OCA 2007

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, challenging the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence regarding corporate costs, work orders, and profit margins.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient documentary evidence filed at trial to support the respondent's claim and the trial judge's findings.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning a property boundary and adverse possession dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the boundary issue, properly accepted the respondents' expert evidence, and made no reversible error regarding adverse possession.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual exploitation involving teenage complainants, arguing the trial judge misdirected himself on the meaning of a position of trust and improperly relied on evidence said to be tainted by collusion and police pressure.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge correctly applied the governing authorities under s. 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and was entitled to find a relationship of trust based on the appellant's close involvement with the family and the entrusted care of the young persons.

The court also held that the trial judge was not required to reject all impugned evidence and that the convictions rested largely on unchallenged evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant builder appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to stay a negligence claim in favour of arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the arbitration clause did not encompass claims in negligence.

Furthermore, because the homeowner's claim involved other parties not bound by the arbitration agreement, the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under s. 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to refuse a partial stay to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

Under s. 7(6) of the Act, this discretionary decision was unappealable.

The appellant was wrongfully convicted of first-degree murder of his four-year-old niece in 1993 based on flawed pathology evidence.

Following a reference by the Minister of Justice, the Court of Appeal heard fresh expert evidence conclusively demonstrating that the deceased was neither sexually assaulted nor murdered, and that the trial experts were wrong.

The Court admitted the fresh evidence, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal, but declined to issue a formal declaration of factual innocence, holding that Canadian law does not recognize such a verdict.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment decision finding it failed to comply with s. 64(14) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule when terminating the respondent's benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly assessed the issue of compliance.

The Court also upheld the award of compound interest under s. 68 of the Schedule, finding no unusual circumstances to justify a different conclusion.

The self-represented appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's reasons regarding both the motions and the final disposition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how his alcohol consumption related to the issue of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that alcohol consumption was a minor feature of the defence's case, which primarily relied on expert evidence regarding a major depressive episode.

The court found that the trial judge had referred to the alcohol evidence several times in the charge, and the lack of objection from experienced trial counsel indicated the instructions were fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault, arguing that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to provide adequate reasons and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court judge's reasons were adequate and permitted effective appellate review.

The Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the complainant's prior statements, and the use of confirmatory evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and leave to appeal the sentence was refused.

The appellant appealed from an order committing him for trial on first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed him on the basis of liability for murder through s. 21(2) and first degree murder through s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued these sections could not be combined to found liability for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if combining the sections was an error of law, there was an evidentiary basis to commit for first degree murder through the combined effect of aiding and abetting and s. 231(5).

The court found evidence that the appellant aided and abetted in two murders committed by his co-accused during a robbery and forcible confinement, and that his actions passed the causation threshold in R. v. Harbottle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the Crown's late disclosure that a co-occupant of the searched premises was incarcerated at the time of the search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that defence counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to challenge the search warrant based on the information available, and the late disclosure did not affect trial fairness.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the trial judge's use of documentary evidence and an error regarding unanalyzed drug residue, concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a finding by the trial judge that he was unfit to stand trial.

The trial judge's finding was based on the appellant's delusional thinking, which caused him to disavow his legal name and believe he had no role in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant understood the nature of court proceedings and indicated he would defend the case if the Information were amended to his preferred name.

However, the Court concluded that amending the Information was a matter for the authorities and found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's finding of unfitness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing 5.9 kilograms of opium into Canada and sentenced to five-and-a-half years' incarceration.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting opinion evidence from RCMP officers, misdirected the jury on wilful blindness, and failed to adequately explain the knowledge requirement.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice from the officers' testimony and concluding the jury instructions on wilful blindness and knowledge were sufficient.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the large quantity of drugs involved.

The appellants appealed an order permitting the respondents to amend their statement of claim to increase the prayer for relief, but denying the appellants the right to deliver a jury notice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the discretionary decision concerning terms imposed on the amendment of pleadings constitutes an interlocutory order, over which the court has no jurisdiction.

The appellant, who was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury, appealed his sentence of two years less a day incarceration and three years probation.

He was sentenced as an adult but ordered to serve his sentence in a youth facility.

The appellant argued the sentence was unfit, the trial judge failed to consider his immaturity under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, erred in treating psychiatric evidence, and failed to give enhanced credit for three years of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the adult sentence was fit and balanced.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum and correction to a previous endorsement.

The original endorsement mistakenly stated that the appeal was allowed, when the court intended to dismiss the appeal because the underlying Rule 21 motion involved questions of fact requiring evidence.

The court amended the endorsement to dismiss both the appeal and the motion, with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly treated the trial as a credibility contest and engaged in improper propensity reasoning based on the appellant's criminal record, contrary to the requirements of R. v. W.D. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding sole custody of a child to the respondent with generous access to the appellant.

The appellant argued that the reasons of the trial judge and the Superior Court appeal judge were purely conclusory and tautological.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately assessed the parenting skills and plans of the parties, and correctly concluded that joint custody was not workable due to the parties' lack of cooperation.

The court also upheld the Superior Court judge's costs award.

The Crown appealed a 15-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for four counts of abduction in contravention of a custody order, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include punitive conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a conditional sentence must generally include punitive terms such as house arrest or a curfew.

However, because the respondent had served six weeks of pre-trial custody, faced punitive terms for related passport offences, and had already served a significant portion of the conditional sentence, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the application judge erred in applying the Miglin test and that there was inadequate disclosure by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge properly applied the Miglin test.

The Court also held that the respondents made proper documentary disclosure, and the appellant's failure to review the documents or seek legal advice did not render the disclosure inadequate.