OCA 2002

The appellants appealed a motions judge's decision finding them liable for computer-generated cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the conclusion was dictated by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. C.I.B.C. The Court rejected the argument that a distinction should be drawn because the cheques were entirely produced by computer.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the appeal judge exhibited bias during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appeal judge's remarks were rude and intemperate, they did not reach the level of actual or apparent bias.

The Court further held that there was no basis to interfere with the trial decision, as the Justice of the Peace was entitled to accept the police officer's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, foster parents of three young siblings, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing their application for an order granting them residence of the children pending the final determination of child protection proceedings.

The children had been apprehended over two years prior, but no protection finding had yet been made.

The foster parents argued that the inordinate delay created a gap in the Child and Family Services Act, justifying the Superior Court's exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay did not bring the matter outside the ambit of the legislation, and that the Ontario Court of Justice retained jurisdiction to determine the children's best interests, including the impact of the delay and their attachments to the foster parents.

The appellant Bank appealed a decision granting priority to the respondent Charter's purchase-money security interest.

The debtor company had amalgamated, and there was confusion over its correct corporate name.

Charter registered its interest against the pre-amalgamation name, while the Bank later registered against the new name.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-amalgamation name continued to have legal existence based on the amalgamation agreement, making Charter's registration valid.

Furthermore, the Bank suffered no material prejudice as a search would have revealed Charter's interest.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision setting aside a conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of explanation for near relatives or the finding that the appellant was unable to pay his debts at the relevant time.

In an addendum on costs following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $13,099.75 inclusive of disbursements and GST, having regard to their success on appeal, the complexity of the issues, and their Bill of Costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his s. 7 Charter rights were breached due to missing initial disclosure statements from complainants and the late disclosure of the police file after the jury's guilty verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the missing and late-disclosed materials were of marginal relevance and did not impact the right to a fair trial.

The appellant also argued that a delay in hearing his appeal, caused by issues obtaining transcripts, breached his Charter rights.

The Court dismissed this argument, finding no prejudice or abuse of process.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellants, a bank and its assignee, appealed a trial judgment finding they improperly used the respondent developer's confidential business information during the assignment of a defaulted loan, causing a lost opportunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the bank had an unqualified right to assign the debt.

Furthermore, the Court found that the trial judge erred in awarding damages based on a 'lost opportunity' theory that was neither pleaded nor supported by the evidence.

The cross-appeal by the respondent was dismissed, and the action against the appellants was dismissed in its entirety.

The court-appointed interim receiver brought a motion to lift a stay pending appeal of an order approving the sale of the bankrupt companies' assets.

The appellants opposed the sale.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal had questionable merit and that delaying the sale of the business as a going concern would cause manifest prejudice.

The motion was allowed, the stay was lifted, and the receiver was authorized to complete the sale.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for drug offences.

The Crown conceded that the guilty plea, entered in error at the conclusion of a Charter voir dire, should be struck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in minimizing the seriousness of a section 8 Charter breach, which occurred when the appellant was searched without reasonable and probable grounds before entering a police cruiser after being detained in freezing weather.

The Court concluded that the seriousness of the breach favoured exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The appellants and respondents owned cottage properties on Lake Erie.

The trial judge found the appellants had acquired prescriptive easements for parking and a pier on the respondents' land, but applied equitable proprietary estoppel to impose annual licence fees.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in applying the equitable doctrine without a finding of unconscionability, setting aside the licence fees.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, upholding the findings that parking was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenements, and that proprietary estoppel was established for a well and concrete blocks.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted to the respondents regarding a fourth payment allegedly held in trust.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the fourth payment was not clearly severable from the rest of the case and that the respondents failed to meet the burden of demonstrating no genuine issue for trial.

The court noted the lack of documentary evidence supporting the trust claim and the respondents' failure to explain the transaction.

The partial summary judgment was set aside, with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant, an engineering student, sued the respondent university for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the transferability of its two-year program to other Ontario universities.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and denied class certification, finding that the appellant's failure to complete one elective course meant he had not met a 'condition precedent' to rely on the representations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was framed in tort, not contract, and therefore no condition precedent applied.

The summary judgment was set aside, and the certification motion was remitted to the Superior Court.

The respondent real estate agent obtained an offer to purchase a property, which triggered a right of first refusal by the vendor's minority shareholders.

The minority shareholders purchased the property, and the appellant brokerage received the commission.

The trial judge found that under the Independent Contractor Agreement and the custom of the trade, the respondent was entitled to 50% of the commission.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissed the appellants' argument regarding unjust enrichment against another agent, and upheld the trial judge's costs order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant's second-degree murder conviction was previously overturned on appeal and a manslaughter conviction was substituted.

The Court of Appeal sentenced the appellant for manslaughter arising from the shooting of a convenience store owner during an armed robbery.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the appellant's extensive criminal record, his aboriginal status, and the time already served in pre-sentence and post-sentence custody, the Court imposed a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment, equivalent to a 14-year sentence had it been imposed at the original trial.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order were also imposed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal claim against the individual respondent, a corporate officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statement of claim failed to plead material facts giving rise to an independent claim against the officer in his individual capacity.

The allegations of inducing breach of contract and tortious misrepresentation were deemed insufficient to establish personal liability.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decisions to strike his statement of claim and declare a mortgage registered to his mother as not binding on a partnership.

The appellant also alleged bias on the part of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the statement of claim and the bias allegations, finding no substantial wrong and that the trial judge's conduct did not amount to bias.

However, the Court varied the judgment regarding the mortgage, directing that its validity and priority be determined in future proceedings when the property is sold, as the mortgagee was not a party to the action.

The appellant's statement of defence was struck and he was subsequently noted in default.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking to set aside both the order striking his statement of defence and the noting of default.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction, arguing the appellant must first move to set aside the noting of default under rule 19.03.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, holding that a defendant must exhaust remedies in the court of first instance before an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the same constitutional issue had already been decided in respect of a closely connected defendant in the same proceeding.

The court also noted that the trial was imminent, several plaintiffs were critically ill, and the defendants had engaged in a proliferation of proceedings resulting in unacceptable delay.

During a lawful strike by court workers, a Superior Court judge issued an ex parte injunction on his own motion restraining picketing outside courthouses in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo.

The union appealed, arguing the injunction infringed its members' freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal held that while the order infringed freedom of expression, it was justified under section 1 of the Charter to ensure unimpeded public access to the courts.

However, the court deleted a paragraph of the order prohibiting 'any activities whatsoever' as there was no evidence of non-picketing interference.