P. Burstein

The applicant sought a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a multi-accused fraud prosecution where the anticipated end of trial was 31 months and three days after charge.

The court held there was no defence delay and rejected the Crown's submission that the matter was exceptionally complex.

However, the slight exceedance of the 30-month superior court ceiling was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance because much of the early delay arose before Jordan, when the parties reasonably treated co-accused election delay as neutral.

The application was therefore dismissed.

The Crown and the Ontario Provincial Police applied for certiorari to quash a trial judge's order requiring the disclosure of a Drug Recognition Expert's (DRE) rolling logs to the accused in an impaired driving trial.

The applicants argued the logs were irrelevant third-party records and that disclosure was prohibited by s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the rolling logs are relevant to the DRE's proficiency, constitute 'fruits of the investigation' subject to first-party disclosure, and are not shielded from disclosure by statutory privacy or public interest provisions.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and to refusing to provide a breath sample after a motor vehicle collision that killed a child passenger.

The collision occurred when the accused drove through a stop sign at excessive speed and struck another vehicle lawfully proceeding through the intersection.

Although alcohol had been consumed prior to the collision, the impaired driving causing death charge was withdrawn as part of a joint submission.

The court reviewed sentencing ranges for dangerous driving causing death and emphasized the high threshold for rejecting a joint submission.

Finding the proposed disposition within the reasonable range and not contrary to the public interest, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence totaling 27 months and a four‑year driving prohibition.

In a criminal trial arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the accused sought exclusion of roadside, police-station, and ambulance statements, together with refusal evidence, on the basis of alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the roadside denial of drinking was not a statutorily compelled statement, was not protected from later use as merely demand-founding evidence on these facts, and was voluntary.

The court further found no denial of the right to counsel, concluding that although the police initially resisted contact with the accused's mother, the accused did not exercise reasonable diligence in seeking counsel and instead used counsel requests to obstruct and delay the breath-testing process.

The statement to the paramedic was also held admissible because the paramedic was not a person in authority.

The application was dismissed and the challenged evidence was admitted.

The court considered whether police could, without a warrant or consent, enter a damaged vehicle at a fatal collision scene and download Event Data Recorder information showing speed, braking, and accelerator position in the seconds before impact.

Applying the totality of the circumstances privacy analysis, the court held that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicle and in the EDR data, and that the warrantless download breached s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach was at the low end of seriousness given the unsettled state of the law at the time and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The voir dire was therefore dismissed and the EDR evidence remained admissible at trial.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought a publication ban under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code to prevent publication of information identifying the deceased victim, primarily to shield an elderly relative from learning distressing details of the death through media reporting.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governs discretionary publication bans even when sought under a statutory provision.

The Crown failed to establish that the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or that a significant public interest justified limiting openness.

The concern raised was characterized as a private interest unsupported by medical evidence demonstrating likely harm.

The interim publication ban was therefore set aside.