OCA 2015

The appellant purchased a pre-construction commercial condominium unit and later discovered a large concrete pillar bisecting the glass storefront.

He refused to close and sought rescission, arguing the pillar was an undisclosed material change under the Condominium Act because the draft plans depicted the storefront as a straight line.

The trial judge found no material change, as the straight line did not represent construction materials.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the plans were schematic and not intended to provide structural details.

Following an appeal, the court received written costs submissions.

The appellant had made an assignment in bankruptcy.

Adopting the joint submissions of the respondent and the appellant's trustee in bankruptcy, the court ordered costs of $15,000 in favour of the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claim against the respondent.

The corporate appellant's claim was struck because its corporate charter had been revoked when the action was commenced, making it a nullity, and the limitation period expired before it was revived.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the individual appellants' claims, finding that the motion judge erred by striking the entire action based on an improper post-hearing communication from the respondent's counsel without giving the appellants an opportunity to make submissions.

The appellant estate appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim against the respondent for occupation rent and nursing care expenses.

The estate alleged the respondent unlawfully refused to allow the deceased to return to the matrimonial home after a hospitalization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no evidence of an unlawful refusal; rather, the respondent, due to her own advanced age and frail health, was simply unable to provide the necessary care.

Furthermore, the claim for medical expenses was barred by the parties' marriage contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants' action was administratively dismissed for delay after their solicitors failed to receive a status notice sent to the wrong address.

The motion judge refused to set aside the dismissal, finding the appellants failed to adequately explain the delay or prove a lack of prejudice to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the action, holding that the motion judge failed to give sufficient weight to the non-receipt of the status notice and erred in his assessment of prejudice by ignoring the respondent's own passivity in the litigation.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against a grocery store after the deceased was struck by another customer's overloaded shopping cart.

The appellants argued the store's safety policies were inadequate and that employees failed to intervene despite seeing the hazard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the store's general safety policy was reasonable and did not require a standard of perfection.

The court also found it was reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that the store employees did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene in the seconds before the tragic accident occurred.

A mother transferred her family home into joint tenancy with her daughter and executed a will directing that her share of the property go to the daughter on the condition that she pay bequests to her grandchildren.

After the mother's death, the daughter sold the property and kept the proceeds, claiming right of survivorship.

The grandchildren challenged the daughter's actions.

The Court of Appeal held that the presumption of resulting trust was not rebutted because the mother intended the property to be used to fund the bequests after her death.

The property therefore formed part of the estate, and the daughter's failure to pay the bequests was a breach of trust.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent landlord for negligence after a fire damaged its leased premises.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no evidence of the landlord's negligence and holding that expert evidence was required to prove causation.

On appeal, the appellant argued that common sense inferences and the landlord's spoliation of evidence (destroying a space heater) should suffice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that expert evidence was necessary given the technical nature of the building's electrical system, and noting that an adverse inference from spoliation cannot serve as positive proof of negligence.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm found under his passenger seat during a traffic stop.

He appealed, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights, was racially motivated, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the trial judge reasonably concluded there was no racial bias, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a weapon and assaulting his adult son, and was sentenced to 25 days in jail.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were equivocal, involuntary, and uninformed due to stress, lack of sleep, and a misunderstanding of the appeal process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a proper plea comprehension inquiry, the appellant made unequivocal admissions of guilt, and his ability to make a conscious choice was not impaired.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related kidnapping and robbery.

At trial, two key Crown witnesses recanted their prior statements inculpating the appellants.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework but refused to allow defence counsel to cross-examine one of the witnesses on her statement after it was admitted.

The trial judge also admitted the entire transcript of a co-accused's guilty plea proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by denying the defence the right to cross-examine the witness on her prior statement and by admitting the guilty plea proceedings where cross-examination was limited by solicitor-client privilege and the statement contained inadmissible hearsay.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their personal injury claim against the Toronto Transit Commission after a slip and fall at a transit station.

The motion judge found no objective evidence of a hazard on the stairs and concluded the TTC met its statutory duty of care as an occupier.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test or his reliance on the uncontradicted evidence regarding the condition of the stairs and the TTC's maintenance practices.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her insurer for caregiver benefits and extra-contractual damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding it was statute-barred because it was commenced more than two years after the insurer's clear refusal to pay benefits.

The trial judge also found the appellant failed to establish entitlement to caregiver benefits beyond the 104-week period and dismissed her claims for bad faith and mental distress.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, including his evidentiary ruling that medical reports in a document brief not referred to by witnesses were inadmissible for the truth of their contents.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his claim and awarding $48,000 in costs to the respondent.

The dismissal resulted from the appellant's persistent and deliberate failure to comply with court orders regarding disclosure and production obligations.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere, noting the appellant's repeated flouting of court orders and failure to comply with a 'last chance' order.

The court rejected the suggestion that the self-represented appellant was treated unfairly, noting he had threatened opposing counsel with death.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of her appeal and sought a fourth adjournment due to alleged dental pain.

The court refused the adjournment, noting the appellant's history of delaying the litigation, the lack of medical evidence regarding her inability to proceed, and the prejudice to the respondent who had been carrying the costs of caring for their elderly mother.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action for long-term disability benefits.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis of a contractual one-year limitation period, failure to meet qualifying conditions, and the statutory two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in relying on the contractual limitation period without making necessary findings under section 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal because the appellant failed to meet the policy's qualifying conditions and her action was barred by the statutory two-year limitation period.

The appellant, a former probationary employee of the National Research Council, brought a defamation action against his former employer and colleagues regarding statements made in a 'Release on Probation' document.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding it was barred by the grievance scheme under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, lacked evidence of defamation, and was protected by qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim for professional negligence and medical malpractice against several dental surgeons.

The motion judge found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant commenced the action nearly five years after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's own pleadings and correspondence contradicted her argument that she did not discover her claim in 2006, and there was no basis to grant leave to amend a statute-barred claim.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and extortion against an employee.

He appealed the convictions, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper, the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial after a courtroom interruption, and the trial judge erred in preventing the jury from questioning a DNA expert.

He also appealed his 27-month sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on the victim impact statement as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice in the cross-examination, no error in the trial judge's discretionary rulings, and no error in principle regarding the sentence.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a motion judge's decision that allowed an Ontario supervisory judge to sit outside the province with judges from British Columbia and Quebec to hear motions regarding a national class action settlement, without requiring a video link to an Ontario courtroom.

The Court of Appeal held that while superior courts have the inherent jurisdiction to conduct hearings outside their home province, the open court principle under section 135 of the Courts of Justice Act requires a video link to a reasonably accessible Ontario courtroom.

The appeal was allowed to amend the order to require a video link.