OCA 2006

The parties, former accounting partners, entered into an arbitration agreement to resolve a dispute over the final accounting for the winding-up of their partnership.

The respondent later commenced a court action regarding the same issues, arguing the arbitration agreement was invalid due to a lack of consensus ad idem.

The motion judge agreed and refused to stay the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the arbitration agreement was clear, unambiguous, and validly executed with the assistance of counsel.

The court held that none of the exceptions in s. 7(2) of the Arbitration Act applied, and therefore a stay of the court proceeding was mandatory under s. 7(1).

The appeal was allowed and the action stayed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a custody application and a family adoption application, as well as the granting of a restraining order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the Child and Family Services Act precluded the custody application and that the Crown wardship order and adoption placement precluded the family adoption application.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a bookkeeper, stole over $300,000 from her employer over three years to fund a gambling addiction linked to post-traumatic stress disorder.

She appealed her 16-month custodial sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to her mental health diagnoses and erred in not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately balanced the appellant's rehabilitation and mental health with the need for denunciation.

The appellant and respondent entered into a separation agreement where the respondent agreed to buy the appellant's interest in the matrimonial home for $225,000.

The respondent paid $100,000 but went bankrupt before paying the remaining $125,000.

The appellant sought to characterize the remaining debt as spousal support.

The motion judge refused, finding the agreement clearly characterized the payment as property division.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant was not precluded from bringing a variation motion on proper materials.

The appellants sought to amend their statement of claim during a summary judgment motion to raise a new cause of action against opposing counsel.

The motion judge denied leave, finding the amendments disclosed no tenable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a lawyer generally owes no duty of care to the clients of opposing counsel.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, who had previously pled guilty to fraud, brought two civil actions against the police and others for false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, conspiracy, and abuse of authority.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissals, finding no genuine issue for trial as the respondents acted lawfully, had reasonable and probable grounds for the charges, and there was no evidence to support the appellant's claims.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment regarding spousal support and equalization of matrimonial property.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's failure to contest the original motion was adequately explained by her being paralyzed by depression, contrary to her counsel's characterization before the motion judge.

Additionally, fresh evidence indicated the respondent had died.

The appeal was allowed, the default judgment set aside, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh determination.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued that the respondents lacked status as undischarged bankrupts, that the judge erred in refusing an adjournment, and that the evidence did not support the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the relief sought was personal, the procedural orders were discretionary, and there was abundant evidence of the appellant persistently instituting vexatious litigation and leaving costs orders unpaid.

The appellant gas distributor sought to recover unrecorded gas costs, regulatory costs, and interest charges resulting from an accounting error.

The Ontario Energy Board allowed the recovery of the unrecorded costs deferred over three years but denied the recovery of regulatory costs and interest charges.

The Court of Appeal determined the applicable standard of review was reasonableness and upheld the Board's decision, finding it was open to the Board to balance the utility's right to recover prudently incurred costs against the impact on consumers caused by the utility's own accounting error.

The appellant municipality entered into an agreement to sell surplus land to the respondent developer but failed to give public notice of the proposed sale as required by s. 268(3)(c) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

When the municipality refused to close the transaction due to a zoning dispute, the developer sued for breach of contract.

The municipality argued the agreement was void because of its own failure to provide the statutory notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statute requires notice to be given before a binding agreement is signed, the failure to do so did not render the contract void or unenforceable, as the statute does not expressly invalidate such contracts and public policy does not favour voiding contracts for technical deficiencies.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict granting judgment to the respondent for $35,126 for prepaid telephone cards and implicitly dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the main action but allowed the appeal in part regarding the counterclaim for slander.

The Court found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the concepts of general, special, and nominal damages for slander, and that proof of special damages is not essential when the slander concerns the appellant's business.

A new trial was ordered for the counterclaim for defamation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding costs in the form of damages and substantial indemnity costs against Westmont.

The Court of Appeal set aside the award of costs as damages due to lack of specificity in the pleadings.

The Court upheld the substantial indemnity costs for the main claim under Rule 49.10, but found that Rule 49 should not apply to the counterclaim against Westmont, as it was not a party to the counterclaim.

The costs award was apportioned and reduced to $190,000.

The appellant, a police officer, brought an action against the police association, the police board, and various officers for workplace-related complaints.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute arose from the employment relationship and was governed by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the legislative scheme provides a comprehensive mechanism for resolving such disputes, including the appointment of a conciliation officer under section 123(1) of the Act.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court Judge, which had struck his appeal from a Master's order on the basis that the Master's order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, confirming that the Master's order was interlocutory and that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant developer appealed a decision dismissing its application to declare a municipality's conveyance of access lands to a respondent developer void.

The municipality had transferred a one-foot reserve and four lots dedicated as a public highway to the respondent to provide road access to landlocked development lands.

The Court of Appeal found that the conveyance constituted a 'sale' of 'surplus' land under s. 193 of the Municipal Act.

The municipality failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of s. 193, including passing a procedure by-law and providing public notice.

Furthermore, the by-law passed under s. 297 to stop up the highway lots did not exempt the municipality from public notice requirements.

The appeal was allowed and the conveyance was declared void.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding an enforceable agreement to pay a success fee and assessing damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in finding an agreement and that her assessment of damages, based on factors such as amounts typically paid to investment bankers, time spent, and value added, was reasonable.

The appellants defaulted on a commercial mortgage, prompting the respondent mortgagee to issue a Notice of Sale and accept an offer to purchase the property.

The appellants subsequently obtained a higher offer and sought to enjoin the sale, arguing the Notice of Sale was defective and the accepted offer was improvident.

The application judge declined to enjoin the sale, and the sale closed before the appeal was heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Notice of Sale was reasonable and the mortgagee could not be restrained from exercising its power of sale after entering into a binding agreement in good faith.

The appellant Bank appealed a decision dismissing its application to vary a retroactive vesting order that transferred the husband's interest in the matrimonial home to the respondent wife.

The Bank held writs of seizure and sale against the husband and argued the vesting order unjustly defeated its interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the original judge implicitly based the vesting order on a constructive trust that arose when the wife paid the husband's debts at separation.

Because this equitable interest arose before the Bank obtained its writs, the husband had no interest in the property to which the writs could attach.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for specific performance of a handwritten agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The trial judge had found that the parties were not ad idem and declined to enforce the agreement, despite finding it contained all essential terms and was not unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the executed written agreement was a clear manifestation of mutual assent and that the vendor's uncommunicated reservations did not support a defence of mistake.

Specific performance was ordered.

The applicant, a young person, sought a stay of a placement decision transferring him to the federal adult system pending his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience weighed against a stay, as the trial judge's concerns for the safety of others in the youth system outweighed any potential prejudice to the applicant.