8 total
Costs of $36,000 awarded to separately represented successful respondents on a partial indemnity basis.
The respondents were successful in defending an application for a declaration of a public highway.
The Township and the individual respondents, who were separately represented, sought costs.
The Township claimed partial indemnity costs, while the individual respondents sought full indemnity costs.
The court found that separate representation was justified but declined to award substantial indemnity costs as there was no Rule 49 offer or discreditable conduct.
Costs were fixed at $19,000 for the Township and $17,000 for the individual respondents, payable by the applicant.
Application for declaration of a public road based on an 1890 by-law dismissed for uncertainty.
The applicant sought a declaration that an 1890 municipal by-law established a public road across the respondents' properties to provide access to his landlocked parcel.
The court reviewed historical township minutes and found that while a road was contemplated and partially constructed, its exact location could not be determined with certainty.
The original survey was lost, and there was no modern record or visual evidence of the road's existence.
The application was dismissed due to the lack of certainty regarding the road's location.
Successful plaintiffs in commercial lease dispute awarded $25,000 in partial indemnity costs.
The plaintiffs were successful on a motion for partial summary judgment and successfully defended a cross-motion to dissolve an interim injunction regarding a commercial lease dispute.
The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of over $40,000, relying on an offer to settle and the defendant's conduct.
The court found the plaintiffs' offer to settle was reasonable but noted that both parties expended excessive and unnecessary time on the motions.
The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $25,000.
Landlord bound by prior lease amendments referenced in estoppel certificate due to lack of due diligence.
The plaintiff tenants brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that a 2009 Minutes of Settlement amended their commercial lease and bound the defendant landlord, who purchased the property in 2012.
The landlord argued it was not bound because the tenants signed an estoppel certificate that did not fully detail the amendments.
The court granted the tenants' motion, finding that the estoppel certificate referenced the Minutes of Settlement, the landlord failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting a copy, and the landlord did not detrimentally rely on the certificate.
The court continued an interlocutory injunction preventing a commercial landlord from terminating a restaurant lease pending a summary judgment motion.
The plaintiffs, commercial tenants, obtained an interim interlocutory injunction prohibiting the defendant landlord from forfeiture actions.
The landlord subsequently sought to set aside the injunction, while the tenants sought its continuation pending a summary judgment motion regarding the enforceability of minutes of settlement that purportedly amended the lease.
The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the minutes of settlement, irreparable harm to the tenants if the injunction was not continued, and that the balance of convenience favoured continuation.
The court dismissed the landlord's motion to set aside the injunction and ordered its continuation until the summary judgment motion, with the tenants providing undertakings for damages.
Appeal dismissed; discoverability principle and special circumstances justified adding vehicle owner after limitation period expired.
The appellants (Daimler Chrysler) appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed their motion to have the actions against them declared statute-barred.
The plaintiffs had relied on a police accident report that incorrectly identified the driver as the owner of the vehicle.
The true owner, Daimler Chrysler, was discovered during examinations for discovery, more than two years after the accident.
The motion judge found that the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence and the discoverability principle applied for the Limitations Act claims.
For the Trustee Act claims, the motion judge found special circumstances and no prejudice to the appellants.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her application of the discoverability principle or the special circumstances test.
Appeal allowed in part; triable issues found regarding both the main action and the third party claim.
The appellant, UPI Inc., appealed a Master's order that dismissed its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment dismissing its third party claim against Kemar Mechanical Limited.
The Divisional Court assumed jurisdiction over both the interlocutory and final components of the Master's order.
The court upheld the Master's decision refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim, finding a triable issue regarding UPI's duty to communicate about its furnace maintenance program.
However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the third party claim, concluding that if UPI were found liable, its right to indemnification from Kemar also presented a triable issue.
Applicant denied income replacement benefits for driving without a valid Ontario licence while residing in Ontario.
The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.
The Insurer terminated income replacement benefits on the basis that the Applicant was a resident of Ontario at the time of the accident but only held a Quebec driver's licence, and was therefore not authorized by law to drive under section 32 of the Highway Traffic Act.
The Arbitrator found that the Insurer presented substantial objective evidence proving the Applicant had been a resident of Ontario since 1993.
The Applicant's evidence to the contrary was found not credible.
Consequently, the Applicant was precluded from receiving income replacement benefits pursuant to section 58(1)(d) of the Schedule.
Despite this, the Arbitrator awarded the Applicant two-thirds of his arbitration expenses because the Insurer unnecessarily prolonged the hearing.