Martland

The appellant, a real estate broker, was improperly suspended and expelled from the respondent real estate board.

He brought an action seeking reinstatement and damages for loss of income, humiliation, and suffering.

The Superior Court quashed the expulsion but dismissed the damages claim as prescribed under the two-year limitation for offences and quasi-offences.

The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the relationship between a voluntary association and its members is contractual.

Therefore, the damages claim for the improper expulsion is subject to a thirty-year prescription period, though damages for separate tortious acts like bomb threats remain prescribed.

The appellant struck a fellow student with a rock after reading a letter in which she referred to him as a 'nothing'.

At trial, he advanced the defence of non-insane automatism, arguing he was in a dissociative state caused by a psychological blow.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding he was not insane and had acted in a state of automatism brought about by an external cause.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal, holding that the psychological blow was not an externally originating cause and that the dissociative state constituted a disease of the mind.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the ordinary stresses and disappointments of life do not constitute an external cause, and that the appellant's condition was a disease of the mind.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(2) of the Fisheries Act after spilling 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into tidal waters.

The appellant sought an order of prohibition, arguing that s. 33(2) was ultra vires the federal Parliament as it related to general water pollution rather than fisheries, and that the information was multiplicitous.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 33(2) is intra vires as its true nature and character is the protection and preservation of fisheries, a valid exercise of federal power under s. 91(12) of the B.N.A. Act.

The Court also found the information was not multiplicitous, as the accused was not prejudiced in preparing a defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Province of Manitoba assessed Air Canada for retail sales tax on its aircraft, repair parts, and services used during overflights through Manitoba airspace and temporary stopovers, as well as on liquor served to passengers.

Air Canada successfully challenged the assessment in the Manitoba courts.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the mere entry of aircraft into the airspace over Manitoba does not give the aircraft a situs within the Province to support a tax under section 92(2) of the British North America Act.

The Court further found that the taxing statute itself did not capture overflights or temporary stopovers, as there was no bringing of property into the Province or consumption within it.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal concerning Nova Scotia succession duties assessed against resident grandchildren following an estate-planning scheme using Alberta parent and subsidiary corporations to receive the residue of a Nova Scotia estate.

The majority held that the non-resident parent corporation was "beneficially entitled" to the estate property within the meaning of s. 2(5), because it had complete control over the named subsidiary beneficiary and could compel transfer of the residue.

The majority further held that the combined effect of ss. 2(5) and 8(2) imposed a valid in personam tax on resident successors and was intra vires the provincial legislature under s. 92(2).

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, holding that "beneficially entitled" carried its established equitable meaning and did not extend through the corporate structure.

The appellants, operators of sugar refineries in eastern Canada, were charged with conspiracy to enhance the price of sugar unreasonably and to lessen competition unduly under the Combines Investigation Act.

The trial judge acquitted them, finding that while there was a tacit agreement to maintain traditional market shares, it was not intended to lessen competition unduly but rather to avoid a price war.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal on the second count.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not err in law in concluding that the Crown failed to prove an agreement to lessen competition unduly.

The Court affirmed that conscious parallelism or a tacit agreement to maintain market shares does not necessarily amount to an undue lessening of competition.

The employer claimed damages against two unions following an unlawful strike, alleging a violation of the no-strike clauses in their collective agreements.

The unions refused to appoint an arbitrator, arguing the claims were not grievances under the collective agreement or the Labour Code.

The Minister of Labour appointed an arbitrator who affirmed his jurisdiction, a decision upheld by the Superior Court but reversed by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a claim for damages resulting from the violation of a collective agreement constitutes a grievance within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator.

The deceased died domiciled in Alberta, leaving personal property in Alberta to beneficiaries resident in British Columbia.

British Columbia assessed succession duty under s. 6A of its Succession Duty Act.

The executors challenged the constitutional validity of the section.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 6A imposes an in personam tax on a resident beneficiary, which constitutes direct taxation within the province under s. 92(2) of the B.N.A. Act, and is therefore intra vires the provincial legislature.

The respondents, treaty Indians, were convicted of hunting deer at night with spotlights in a wildlife management area.

The convictions were upheld by the County Court but overturned by the Court of Appeal, which found s. 49 of The Wildlife Act ultra vires.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 49 is ultra vires because it singles out Indians and attempts to unilaterally amend the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement.

The Court further held that since the province allowed limited hunting in the area, Indians had a right of access to hunt for food at all seasons under paragraph 13 of the Agreement.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta that quashed the accused's robbery conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge did not commit an error of law in his jury charge regarding the need for corroboration of certain witnesses' evidence.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal erred by allowing the appeal based on an inadequate charge without finding an error of law or invoking the specific powers under section 613(1)(a)(i) or (iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal by a judge alone on a charge of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Chief Justice McGillivray in the Court of Appeal.

The Court declined to express an opinion on the applicability of section 16(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to the evidence of the child witness.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Commission.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Federal Court of Appeal's decision.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(3) of the Fisheries Act for depositing logging debris into a stream that flowed into fish-bearing waters.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the subsection ultra vires the federal Parliament.

The County Court and Court of Appeal upheld the legislation as valid under the federal power over sea coast and inland fisheries.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 33(3) is a blanket prohibition of activities subject to provincial jurisdiction without linking the proscribed conduct to actual or potential harm to fisheries.

Therefore, it is not necessarily incidental to effective fishery legislation and is ultra vires.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the ownership of silver tailings deposited on a parcel of land prior to the severance of the surface and mining rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the reasons delivered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with more than 80 mgs of alcohol in his blood, challenging the interpretation of the requirement for an interval of at least fifteen minutes between breathalyzer samples under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a restricted drug, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of intercepted private communications.

The appellant contended there was no evidence upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed this ground of appeal, holding that even if such an authorization is reviewable by a trial judge, the Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings that there was some evidence to support the authorization.

The appellant general contractor paid funds into court following a garnishment order obtained by a judgment creditor of its subcontractor.

The general contractor opposed the payment out of the funds to the creditor, arguing it was a cestui que trust of the funds under the Mechanics' Lien Act or that it stepped into the shoes of lien claimants it had paid directly.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and ordered the funds paid out.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, finding no reason to disturb the Court of Appeal's decision.

The appellant, convicted of possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, filed an appeal and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the habeas corpus petition on the basis that the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court could have been raised by way of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that habeas corpus does not lie in these circumstances, noting that the legal issues would be addressed in the appellant's separate appeal on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of rape.

He appealed on the ground that the trial judge failed to put the defence of mistake of fact to the jury.

The appellant claimed the complainant consented, while the complainant testified she was raped over her protests and struggles.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial judge is only required to put a defence to the jury if there is some evidence that conveys a sense of reality to it.

In this case, the conflicting testimonies presented a simple issue of consent versus no consent, with no evidentiary basis to support a mistaken but honest belief in consent.