Reginald M. McLean

The respondent father moved for a stay of the application, asserting that Jordanian courts had jurisdiction and had already ruled on divorce, custody, and support.

The applicant mother cross-moved for recognition of Ontario's jurisdiction, non-recognition of Jordanian orders, lifting of a travel ban, interim parenting and support, and asset restraint.

The court found insufficient evidence to determine the jurisdictional issues and outlined a series of questions for a hybrid trial, including the validity of the parties' marriage in Canada (due to bigamy allegations), the effect and recognition of Jordanian orders, habitual residence of the children, and the application of forum conveniens and antisuit injunction principles.

The applicant was granted leave to amend her application to plead the Children's Law Reform Act and Family Law Act.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented for the first 33 months of the litigation, had delayed advancing the action because the defendants claimed they were conducting a forensic audit into alleged fraudulent activity implicating the plaintiff.

The court found the delay was not inordinate, the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse due to settlement attempts and waiting for the audit, and the defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion to prevent the applicant from sending their child to a specific school pending arbitration, which was largely unsuccessful.

The applicant sought costs for the motion.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

After considering the factors, including the applicant's slight delay in responding to the respondent's inquiries, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $2,708.98.

The applicant mother brought a motion to suspend the respondent father's access to their child, AR, due to his work as an emergency room physician during the COVID-19 pandemic, or alternatively, to enforce the regular school-based access schedule.

The respondent father requested the holiday access schedule.

The court dismissed the motion to suspend access, finding the applicant's evidence inadequate to demonstrate a COVID-19 risk.

The court also rejected both parties' interpretations of the consent order's access provisions during school closures.

Instead, the court ordered equal, shared access on an alternating weekly basis until AR's school reopens, at which point the original school access schedule would resume.

The respondent brought a motion seeking immediate resumption of parenting time and make-up time, which had been suspended due to the applicant's concerns about potential COVID-19 exposure from the respondent's workplace and the presence of international students in his home.

The applicant sought to delay the resumption of parenting time until April 6, 2020, following a 14-day self-isolation period for the respondent and the students.

The court, emphasizing the best interests of the child and adopting principles from Ribeiro v. Wright, ordered the parenting schedule to resume on April 6, 2020, conditional on the respondent and the students continuing self-isolation, practicing social distancing, and displaying no COVID-19 symptoms.

The issue of make-up parenting time was deferred to costs submissions if the parties could not resolve it.

The appellants, nieces of the deceased and remainder beneficiaries of his estate, appealed a decision declaring the Constantine Gicas Family Trust validly created.

They argued the trust lacked the three certainties and was not properly constituted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the trust was validly declared and constituted, and that specific shares were properly transferred to it.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, finding that because the litigation was reasonably necessary to administer the estate due to the testator's conduct, costs should be paid out of the estate rather than by the appellants personally.

Motion to change a 2006 custody order whereby the mother seeks child support for a seven-year-old child with hemiplegic cerebral palsy.

The father was not required to pay child support under the original order.

Both parents were receiving social assistance.

The court determined that income should be imputed to the father in the amount of $40,000 per year based on his demonstrated skills in the construction trades and his historical earning capacity, despite his claims of unemployment.

The court ordered the father to pay $360 per month in child support commencing February 1, 2012, with arrears of $6,120 to be paid at $200 per month.

The mother's claim for section 7 special or extraordinary expenses was dismissed without prejudice, as the father lacked the financial capacity to contribute to such expenses despite their necessity for the child's best interests.

The respondent brought a motion to change child support for Margaret, an adult university student, seeking to terminate or significantly reduce his support obligations.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought arrears of support.

The court determined that support should be calculated under section 3(2)(b) of the Child Support Guidelines rather than the table amount, given Margaret's status as a post-secondary student living away from home.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on his corporation's pre-tax income after disallowing unreasonable personal expense deductions.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $814 monthly commencing July 1, 2013, with retroactive support for the period September 1, 2012 to June 1, 2013 calculated at varying amounts based on the respondent's income in each year.

The applicant sought costs of $20,615.23 following a successful motion for temporary spousal support in the amount of $1,125 per month.

The respondent conceded the applicant was the successful party but proposed costs of $5,000.

The court found the respondent acted in bad faith by structuring business affairs to hide assets, failing to provide accurate financial disclosure, providing multiple conflicting income estimates, and attempting to deceive the court about his true income.

The court awarded costs on a full recovery basis for the second phase of the case and partial indemnity for the first phase, fixing total costs at $15,000 inclusive of HST, fees and disbursements, payable forthwith and enforceable as an incident of support.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly, childcare, and housekeeping benefits until the insurer terminated them, claiming an overpayment.

The insurer relied on a medical report and a nurse's assessment to conclude the applicant was no longer disabled.

The arbitrator found the nurse was not qualified as an expert and her assessment lacked an objective basis, while the treating orthopaedic surgeon's testimony was contradictory and unreliable.

Relying on the applicant's credible testimony regarding her ongoing physical limitations, the arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of all benefits and dismissed the insurer's claim for repayment.