Ginette Gobeil

The Court allowed multiple appeals from pre-trial and appellate orders that had permitted accused former police officers to discuss informer-privileged information with defence counsel.

It held the declaratory order was criminal in nature, that objections and appeal routes under sections 37 and 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act were available, and that informer privilege could not be pierced absent a successful innocence-at-stake application.

The Court dismissed the appeal from both the committal order and the surrender order in an extradition case involving child-abduction charges sought by the United States.

The majority held the extradition judge exceeded her limited committal role by weighing defence and exculpatory evidence instead of applying the prima facie committal test and the presumption of reliability of the record of the case.

At surrender, the Minister reasonably considered both the possible defence issue and the children’s best interests and reasonably concluded surrender was not unjust or oppressive under the Extradition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the Minister of Justice’s surrender order in an extradition matter.

The Court held the Minister’s decision was reasonable, that a possible fourth trial in New Hampshire did not meet the threshold of shocking the conscience or being unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1) of the Extradition Act, and that comity and international cooperation strongly favored surrender.

The appeal concerned judicial review of a surrender order under extradition legislation in relation to historic U.S. murder charges revived after modern DNA testing.

The appellant argued delay, evidentiary weakness, and prejudice rendered surrender contrary to fundamental justice and unjust or oppressive.

The Court held the Minister reasonably concluded those concerns should generally be addressed by the foreign trial court, consistent with comity and established extradition principles.

The Court found no reviewable error in the assessment of section 7 Charter concerns or section 44(1) of the Extradition Act.

The surrender order was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

A Canadian citizen imprisoned in the United States challenged provisions of the International Transfer of Offenders Act that allow the Minister to refuse transfer requests.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the statutory scheme, with the majority finding no breach of s. 6(1) mobility rights because there is no constitutional right to serve a foreign sentence in Canada.

Concurring reasons found a s. 6(1) limitation but held it justified under s. 1 based on security and public safety objectives.

The Court emphasized that ministerial discretion in transfer decisions must still be exercised reasonably and with due regard to Charter values.

The appellant did not pursue the reasonableness challenge to the specific refusal decision before the Court.

The appeal addressed exclusion from refugee protection under art. 1F(a) for alleged complicity in crimes against humanity by a state official.

The Court rejected guilt by association and held that exclusion requires serious reasons for considering the claimant voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the group’s crime or criminal purpose.

It clarified that passive acquiescence or mere rank is insufficient, and that analysis must remain individualized and contextual.

The matter was remitted to a new panel for redetermination under the refined contribution-based test.

The appellant municipality challenged the federal minister's valuation of lands at a national historic site for payments in lieu of municipal property taxes.

The Court held that, while the minister may form an independent opinion of property value, that opinion must reflect how an assessment authority would value the property under the applicable tax system and must remain consistent with the governing statute's fairness objectives.

The Court found the nominal valuation approach unreasonable because it lacked evidentiary grounding in assessment practice and effectively undermined the statutory scheme's inclusion of historic sites.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted for redetermination by the minister, with any new advisory panel required to be differently constituted.

The appellants, recognized as Convention refugees in Canada due to persecution in Hungary based on their Roma ethnic origin, were sought for extradition by Hungary on fraud charges.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding they had not established a continuing risk of persecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Minister has the authority to extradite a refugee, the Minister erred by placing the burden on the refugees to prove they would face persecution if returned.

The Court ruled that under section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, a recognized refugee is presumed to face prejudice, and the burden is on the state to show the person is no longer entitled to refugee protection.

The appellant, a Convention refugee in Canada, was sought for extradition by Romania to serve a prison sentence for forging visas.

The Minister of Justice ordered his surrender, applying a test that required the appellant to prove he would face persecution that shocks the conscience.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its concurrent decision in Németh v. Canada (Justice).

The Court held that the Minister applied the wrong legal principles because the appellant's refugee status had not been revoked, and the Minister should have considered section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act rather than requiring the appellant to prove persecution under section 44(1)(a).

The matter was remitted to the Minister for reconsideration.

The appellant, named in a security certificate, sought a stay of proceedings after learning that CSIS had destroyed operational notes from his interviews and that the ministers had introduced new evidence late in the process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that CSIS has a statutory and constitutional duty to retain and disclose its operational notes in targeted investigations, as the destruction of such notes compromises the judicial review process and the named person's right to procedural fairness under section 7 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was premature and inappropriate at this interlocutory stage, and that the designated judge's decision to grant an adjournment remedied the late disclosure.

The Court also confirmed that new evidence may be admitted at any stage of the security certificate review.