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The Kienapple principle does not preclude multiple convictions for a single act of driving while suspended if the suspensions stem from distinct legal and factual grounds.
The County of Elgin appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision to apply the Kienapple principle, resulting in only one conviction for driving under suspension despite two distinct suspensions.
The respondent's driver's license was suspended for unpaid fines and separately for an outstanding debt to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.
The appeal court found that the trial justice erred by improperly applying the Kienapple principle, as there were distinguishing factual and legal elements between the two suspensions, representing distinct delicts.
The court granted the appeal, registered the second conviction, and remitted the matter for sentencing.
The court dismissed the conviction appeal of an OPCA litigant but reduced her pandemic-related fine.
Kristen Nagle appealed her conviction and $10,000 fine for attending a religious observation with more than ten persons, an offence under the Reopening Ontario Act during the Covid-19 pandemic.
She argued that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide reasonable assistance to her as an unrepresented accused and failed to raise a Charter issue.
The court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial justice's assistance was reasonable given Nagle's deliberate use of Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments (OPCA) tactics, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.
However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the fine to $3,750 (plus costs and surcharges), finding the original reasons for sentence insufficient for meaningful review and considering new biographical information and aggravating factors.
Unawareness of an automatic licence suspension does not render a novice driver's guilty plea uninformed.
The appellant, a novice driver, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while holding a cellular phone, arguing his guilty plea (made by paying the fine) was uninformed because he was unaware of the automatic 30-day licence suspension that followed.
The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the licence suspension as a direct consequence of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) regulatory scheme, rather than a collateral consequence that would invalidate the plea.
The court emphasized that drivers are expected to be aware of the consequences within the highly regulated driving regime and that the simplified plea process under the Provincial Offences Act (POA) is intended for efficiency, making it rare to set aside a plea on "fundamental fairness" grounds for readily discernable penalties.
Mother granted sole custody and spousal support after 18-year relationship; joint custody denied due to poor communication.
The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property following an 18-year relationship.
The respondent father sought joint custody.
The court granted sole custody to the mother, finding the parties lacked the ability to communicate effectively for joint custody.
The father was ordered to pay child support of $940 per month and spousal support of $1,300 per month for 8.5 years, based on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.
The court also ordered an equalization payment of $21,309.05 to the mother via a pension roll-over.
Board splits jurisdiction over asbestos grievance, deferring health claims to WSIB but retaining failure-to-warn claims.
The employer brought a motion challenging the Public Service Grievance Board's jurisdiction to hear a grievance concerning the grievor's exposure to asbestos in the workplace.
The employer argued the claim was essentially for workplace injury and mental stress, falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB).
The Board found it had mixed jurisdiction: claims relating to personal injury and health consequences of asbestos exposure were deferred to the WSIB, while claims alleging the employer breached the Occupational Health and Safety Act by failing to warn or train the grievor remained within the Board's jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed; respondents established a prescriptive right of way based on continuous use since 1982.
The appellant appealed an order granting the respondents an easement over his property.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondents' predecessors in title had enjoyed open, continuous, and undisturbed use of the right of way from 1982 until 2006.
The Court rejected the appellant's argument that his consent defeated the prescriptive right, noting the consent was for a permanent easement.
The appeal was dismissed, and the respondents were awarded costs.