Elizabeth Iwata

Following earlier reasons in which the respondents were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, the court determined the quantum of costs payable by the applicant.

Separate bills of costs were submitted by counsel for two respondents, each including disbursements and HST.

Although one respondent’s counsel worked with junior lawyers and produced a slightly higher bill, the court found the respondents had shared responsibility for responding to the application approximately equally.

Using one bill as a baseline, the court awarded identical costs to both respondents.

An insurer sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend insured parties in an underlying civil action arising from a pellet gun shooting involving a minor driver and passengers.

The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury caused by any intentional or criminal act or failure to act.

The court held that the claim against the minor driver arose from intentional or criminal conduct and fell within the exclusion clause, relieving the insurer of the duty to defend him.

However, the claims against the parents for negligent supervision constituted separate torts and were not derivative of the intentional conduct.

The insurer was therefore required to defend the parents in the underlying action.

The applicant insurer sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend its insureds—a minor and his parents—in a civil action arising from a pellet gun shooting.

The minor had been driving a car while his friends shot pellet guns, injuring the plaintiff, and was convicted of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The parents were sued for negligent supervision.

The court held that the minor's actions fell within the policy's intentional or criminal act exclusion, relieving the insurer of the duty to defend him.

However, the court found that the negligence claims against the parents were separate and not derivative of the intentional tort, meaning the exclusion clause did not apply to them and the insurer retained a duty to defend the parents.

The appellant insurer failed to give the respondent insurer the required 90-day written notice of its intention to dispute liability for statutory accident benefits under O. Reg. 283/95.

The appellant argued that a letter from the insured's counsel to the respondent constituted sufficient notice, and alternatively, that a subsequent change in case law justified an extension of the notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a third-party letter does not satisfy the strict notice requirements of the Regulation, that courts cannot grant equitable relief from forfeiture to bypass the statutory scheme, and that evolving jurisprudence does not render the 90-day period insufficient to make a liability determination.