OCA 2016

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding equalization, spousal support, and vesting orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of an alleged debt to the appellant's brother or the imputation of income for spousal support.

The Court upheld the vesting of two condominiums in the respondent as security for the equalization and support owed, and provided directions for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment in 2008, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention order.

He argued the Board erred in law by equating the harm of criminal harassment with a 'significant threat to the safety of the public' under s. 672.5401 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not focus solely on the index offence but considered all evidence, including the likelihood that the appellant would discontinue medication and engage in physical and aggressive behaviour.

The Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat was reasonable.

The appellant settled a tort claim arising from a motor vehicle accident on the advice of her former lawyer.

Years later, after retaining new counsel for her statutory accident benefits claim, she obtained a psychiatric report indicating her injuries met the catastrophic impairment threshold.

Her new counsel advised her to sue her former lawyer for recommending an improvident settlement.

The former lawyer successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discoverable until the appellant received legal advice that the settlement was improvident, as her former lawyer had never advised her of any error.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim and granting judgment to the respondent on two mortgages.

The appellants argued the summary judgment violated res judicata because a previous motion for summary judgment in the original action had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge was entitled to conduct a mini-trial under the new Hryniak framework, and that changes in pleadings and law meant the second motion was not inconsistent with the first.

The appellant doctor appealed a decision dismissing his summary judgment motion to dismiss the respondent's medical malpractice action as statute-barred.

The respondent suffered severe complications following breast reduction surgery, and the appellant continued to perform ameliorative surgeries for over a year.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the respondent did not know that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy until the ameliorative treatments concluded.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, General Motors dealers in the Greater Toronto Area, sued GMCL and its US parent company, GM US, alleging breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under the Arthur Wishart Act and at common law.

The motion judge struck the claim against GM US under Rule 21, finding it was neither a party to the franchise agreement nor a franchisor's associate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the determination of whether GM US was a franchisor's associate or owed a duty of fair dealing required a full factual record and should not be dismissed at the pleadings stage.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that directed his detention at a mental health facility, revoking his prior conditional discharge.

The appellant had been returned to the facility after being charged with criminal harassment, which was resolved by a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was reasonable, given his diagnosis, lack of insight, and recent negative interactions.

The Court also upheld the detention order, noting the appellant's lack of stable housing and employment prospects, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing the terms of a settlement of his action against the respondents.

The appellant had made a written offer to withdraw his claim, which the respondents accepted.

The appellant later claimed he had withdrawn the offer before acceptance and demanded an apology.

The motion judge found the offer was not clearly and unequivocally withdrawn and enforced the settlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding the offer was validly accepted and binding, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent for unpaid structural consulting services.

The motion judge's endorsement merely stated that there was no genuine issue for trial, without providing any factual findings or legal analysis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reasons were so deficient that they did not permit meaningful appellate review.

The court declined to decide the summary judgment motion itself due to unresolved factual disputes and directed the parties to seek an expedited hearing on the merits.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted to the respondent for unpaid invoices on a construction project.

The appellant argued it was entitled to set-off monies related to alleged deficiencies on unrelated projects under s. 12 of the Construction Lien Act or by way of equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 12 did not apply because no trust funds were retained, and equitable set-off was unavailable because the projects were entirely separate and unrelated.

The appellants (lawyers) appealed a judgment finding that they had agreed to represent the respondent on a pro bono basis and ordering them to repay funds improperly applied to legal fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge made no errors in allowing the matter to proceed by application, in finding that the retainer was pro bono, or in resolving ambiguity in the retainer in favour of the client.

The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the application judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant wife appealed an order granting her an equalization payment of $60,000 following a short marriage with less than five years of cohabitation.

She argued the motion judge erred by not adopting a mathematical formula for unequal division and by misstating her alternative position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge was not required to use a mathematical formula and properly applied s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act to determine that equal division would be unconscionable based on the parties' respective contributions.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible due to schizophrenia, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that changed his status from a conditional discharge to a detention order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's refusal to grant an absolute discharge, as the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the detention order, finding the Board failed to adequately explain why a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given the appellant's compliance with previous conditions.

The conditional discharge was reinstated.

The appellant appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two reversible errors: drawing an adverse inference from the appellant's pre-trial silence, and using a co-accused's guilty plea to corroborate the complainant's evidence.

Given that the case turned on credibility, these errors were fatal to the conviction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to produce an affidavit of documents.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the order was purportedly made under Rule 76, despite the litigation continuing under the ordinary procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order did not refer to Rule 76, and even if it had, it would be a mere technical irregularity that did not deprive the motion judge of jurisdiction.

The appellant brought motions to review an order denying an extension of time to appeal a stay of proceedings, and appealed a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions and the appeal, finding that the underlying stay order was interlocutory and that the costs orders were reasonable exercises of discretion.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal two orders in a high-conflict matrimonial proceeding: an order striking his pleadings for failure to pay costs, and a subsequent final order from an uncontested trial.

The moving party argued that as a self-represented litigant, he did not understand the implications of the order striking his pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party had a lawyer present when the consequences were discussed, failed to move promptly after learning of the final order, and failed to demonstrate that the final order resulted in any real injustice or substantive errors.

The respondent sold a marina to the appellant, who subsequently defaulted on payments.

The parties entered into Minutes of Settlement, which the appellant also breached.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment.

The appellant appealed, arguing she was entitled to a set-off for snow storm damage that occurred while the respondent remained in possession, claiming he owed a duty as a mortgagee in possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty to maintain or insure the property was pleaded or established in the Minutes of Settlement.

The parties, who are brothers, entered into a Share Purchase and Sale Agreement to resolve an oppression application.

The appellants defaulted on the monthly installment payments.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking either enforcement of a purported settlement agreement or the full amount owing under the Share Purchase and Sale Agreement.

The motion judge found no binding settlement but awarded the full amount owing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in accelerating the debt in the absence of an acceleration clause in the agreement.

The cross-appeal regarding the settlement was dismissed, as the correspondence showed material terms remained unresolved.

The accused was acquitted of sexual offences involving two underage girls after the trial judge found he had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain their ages under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his application of the mistake of age defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly identified and applied the legal principles, and that it was open to him to conclude that a reasonable person would not have made further inquiries given the compelling indicia of age presented by the complainants.