Louise Talbot v. Jeffrey Nourse et al., 2019 ONCA 436

Case Summary

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a contract dispute with the respondent. The appellants raised two main issues: first, whether the "common employer" issue constituted a different cause of action triggering a Limitations Act defence; and second, whether the trial judge erred in finding that Mr. Nourse had authority to bind the appellants to the contract with the respondent. The Court of Appeal found that while the common employer issue raised pleading concerns, the trial judge's finding that the appellant had notice of the claim at least six weeks before trial meant any pleading deficiencies caused no prejudice. The Court also deferred to the trial judge's factual finding regarding Mr. Nourse's authority to bind the appellants, which was supported by the evidence. The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2019-05-24 Docket: C65175

Judges: Doherty, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.

Between

Louise Talbot Plaintiff (Respondent)

and

Jeffrey Nourse, 2255588 Ontario Inc. and 2207500 Ontario Inc. Defendants (Appellant)

Counsel

Warren S. Rapoport, for the appellant

Kenneth Alexander and Kristopher Stone, for the respondent

Hearing and Appeal

Heard: May 22, 2019

On appeal from: the judgment of Justice Koehnen of the Superior Court of Justice, dated February 21, 2018.

Appeal Book Endorsement

[1] In our view, the "common employer" issue does not raise a different cause of action, thereby engaging a Limitations Act defence. It does raise pleading issues. However, in light of the trial judge's finding that the appellant had notice of the nature of the claim at least six weeks before trial, we are not convinced that any deficiencies in the pleadings caused any prejudice to the appellant.

[2] The appellant also argues that the trial judge erred in finding that Mr. Nourse had authority to bind the appellant to the contract with Ms. Talbot. This is a factual question. The trial judge addressed the question in his reasons, at paras. 145-51. In our view, his factual finding, at para. 150, is supported by the evidence. We defer to that finding.

[3] The appeal is dismissed.

[4] Costs to the respondent in the amount of $10,000, "all in".