Kourosh Farrokhzad

The applicant sought spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act despite a prior separation agreement providing for mutual spousal support releases in exchange for her receiving the respondent’s share of condominium equity.

Applying the two‑stage framework in Miglin v. Miglin, the court accepted that the agreement was properly negotiated but considered whether subsequent circumstances justified departing from it.

The court found that the applicant’s severe and chronic mental health deterioration after the agreement represented a significant departure from the circumstances reasonably contemplated when the agreement was executed, undermining the assumption that she would remain self‑sufficient.

Although the agreement retained weight given the objectives of finality and certainty, strict enforcement would not adequately address the applicant’s economic hardship.

Considering the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and the lump sum already received, the court ordered an additional lump sum spousal support payment.

Following the dismissal of the respondent’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the applicant’s claim for support, the court considered costs.

The applicant sought costs as the successful party under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent argued no costs should be awarded because the motion narrowed issues for trial and because the applicant abandoned a motion for interim support.

The court held that the unsuccessful party should ordinarily pay costs and found no reason to depart from that rule.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $2,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking dismissal of a spousal support claim advanced despite a prior separation agreement containing mutual waivers of support and a property transfer.

The applicant limited her claim to the second stage analysis under Miglin, asserting that current circumstances, including alleged health issues preventing employment, constituted a significant departure from the range of outcomes contemplated by the parties.

The court held that the applicant would need to establish that current circumstances were inconsistent with the objectives of s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

Although the court expressed serious doubt that the applicant could meet this threshold on the affidavit record, it concluded that a genuine issue requiring a trial remained.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the matter was directed to proceed to trial on the limited issue identified.

The grievor, a liquor store manager, was previously reinstated subject to strict terms akin to a last chance agreement.

He was discharged after arriving nearly two hours late for a shift on a busy holiday weekend and failing to notify management.

The union argued the lateness was innocent absenteeism caused by sedation from taking Tylenol for a recurrence of a back injury.

The arbitrator rejected this explanation, finding the grievor's testimony regarding the amount of Tylenol taken to be inconsistent and not credible, and noting that Tylenol does not cause sedation.

The arbitrator also found the grievor's failure to notify management unacceptable.

As the grievor's conduct was culpable and gave cause for discipline, the discharge was upheld under the terms of the prior reinstatement.

The grievor, a liquor store manager, was discharged after failing to open the store on time.

The union brought a motion arguing the discharge was void ab initio because the employer failed to provide union representation during a telephone call between the grievor and the District Manager, allegedly in violation of article 26.3 of the collective agreement.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the motion, finding that the brief telephone call, in which the manager merely asked why the store was not open, was an administrative inquiry rather than an investigatory meeting that could result in discipline.

The grievor, a store manager with 23 years of service, was discharged for three incidents of misconduct: making inappropriate sexual comments to a casual employee, asking a casual employee to purchase marijuana during work hours, and consuming alcohol with a contractor's crew on company premises while on duty.

The union argued the discharge was void due to the employer's delay in confronting the grievor, but the arbitrator found no actual prejudice.

While the arbitrator found the grievor's conduct constituted serious culpable misconduct and noted his lack of true remorse, the penalty of discharge was deemed excessive because the grievor had not received the benefit of progressive discipline for these types of offences.

The grievor was reinstated subject to a lengthy suspension without pay and a strict two-year discipline-free condition.

During a grievance arbitration concerning the grievor's discharge for alleged sexual harassment and workplace alcohol consumption, the employer raised numerous objections to the grievor's testimony based on the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The employer argued that the union failed to cross-examine employer witnesses on points the grievor later contradicted in his testimony.

The Vice-Chair reviewed the legal principles of the rule, noting that a cross-examiner must indicate an intention to challenge a witness's credibility.

The Vice-Chair ruled on 30 specific objections, excluding the grievor's testimony where the rule was violated and permitting it where the rule did not apply or the cross-examination was sufficient.

The union filed two grievances on behalf of the grievor regarding a suspension and termination.

The hearing was adjourned twice previously due to the grievor's unavailability, with the second adjournment granted on the condition that the grievances would be withdrawn if the grievor failed to attend the next scheduled date.

The grievor failed to attend the rescheduled hearing despite the union's efforts to contact him.

Consequently, the union withdrew the grievances and the files were closed.

The union filed three grievances on behalf of the grievor seeking remedies amounting to accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

Based on joint submissions, the Grievance Settlement Board ordered that the grievor be placed in a permanent full-time Warehouse Worker 3 position.

As an accommodation, the employer was ordered not to schedule the grievor on the afternoon shift during his probationary period, and the grievor was permitted to switch scheduled afternoon shifts with other workers for two years.