OCA 2003

The appellant appealed an order dismissing an application to remove the respondent as executrix and trustee of an estate due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that there was no sufficient conflict, noting the executrix was the only creditor in her capacity as residual beneficiary.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed their sentences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in finding their actions constituted premeditated, planned criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an insufficient basis on the record to support this aggravating circumstance.

Without this finding, the original sentence of a short, sharp term of imprisonment was deemed excessive.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences were varied to time served (9 days) plus probation.

The appellant purchasers entered into Agreements of Purchase and Sale with the respondent vendors to acquire farmlands for a golf course development.

The agreements were conditional on obtaining severance approvals for estate lots to be retained by the vendors.

The purchasers waived this condition and sought to close without the approvals, which the vendors refused.

The trial judge found the waiver clause ambiguous and held that the true intention of the parties required severance approvals prior to closing, declaring the agreements null and void and ordering the deposits forfeited.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation and confirming that the purchasers' failure to perform the contract justified the forfeiture of the deposits.

The appellants were injured when a youth, who had left a residential treatment home operated by the respondent without permission, crashed a stolen car into their house.

Over three years later, the appellants moved to add the respondent as a defendant, alleging negligent supervision.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondent was protected by the six-month limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act and refusing to exercise discretion to add the party due to presumed prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming the respondent was acting as a public authority fulfilling a public duty, and the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the delay.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court of Justice judgment regarding the quantum of support and arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusions as there was no misappreciation of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found him 50% contributorily negligent for his loss, despite also finding the respondent liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding a mortgage life insurance policy.

The appellant argued that a finding of negligent misrepresentation, which requires reasonable reliance, precludes a finding of contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the two findings can logically co-exist at law, as the focus of each analysis is different.

However, on the facts of this case, the trial judge's finding that the appellant acted unreasonably in failing to inquire about the insurance term was inconsistent with the reasonable reliance required for negligent misrepresentation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 18 years imprisonment (effectively 20.5 years) for extremely serious offences.

The Court of Appeal found that while a substantial penitentiary sentence was warranted given the appellant's background, the sentence imposed was outside the range for like offenders in like circumstances.

The court granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence to 13.5 years, representing a total sentence of 16 years less 2.5 years for time served.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife 13 times and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued that the trial was rendered unfair because the Crown retained and obtained notes from a psychiatrist initially consulted by the defence, breaching privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that privilege was likely waived and no prejudice resulted since the Crown did not lead the evidence.

The Court also dismissed arguments regarding jury instructions on automatism, section 16, and reasonable doubt.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and parole ineligibility was reduced to 13 years because the trial judge improperly relied on unproven hearsay evidence of a prior attempted murder as an aggravating factor.

The appellant appealed her conviction for unlawfully importing a controlled substance.

The Crown conceded that the cross-examination of the appellant at trial was improper and impaired her right to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for importing a controlled substance, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant abandoned her appeals regarding other charges to which she had pleaded guilty.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

After receiving submissions from the parties, the court fixed the appellants' costs on a partial indemnity basis at $2,250 for the action and $10,000 for the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $50,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant husband appealed and the respondent wife cross-appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal support, equalization, and the disposition of shares.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act to extend time, nor in the spousal support award.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act to include only the growth in value of the matrimonial home ($11,100) in the husband's net family property, given the wife's lack of contribution to the home.

The order for disposition of Algoma Steel shares in specie was also upheld.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside a previous order and for directions regarding an appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion, setting aside the lower court's order and permitting either party to set the matter down for trial, conditional upon the appellant making specified payments to the respondent and the Family Responsibility Office.

The court also directed the payout of funds held in court as security for costs.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding charges against the respondent under the Environmental Protection Act and the Ontario Water Resources Act.

Following further submissions, the Court of Appeal concluded that errors of law relating to the due diligence defence applied equally to both charges.

Pursuant to s. 125 of the Provincial Offences Act, the Court ordered that the OWRA charge be retried together with the EPA charge.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $54,980.34 for the cost of replacing an entire swimming pool structure due to defective workmanship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by awarding replacement costs when the evidence indicated the pool was structurally sound and only required repairs to the retaining walls and decking.

The Court held that awarding a new pool would provide a substantial gratuitous benefit.

The appeal was allowed, and damages were reduced to $25,000.

The applicants applied to re-open an appeal previously decided by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the court was misled by false evidence regarding the status of a police informant.

The Crown conceded that newly disclosed evidence contradicted the evidence relied upon in the original appeal, which had determined the individual was a police informer rather than a police agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that while there is inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment based on fraud or newly discovered evidence, the proper forum to seek such relief is the court of first instance (the Superior Court), not the appellate court.

The appellant, who represented himself at trial, was convicted of arson for burning down a hotel on which he held a mortgage, and was sentenced to an 18-month conditional sentence.

He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that the trial judge failed to prevent a police officer from giving opinion evidence on his guilt.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking a custodial term and restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error or prejudice.

The Court also dismissed the Crown's cross-appeal; although the conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit when imposed, the appellant had already served it, and the Crown failed to prove the replacement value required for a restitution order.

The respondent OPP officers brought a civil action against senior officers, alleging they were transferred as a form of disguised discipline.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the matter was governed by the collective agreement and statutory scheme.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the Police Services Act and the Public Service Act form a complete code governing police discipline, leaving no residual jurisdiction for the civil courts.

The appellant appealed from an order of Justice K. Pedlar dated October 18, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs, with reasons to follow.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery following a jury trial and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with an order for increased parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on prior discreditable conduct and by failing to leave the defence of theft with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as part of the narrative and there was no air of reality to the theft defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lengthy criminal record and poor prospects for rehabilitation justified the increased parole ineligibility period.