OCA 2001

The appellant appealed from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court judge dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's conclusion was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the summary conviction appeal court judge's finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding the plaintiff, a doctor and research scientist, $950,000 in general, aggravated, and punitive damages for defamation arising from a television broadcast.

The broadcast falsely implied the plaintiff supported prescribing killer drugs, was in a conflict of interest, and acted negligently or dishonestly.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comment failed because the broadcast was deliberately slanted and the defendants did not honestly believe their thesis.

The damage awards and the award of solicitor and client costs were affirmed due to the egregious and malicious conduct of the defendants.

The appellant farmer appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay the respondent for soybean seed, chemicals, and spraying services, and dismissing his counterclaim for crop losses.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he authorized a herbicide substitution, in enforcing an allegedly illegal contract for an unregistered pesticide combination, and in calculating the quantity of soybeans ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that enforcing the contract for the unregistered pesticide combination was not contrary to public policy.

The appellant appealed a decision finding a breach of trust regarding a cottage property but ordering the trust wound up and the cottage sold.

The Court of Appeal held that the breach did not result in the failure of the trust or damages, and therefore the application judge erred in winding up the trust and ordering the sale.

The appeal was dismissed subject to varying the judgment to strike out those orders.

The request for a resulting trust was denied as the trust had not failed.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's charge to the jury on identification evidence and section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on the Crown's closing address.

The Crown had improperly invited the jury to speculate on why one co-accused did not testify and to use that silence as positive evidence of the other's guilt.

The trial judge also erred in instructing the jury that a statement made by one co-accused to an undercover officer could be used against the other.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were committed for trial on charges arising from the alleged misuse of funds of a rape crisis line to pay legal costs.

They applied for certiorari to quash their committals, which was largely dismissed by the reviewing judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find guilt.

The court also upheld the extension of the timeframe for the charges against one appellant, finding it covered a series of connected acts.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellants, university students, rented a unit from the respondent university.

The university refused to renew their lease solely because they kept cats, relying on a tenancy termination agreement signed at the start of the lease.

The university claimed an exemption under the regulations allowed them to enforce the termination agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that while the university is exempt from the prohibition against requiring termination agreements at the time of leasing, it cannot use such agreements solely to enforce a 'no pets' policy, which is explicitly prohibited by the Tenant Protection Act.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant mother sought a stay of an order requiring her to return her two children to Trinidad and Tobago.

The mother had brought the children to Canada and applied for refugee status.

The respondent father obtained an ex parte custody order in Trinidad and subsequently brought an urgent motion in Ontario for the children's return.

The motion judge heard the matter in the absence of the mother's counsel, who had requested a short adjournment after receiving voluminous materials late.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay pending appeal, finding that the mother was denied procedural fairness and the right to be heard, which undermined the rules of natural justice.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to the respondent, who had previously been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed a new hearing, finding that while the Board reasonably determined the scope of its inquisitorial function, it erred by failing to consider all factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

Specifically, the Board focused almost exclusively on the respondent's previous conduct and failed to consider the danger posed by his immediate, unsupervised re-entry into the community given his severe mental illness, lack of insight, and likelihood of non-compliance with medication.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding the plaintiff doctor $200,000 in general damages for defamation arising from a television broadcast.

The plaintiff cross-appealed the dismissal of his claim for aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's liability findings or assessment of general damages.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding that the plaintiff was attacked in his profession and defamed using his own distorted words, warranting an award of $150,000 in aggravated damages.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for wrongfully dismissing the respondent employee.

The employer argued that the trial judge interfered in the conduct of the trial to such an extent that the image of judicial impartiality was destroyed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge unduly intervened by redirecting lines of questioning, extensively cross-examining the employer's witnesses, and requiring the production of a policy manual that was not part of the pleadings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his common-law wife.

At trial, the primary issue was whether the appellant had the requisite intent, given his intoxication and mental disorder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding his voir dire testimony, evidence of his violent disposition, and the issue of intention, and appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant husband appealed a family law judgment and sought to introduce fresh evidence to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The proposed evidence included the trial judge's personal divorce file and an affidavit from the appellant's trial counsel regarding out-of-court remarks made by the judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the threshold of relevancy and did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal on the merits regarding the trial judge's directions and determination of a retirement date was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an incident where the complainant allegedly passed out after consuming alcohol, Ecstasy, and GHB.

The Crown's case relied on a witness who observed the appellant and the complainant in a bedroom.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on the elements of consent and knowledge of lack of consent, and in his answers to jury questions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury was not properly instructed on the crucial issues of the complainant's lack of consent and the appellant's knowledge of her lack of consent, and that the trial judge's answers to the jury's questions were incorrect and unresponsive.

A visitor was injured when a child lost control of a go-kart on the insureds' property.

The insureds claimed coverage under their homeowner's insurance policy.

The insurer denied coverage, relying on an exclusion for 'motorized land vehicles'.

The motion judge found the go-kart was a toy or 'implement' and thus excepted from the exclusion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the go-kart was a motorized land vehicle and did not fall within the exception for 'implements' such as lawnmowers or snow blowers.

The claim was therefore excluded from coverage.

The appellant was convicted of drug and weapons offences following an undercover narcotics investigation.

Police forcibly entered an apartment, arrested the appellant without a warrant, and seized firearms.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the firearms, allowing improper cross-examination, and inadequately answering jury questions.

The Court of Appeal held the firearms were admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the trial judge erred by allowing hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's brother's affidavit and by failing to instruct the jury that a mere bystander cannot be convicted as a party under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the drug and restricted weapons charges.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder for drowning his two children.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission for a 12-year parole ineligibility period and imposed 23 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in rejecting the joint submission, as a 12-year period would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the aggravating features of the crime.

However, the trial judge erred in imposing 23 years, as the appellant was not one of the worst offenders, had no prior record, suffered from severe depression, and showed remorse.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 17 years.

Three insurance companies disputed the funding of a $1,995,000 settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The primary insurer's liability was capped at the $200,000 statutory minimum due to the insured's material misrepresentation regarding the vehicle's use as a taxi.

The two underinsured motorist insurers were ordered to contribute the balance on a pro rata basis in proportion to their policy limits.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld these findings but reversed the motion judge's decision that the primary insurer should bear all costs, ordering instead that the three insurers share the $155,000 costs component equally.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and sentenced to four years in prison.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the search warrant used to seize his blood sample from the hospital was invalid due to the police officer's failure to disclose a prior warrant refusal.

He also argued the trial judge erred by refusing to compel the prosecuting attorney to testify on the voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the non-disclosure did not invalidate the warrant because the second information was substantially different and the omission was not intended to mislead.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to compel the prosecutor to testify and agreed that the blood sample was non-conscriptive evidence that should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant employee was terminated due to funding cuts and sued for wrongful dismissal.

The employer argued that the termination provisions in its policy manual limited her entitlement to common-law reasonable notice.

The trial judge found the provisions ambiguous and awarded eight months' notice.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision, finding no breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the Divisional Court failed to apply the principle from Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd. The termination provisions were not sufficiently clear to rebut the common-law presumption of reasonable notice.