application should have been made to the Divisional Court under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The judge below lacked jurisdiction, so his decision was quashed, and the appeal was also quashed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several offences including assaulting police officers, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Board had ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit, rejecting a joint request by the appellant and the hospital for a hybrid order that would allow discretion to transfer him to a general unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was supported by evidence of the appellant's continuing behavioural issues and risk to public safety, and that the Board properly applied the least onerous and least restrictive test.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the respondent's proposal to increase the occupancy of townhouse units to seven students, each with individual leases, did not constitute a boarding, lodging or rooming house under the Building Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed use provided lodging for more than four persons in return for remuneration, thereby meeting the definition under the Building Code.

The units as constructed could not accommodate the increase without violating fire exit requirements.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order regarding their compliance with a municipal by-law.

The sole issue on appeal was whether a chain link fence could be considered a 'principal structure' under section 5.16.6 of the by-law.

The Court of Appeal held that, reading the by-law as a whole, a principal structure must have a wall, and a chain link fence does not constitute a wall.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.