David Swift

The Upper Thames River Conservation Authority (UTRCA) brought a motion for party status in an appeal under the Drainage Act regarding a petition for drainage works.

The Township of Zorra had previously declined to proceed with the drainage works because the potential outlet was subject to a court order requiring the petitioner to rehabilitate lands under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the UTRCA's motion, finding that while its interests might be affected if an engineer's report is eventually produced, its intervention as a party at this preliminary stage of the appeal was premature.

The Tribunal held a Case Management Conference regarding an appeal from the respondent conservation authority's refusal to permit the construction of a pool cabana.

The parties indicated a willingness to discuss settlement but requested a hearing date in the alternative.

The Tribunal scheduled a one-day video hearing and directed the parties to file a Procedural Order and Issues List.

The plaintiff subcontractor and defendant general contractor both brought summary judgment motions in a contract dispute arising from a highway bridge construction project.

The plaintiff claimed the unpaid balance of its contract, while the defendant claimed damages for delays caused by the plaintiff's admitted negligence, which resulted in the owner assessing liquidated damages against the defendant.

The court held that the exclusion of liability clause in the plaintiff's estimate did not protect it from damages arising from its own negligence.

The court awarded judgment to both parties and applied legal set-off, resulting in a net judgment in favour of the defendant.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment finding her personally liable to the respondent bank under section 100 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge found that the appellant's company and her father's bankrupt company engaged in a non-arm's length transaction for less than fair market value, and that the appellant was privy to the transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant, as the sole principal and controlling mind of her company, was privy to the transaction because she had knowledge of it and benefited from it.

The respondent's cross-appeal for substantial indemnity costs was also dismissed.

The appellant and respondent entered into a co-habitation agreement acknowledging the appellant's $61,000 net equity in their home.

After separation, the appellant obtained a consent judgment for the amount.

The respondent subsequently made an assignment in bankruptcy and was discharged.

The appellant appealed the discharge, arguing for the first time that the $61,000 was a contingent obligation for future spousal support that should survive bankruptcy under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was a transparent attempt to shelter the debt from bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the agreement clearly related to the appellant's net equity in the matrimonial home.

The petitioning creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor on a promissory note and subsequently filed a petition for a receiving order based on this single debt.

The bankruptcy judge granted the petition, finding that the unpaid judgment automatically constituted special circumstances under s. 42(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a judgment constitutes a continuing demand, a single judgment debt does not automatically establish an act of bankruptcy.

The court must consider all circumstances, including the size of the judgment, how long it has been outstanding, and collection efforts.

The appeal was allowed, the receiving order set aside, and the matter remitted to the bankruptcy judge.