OCA 2001

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault male, sexual assault, and buggery, relating to historical allegations of abuse against a younger relative.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions, which told the jury that 'reasonable doubt' had no special legal meaning and could be determined using their everyday life experiences, failed to locate the standard above a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal noted that while the sentence would be high for a first offence, the appellant had an horrific criminal record for violence against women and non-compliance with court orders.

Given the pre-sentence report indicating a very high risk to re-offend, the court found the sentence merited and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a sentence of three years' imprisonment and a six-year driving prohibition imposed on the respondent, who pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired driving causing death and one count of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent crossed the centre line and collided with an oncoming vehicle, killing two children and injuring their mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the mitigating factors, including an early guilty plea, lack of a prior criminal record, and genuine remorse.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of alibi evidence and by admitting hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating he was 'not satisfied' the alibi witnesses were reliable, without considering if their evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding cell phone records through a police officer without meeting the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial for both appellants, declining to apply the curative proviso.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant to organize a consumer club.

The defendant delivered a notice terminating the agreement, which the plaintiff argued was ineffective based on the renewal terms.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and the defendant successfully moved for partial summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the termination provision ambiguous and held that extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is always admissible to interpret a contract.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial and allowed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for extortion and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had departed from a joint submission and imposed a conditional sentence for extortion and 60 days' imprisonment for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional sentence inappropriate but declined to interfere as it was nearly completed.

However, the Court held the 60-day sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm was manifestly inadequate, noting the respondent was on bail for 'over 80' at the time.

The sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm was increased to five months.

The appellant appealed her custodial sentence for cocaine trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a conditional sentence on the basis that general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Proulx, the Court of Appeal held that general deterrence and denunciation can be met by a conditional sentence even in cocaine trafficking cases.

Given the appellant's full rehabilitation over four years on bail, the appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to a 13-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include punitive conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that an error in principle occurred, noting the trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Proulx.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal due to the respondent's family circumstances, his guilty plea, his testimony against co-accused, and the significant passage of time since the offence and sentencing.

The appellant was acquitted of assault with a weapon and aggravated assault but convicted of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public after stabbing the complainant during an altercation at a pool hall.

He appealed the conviction, arguing errors in the jury charge and inconsistent verdicts, and appealed the sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed and the verdicts were not inconsistent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to time served, given the appellant's good conduct in the four years since the offence.

The police obtained ex parte search warrants to seize video footage and photographs from various media organizations following a violent demonstration at Queen's Park.

The media organizations challenged the validity of the warrants, arguing they should have been given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before the warrants were issued, and that the police failed to disclose an alternative source of video footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuing justice had the discretion to proceed ex parte and did not commit jurisdictional error.

The court also found that the failure to disclose a secondary security camera system was not fatal to the warrants' validity.

The appellant was tried for attempted murder.

When the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge and others misheard the foreman say 'Not guilty as charged' instead of 'Guilty as charged'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty and the jury was discharged.

Moments later, the error was discovered.

The trial judge recalled the jury, conducted an inquiry, and corrected the verdict to guilty.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to change the verdict after discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's mishearing of the verdict was an accidental slip that could be corrected, and that the inquiry did not violate the appellant's Charter rights or section 649 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant applied for a stay of an order requiring the taking of a DNA sample pending his appeal of that order.

The Court of Appeal held that it has jurisdiction to stay such an order despite section 487.056(1) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the majority granted the stay, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the appellant's privacy interests, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant as he was already in custody.

A dissenting judge would have refused the stay due to the appellant's failure to perfect the appeal on time.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence of three and one-half years' imprisonment.

He argued that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding an accomplice's testimony was deficient, that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, and that the defence of intoxication should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Vetrovec warning adequate, no prejudice from the hearsay evidence, and no air of reality to the intoxication defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly applied the mandatory minimum for robbery with a firearm and the sentence was not excessive.

The appellant landlord sued the respondent, a competing landlord, for inducing breach of contract after a tenant abandoned the appellant's building and signed a new lease with the respondent.

The tenant had previously threatened to terminate its lease due to the appellant renting space to an abortion clinic.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no genuine issue for trial because the evidence showed the tenant had already decided to terminate its lease before any contact with the respondent.

The self-represented appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his action for solicitor negligence against his former tax counsel.

The trial judge had found that the respondent counsel met the appropriate standard of care, was properly qualified, and did not err in the preparation or prosecution of the tax appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence fully supported the trial judge's conclusions.

The debtor appealed a receiving order in bankruptcy.

The petitioning creditors relied on judgments entered against the debtor more than six months prior to the petition.

The debtor argued that the creditors failed to prove an act of bankruptcy within the six months preceding the petition because no fresh demand for payment was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a judgment is a continuing demand for payment and a fresh demand within the six-month period is not required to establish an act of bankruptcy.

The applicant hospital administrators moved under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code to suspend a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering the transfer of the respondent accused from a maximum to a medium secure hospital facility, pending their appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the accused was fourth on the waiting list for the medium secure facility and it was highly unlikely he would be transferred before the appeal was heard in 13 days, making the suspension order unnecessary.

The developer of a multi-phased condominium project marketed the development as having an outdoor recreational area.

The disclosure statement and related documents provided that the recreational area might not be built.

The developer later decided to build townhouses on the recreational lands instead.

The condominium corporation opposed this and obtained a permanent injunction at trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the developer did not owe a fiduciary duty or a duty of good faith to prospective purchasers during the pre-contractual phase.

The developer's obligations were circumscribed by the statutory disclosure requirements, which clearly stated the developer was under no obligation to build the recreational facilities.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay spousal and child support, make an equalization payment, and transfer property to the respondent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred regarding the nature of the family business, alleged embezzlement by the respondent, a claim of malicious prosecution following an assault acquittal, and whether the respondent's conduct repudiated the marriage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were well-supported by the evidence and that there was no basis for the appellant's claims.