OCA 2006

The appellant was convicted by a jury of selling imported liquor, smuggling spirits, possession of property obtained by crime, and trafficking in cocaine following an undercover investigation.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by discharging a juror for internal strife, giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction, excluding him from an in camera stay proceeding, failing to properly instruct on reasonable doubt, and failing to leave an 'agent for the purchaser' defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion under s. 644 of the Criminal Code to discharge the juror and made no reversible errors in her instructions or procedural rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-month custodial sentence was fit for the offences.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its earlier reasons to address the disposition of monies paid as security for costs and the costs of earlier motions.

The Court directed that monies held in the respondent's solicitor's trust account be released to the Family Responsibility Office to credit the appellant's child support obligations.

Monies paid to the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice were ordered paid out to the appellant's counsel in trust.

The Court also ordered no costs for the appellant's motion for an extension of time or the respondent's motion for security for costs.

The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside its order denying Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. a rate increase for certain transportation costs.

The Divisional Court had found that the OEB erred in law by improperly using hindsight in its 'prudence' review of Enbridge's contracts.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the OEB's order, holding that when read as a whole, the OEB's reasons did not demonstrate a misuse of hindsight or legal error.

The Court also confirmed the OEB had standing to appeal the Divisional Court's decision.

The appellant appealed a two-year sentence imposed following guilty pleas to drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The sentence was based on a joint submission.

The appellant sought a one-day reduction in his sentence to avoid the prohibition under s. 64 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act against appealing a deportation order for permanent residents sentenced to at least two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the immigration consequences were not considered at sentencing and that a one-day reduction would not detract from the fitness of the sentence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation and awarding damages to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and damages in favour of one respondent, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the law of justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, and malice.

The Court also upheld the liability and damages against one appellant in favour of the second respondent regarding untrue statements made to a reporter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the appellant's wife, finding she was not jointly liable for her husband's defamatory statements as she did not participate in making them to the reporter.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding an enforceable buy/sell agreement for shares at a pre-determined price of $500,000.

The appellants also appealed the dismissal of claims for oppression, wrongful dismissal, and an outstanding shareholder loan.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, noting the decision was fact-driven and supported by evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for a conditional sentence and imposed a $5,000 fine.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the fine manifestly unfit and holding that the sentencing judge misunderstood the principles of conditional sentencing and failed to justify departing from the joint submission.

The sentence was varied to add an 18-month conditional sentence to the fine.

The appellant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a sentence of 10 months' imprisonment plus 12 months' probation.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed 21 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explain how the joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as required by Cerasuolo.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted the jointly proposed sentence.

The insurer appealed an order requiring it to indemnify the insured general contractors under two Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies for the cost of repairing structural defects in new homes caused by defective concrete supplied by a subcontractor.

The insurer argued that CGL policies inherently do not cover an insured's own defective work or product.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly focused on the specific language of the policies rather than general insurance principles.

The policies contained an explicit exception to the defective work exclusion for work performed by a subcontractor, which operated to restore coverage.

The appellant appealed the extradition judge's dismissal of two preliminary stay applications and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The stay applications alleged abuse of process due to political or religious motivation and challenged the certification of the Record of the Case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the extradition judge correctly held that political motivation allegations are for the Minister to consider at the surrender stage, and that certification concerns related to reliability rather than admissibility.

The application for judicial review was also dismissed, as the Minister reasonably concluded there was no general policy of neglect for due process in the requesting state and no factual basis to suggest extradition was sought for an improper purpose.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge gave the appellant an enhanced credit of seven years for five years and three months of pre-sentence custody, effectively applying a 1.33-for-1 ratio instead of the usual 2-for-1 credit.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the judge erred by departing from the 2-for-1 practice without adequate explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's reasons clearly indicated the appellant posed a serious danger to society and was unlikely to receive early parole, which justified the departure from the normal practice.

The Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals brought a motion to quash an appeal by the appellant from a Superior Court decision under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.

The Society argued that because the Act states the judge's decision is 'final', no further appeal lies and the appellant must proceed by judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the word 'final' does not oust the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Courts of Justice Act, and the decision is appealable as a final order of a Superior Court judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of his stepdaughter.

At trial, the Crown called a clinical and forensic psychologist to address frailties in the complainant's evidence, including delayed disclosure and memory issues.

The trial judge relied heavily on this expert opinion to find the complainant credible.

However, the tape of the expert's cross-examination was lost before it could be transcribed.

The Court of Appeal held that the missing transcript prevented a proper assessment of whether the trial judge erred in her use of the expert evidence, raising serious concerns about the safety of the verdict.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, which was based on the eyewitness identification of a police officer who identified him from a single photograph.

The Court of Appeal held that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by focusing solely on the officer's credibility without addressing the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification or expressly considering whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the identification.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

Due to recent developments, the appeal became moot.

The Crown abandoned the appeal, and it was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving two child victims.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two errors regarding the burden of proof: first, by treating the absence of a finding that the complainant lied as sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and second, by improperly relying on the complainant's subsequent conviction for sexual assault as corroboration.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after attacking a young woman in her bed at night, causing severe injuries.

He was sentenced to two years and three months in the penitentiary.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the serious circumstances of the attack and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice refusing to extend the time for compliance with a previous court order.

The Court of Appeal found no ground to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal without costs.

Following the release of the court's reasons, the respondent requested that the court address an argument from their factum to strike out allegations concerning duties owed to a non-party.

The Court of Appeal declined to do so, noting that the motions judge was not asked to strike out those allegations, nor was the court asked to do so during oral argument.

The focus of the appeal remained on whether a duty of care was owed to the plaintiffs.

The appellant, a university student, was suspended by the President of York University for alleged misconduct without a hearing.

The appellant sued the President and the University, pleading misfeasance in a public office.

The defendants successfully moved to strike the claim on the basis that the President was not a public officer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that the tort of misfeasance in a public office is restricted to public officers subject to the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and the claim was permitted to proceed.