COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
ALLEREX LABORATORY LTD. (Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent by way of cross‑appeal) – and – DEY LABORATORIES L.P. and EM INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, c.o.b. under the firm name and style CENTER LABORATORIES (Defendants/Respondents/Appellants by way of cross‑appeal)
BEFORE:
McMURTRY C.J.O., MACPHERSON and ARMSTRONG JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
John M. Connolly and J. Robert Allan
for the appellant
Brian B. Isaac and Kevin K. Graham
for the respondents
HEARD:
October 5, 2004
RELEASED ORALLY:
October 5, 2004
On appeal from the judgement of Justice Royden J. Kealey of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 2, 2004.
E N D O R S E M E N T
1The appellant, Allerex Laboratory Ltd. (“Allerex”), appeals from the summary judgment of Kealey J. dated February 2, 2004, dismissing Allerex’s claim for damages arising from future sales of EPIPEN products in France. The respondents cross‑appeal, in the event that it is found that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment, and assert that summary judgment should have been granted on several other grounds which were rejected by the motion judge.
The appeal
2The motion judge held that there was no contract between the parties. He concluded that the May 10, 1993 letter was merely an agreement to agree at a later time.
3We do not think that the May 10, 1993 letter is sufficiently clear to permit a definitive determination of its legal category on a motion for summary judgment. The brief letter contains the language of a contract (“this letter will confirm our agreement”). However, it also contains language that suggests that the true contract would follow later (“the contract would run concurrently with the Canadian contract”).
4In light of the ambiguity in the letter, its proper characterization would require evidence at a trial – about the 12‑year history of contractual dealings between the parties, industry practice, and, importantly, the conduct of the parties in the months and years after they signed the letter. Only then could a confident decision be made about whether the letter was a stand‑alone contract or, alternatively, merely presaged a contract to follow later.
The cross‑appeal
5The respondents contend that summary judgment should have been granted on four other grounds:
(1) The May 10, 1993 letter was superceded by a 1997 agreement;
(2) the letter expired upon its own terms prior to any alleged breach by the respondents;
(3) the letter terminated pursuant to an implied termination clause such that there was no breach causing damages; and
(4) the appellant is precluded from claiming any expectation damages since it had failed to mitigate its damages.
6On these issues, the motion judge refused to grant summary judgment. He said: “it seems to me that these suggested grounds . . . cannot be resolved on the basis of uncontentious facts, but require consideration of factual and credibility issues”. We agree.
Disposition
7For the sake of completeness, we would not admit the fresh evidence tendered by the appellant. Nor would we amend the Statement of Claim. These are matters to be resolved in the trial process which will now unfold.
8The appeal is allowed and the cross‑appeal is dismissed. The entire dispute must proceed to trial for a fair resolution. The appellant Allerex is entitled to its costs of the summary judgment fixed at $25,000 and of the appeal fixed at $15,000, both inclusive of disbursements and GST. These figures are arrived at taking into consideration that the respondents are entitled to costs in relation to the appellant’s unsuccessful motion for the admission of fresh evidence.
“McMurtry C.J.O.”
“J. C. MacPherson J.A.”
“R. P. Armstrong J.A.”