Myron Shulgan

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly terminated an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for commercial property.

The agreement included a termination option if the respondent failed to complete a pre-consultation meeting with the municipality within four weeks of signing.

The respondent argued a meeting held prior to signing satisfied the condition and sought to convert the application into an action.

The court held the matter could proceed by application as it involved contract interpretation, found the prior meeting did not satisfy the condition, and declared the agreement validly terminated.

The moving parties, the estates of the deceased boat operator and owner, brought a Rule 21 motion to determine whether the $1,000,000 liability cap under s. 29(a) of the Marine Liability Act is inclusive or exclusive of costs and prejudgment interest.

The actions arose from a fatal boating accident on Lake Erie.

The court applied the modern principle of statutory interpretation and concluded that claims for costs and interest serve different purposes than claims for loss of life or personal injury.

The court ruled that the statutory limitation is exclusive of costs and interest.

The plaintiffs brought negligence actions following a fatal nighttime boating accident where a pleasure craft struck a breakwater, resulting in three deaths and two serious injuries.

The plaintiffs sued the estates of the vessel's operator and owner, as well as the federal, provincial, and municipal governments.

On summary judgment motions for liability, the court found the operator and the owner/master jointly and severally liable, apportioning fault equally at 50 percent each, due to their failure to keep a proper lookout, travelling at an unsafe speed, and the operator's impairment.

The actions against the government defendants were dismissed, as the court found that the existing navigation lights were visible and any alleged failures regarding the breakwater's illumination or background lighting did not cause or contribute to the collision.

The defendant appealed an Associate Judge's order dismissing its motion for security for costs against the foreign plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a Washington State corporation, sued for unpaid commissions and damages for breach of contract.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Associate Judge applied the correct legal test from Yaiguaje by holistically considering the justness of the order, and made no palpable and overriding errors of fact in relying on the plaintiff's principal's undertaking to make personal funds available.

The defendant brought a motion seeking leave to compel the plaintiff to post $135,000 as security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (d).

The plaintiff, an extra-provincial corporation, sued the defendant for $2.5 million for breach of contract regarding a unilateral reduction in sales commissions.

The court found the defendant met the initial onus under Rule 56.01(1)(d).

However, the court dismissed the motion, finding it would be unjust to order security because the plaintiff's principal undertook to make her personal investment account available to satisfy any costs award.

The moving defendants sought leave to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiffs to allow a corporation to grant a second mortgage to the Royal Bank of Canada.

The plaintiffs and other defendants opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grounds for discharging the CPL did not satisfy the criteria under section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, nor did the equities favour the moving parties, as ownership interests remained in dispute and the proposed mortgage would dilute the plaintiffs' interests.

The defendants in a securities class action brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Windsor to Toronto.

The plaintiffs opposed the transfer.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the plaintiffs' choice of venue was found to be reasonable, the court concluded that the defendants established that Toronto was a significantly better venue, given that a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was located there, and it was more convenient for the parties, witnesses, and counsel.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a securities class action from Windsor to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations in a prospectus related to the financing of a workforce accommodation complex.

The court conducted a holistic balancing of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2).

Although the plaintiffs' choice of venue was deemed reasonable, the court found that Toronto was a significantly better venue because a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was more closely connected to Toronto, and it was more convenient for the parties, counsel, and witnesses.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

A long‑serving employee brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action seeking 24 months’ notice or, alternatively, statutory severance under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court held that the employee’s entitlement to statutory severance pay could be determined summarily because the undisputed evidence established over 40 years of continuous employment and a payroll exceeding the statutory threshold.

Partial summary judgment was therefore granted for the maximum 26 weeks’ severance pay.

However, the broader claim for wrongful dismissal damages could not be determined because there was no evidence regarding post‑termination income or mitigation.

The remainder of the claim was directed to proceed to trial.

A developer sued a municipality alleging breach of a supplementary subdivision agreement governing allocation of sewage capacity for a commercial and residential development.

The agreement provided that additional sewer capacity in the municipal system was reserved for the developer’s subdivision and that the municipality would not allocate capacity to lands outside the subdivision until the development was fully built out.

The municipality nevertheless allocated capacity to an adjacent development and expropriated a one‑foot reserve to allow connection.

The court interpreted the contractual language in light of the factual matrix and held the agreement granted the developer priority to available capacity.

The municipality breached the agreement by allocating capacity to the neighbouring development before completion of the subdivision.

The plaintiff proved loss‑of‑chance damages for lost leasing opportunities and was awarded compensatory damages, but punitive damages were denied.