Administrative Law - OCA

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's dismissal of his Charter application, in which he sought a recommendation that the Justice Minister award him $35 million in damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming its previous decision in Re Starz that the ORB has no jurisdiction to award or recommend damages.

The appellant, who was previously found NCRMD, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At the outset of his review hearing, the appellant objected to being addressed by his legal name and to the constitution of the Board.

The Chair gave the appellant a five-second ultimatum before cutting off his audio and video feed, proceeding with the hearing in his absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Chair acted precipitously and failed to exercise the judicial patience and restraint required under section 672.5(10)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code before excluding an accused from a hearing.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The appellant doctor appealed a Superior Court decision that reversed a Consent and Capacity Board finding that the respondent was incapable of consenting to proposed psychiatric treatment.

Following the commencement of the appeal, the respondent's NCR verdict was overturned, he was discharged from the facility, and the proposed treatment was never commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case as a decision would have no practical effect on the parties and the appellant's concerns regarding a prior capable wish could be addressed under section 36 of the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant moved for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her Judicial Review Application for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant had sought $1,800,000 in damages in her application.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to grant such relief under section 2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party, a chiropractor, sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that upheld findings of professional misconduct and a costs award against him.

The Court of Appeal applied the test for extending time, focusing on the merits of the proposed appeal.

Finding that the proposed appeals regarding costs, liability, and penalty lacked merit and did not raise an arguable question of law or matter of public importance, the court dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

The City of Hamilton appealed a decision declaring its equipment installation by-law inoperative against Canada Post's installation of community mailboxes.

The by-law imposed a moratorium and permit fees on Canada Post.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law's pith and substance—regulating municipal rights of way—was within provincial jurisdiction, it conflicted with the federal purpose of the Canada Post Corporation Act and its regulations, which grant Canada Post sole decision-making power over the location of mail receptacles.

The appeal was dismissed under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellants, environmental groups, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their judicial review application challenging the vires of O. Reg. 176/13 under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The regulation provided exemptions from the Act's prohibitions.

The appellants argued the Minister failed to meet a statutory condition precedent by not considering the effect of the regulation on each individual species, and that the regulation's purpose was inconsistent with the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Minister properly considered the effect on each species and the regulation was not inconsistent with the Act's purpose.

The appellant municipality appealed a summary judgment finding it owed a duty of care to a class of tenants to provide statutory notices of rent reductions following property tax decreases.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the municipality's specific interactions with the tenants through a pilot project created sufficient relational proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care.

The court further found no residual policy reasons to negate this duty, as the claim was limited to a specific group and did not conflict with the municipality's statutory obligations.

The municipality's failure to send the required notices breached the standard of care.

The appellant police officer was dismissed for unsatisfactory work performance after a hearing officer found the police service's ad hoc performance evaluation procedures were sufficient despite deviating from mandatory policies.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the officer's appeal, finding the strict application of the performance review policies was a mandatory precondition under O. Reg. 268/10.

The Divisional Court set aside the Commission's decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the officer's appeal and restored the Commission's decision, holding that the Commission's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to France for attempted murder.

The applicant argued that the Minister lacked authority to order surrender for attempted murder because the Authority to Proceed was limited to aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable and that the Minister is not required to align the surrender offence with the offence listed in the Authority to Proceed.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for index offences in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that concluded he constituted a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordered his continued detention without community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to address conflicts and ambiguities in the expert evidence regarding whether the appellant posed a significant threat, particularly given his lack of violent offences since 2003.

The matter was returned to the Board for a fresh determination.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the respondent College declaratory and injunctive relief for unauthorized practice and unauthorized use of protected titles.

The appellants argued that the language proficiency requirement in the Registration Regulation was discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants were barred from advancing the constitutional argument due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, as the same issue had been previously decided against them by the Divisional Court.

The respondent physician commenced an action for loss of income after his hospital privileges were temporarily restricted following an incident in the operating room.

The appellant hospital and doctors brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had not first proceeded to a hearing before the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) under the Public Hospitals Act.

The motion judge dismissed the jurisdictional challenge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the respondent had followed through with the hospital's internal dispute resolution process, which concluded with his return to full practice, and therefore he was not required to seek a hearing before the HPARB before commencing his civil action.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Following a deterioration in his mental state, he was readmitted to a secure forensic assessment unit.

The Ontario Review Board held a restriction of liberty hearing and found that his continued detention without usual privileges violated his s. 7 Charter rights, ordering the hospital to pay costs under s. 24(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal, holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the detention met the least onerous and least restrictive standard, and the Board lacked jurisdiction to award costs as a Charter remedy.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At his annual review hearing, all parties presented a joint submission to continue his previous disposition, which included unaccompanied privileges.

The Board rejected the joint submission and imposed a more restrictive disposition without giving the parties notice of its intention to do so.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to give the appellant notice that it was inclined to reject the joint submission and an opportunity to lead further evidence or make additional submissions.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside an Environmental Review Tribunal's revocation of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind farm project.

The Tribunal had found the project would cause serious and irreversible harm to the Blanding's turtle due to increased road mortality.

The Court of Appeal held the Divisional Court erred in its standard of review application, finding the Tribunal's decision on serious and irreversible harm was reasonable despite lacking precise numerical data.

However, the Court of Appeal agreed the Tribunal erred in revoking the approval without allowing the parties to make submissions on the appropriate remedy.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to determine the remedy.

The applicant, a permanent resident detained as a flight risk and danger to the public under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

Pending the appeal, he brought a motion for a stay of any potential future deportation order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it premature as no deportation order had yet been made, and holding that the appeal did not raise a serious issue to be tried because the IRPA provides a complete and comprehensive scheme for reviewing detention.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the Law Society of Upper Canada and its investigator for defamation based on emails sent to victim institutions during an investigation into mortgage fraud.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding the communications were protected by absolute privilege.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 9 of the Law Society Act superseded the common law defence of absolute privilege and that the privilege did not apply in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 9 supplements rather than ousts the common law, and that the investigator's communications were protected by absolute privilege as they were made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding.