Emmeline Morse

The applicants sought further relief in an ongoing Commercial List proceeding involving the appointment of a manager over several corporations.

A respondent argued that the court was functus officio because the earlier order appointing the manager was final, invoking cause of action estoppel.

The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that receivership or management orders are inherently ongoing and include come‑back clauses allowing parties to seek further directions.

The judge held that such orders are intended to function as a “living declaration,” and that additional relief or amendments to the application could be considered without requiring a new proceeding.

The preliminary objection was dismissed and the court retained jurisdiction to hear further matters in the proceeding.

The applicants moved for the appointment of an Inspector as receiver/manager over 31 jointly owned commercial real estate corporations.

The court found significant evidence of oppressive conduct by the respondents, including the unauthorized placement of mortgages, misappropriation of funds for personal use, co-mingling of bank accounts, and failure to maintain proper books and records.

Concluding that the applicants' interests required protection and that the respondents had breached their contractual obligations, the court held it was just and convenient to appoint the receiver/manager.

The appellants sued the respondent for breach of confidence, alleging the respondent misused ticket booking data provided to it for billing and settlement purposes to create a competing data product.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the information was not communicated in confidence, largely due to the absence of a confidentiality clause in favour of the appellants in the relevant agreements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in his assessment of the factual matrix and the reasonable person standard.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal amend a previous decision dismissing the application for delay, arguing that the decision mischaracterized its position regarding whether the applicant's lay-off was temporary or permanent.

The respondent sought the amendment under Rule 25, which allows for the correction of clerical errors.

The Tribunal acknowledged the mischaracterization but dismissed the request, finding that reassessing the interpretation of submissions goes beyond correcting a minor, obvious clerical error.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and sex.

The respondent brought a Request for an Order During Proceedings to dismiss the application for delay, arguing it was filed outside the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the last incident of alleged discrimination occurred on August 4, 2008, when the applicant was laid off, and that the application filed in October 2009 was out of time.

The Tribunal further held that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation to establish that the delay was incurred in good faith.

The application was dismissed.