David Ross

The applicant, who is legally blind, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

She claimed she was excluded from applying for a Director position because the job posting required a valid driver's licence.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding it had no reasonable prospect of success.

Because the applicant never actually applied for the position or requested accommodation, she did not experience any adverse treatment or exclusion, rendering the alleged discrimination purely theoretical.

The applicant, an Emergency After Hours Service worker, alleged that his employment was terminated because of his race, contrary to the Human Rights Code.

The respondent terminated the applicant's services after an investigation concluded he had instructed the answering service to defer calls until the office opened, effectively refusing to take emergency calls.

The applicant argued that deferring non-urgent calls was a common practice among non-racialized workers who were not disciplined.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had indeed refused calls and that there was no evidence other workers engaged in the same practice.

The application was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish discrimination.

The respondent requested an adjournment of the scheduled hearing because it had temporarily laid off its entire workforce due to financing issues, leaving its counsel without an instructing client.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing the respondent's owner could instruct counsel and witnesses could be summoned.

The Tribunal found that the lack of an instructing client constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying an adjournment to ensure natural justice and procedural fairness.

The adjournment was granted, with directions for rescheduling.

The respondent requested an adjournment of the scheduled hearing dates, citing a massive system-wide transition at its workplace that required the attendance of its advisor and key witness.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting its practice of granting adjournments only in exceptional circumstances.

The Tribunal found that the respondent failed to establish exceptional circumstances, as it appeared the individuals would be available, and alternative arrangements could be made for obtaining instructions if necessary.

The respondent requested that the human rights application alleging failure to accommodate a disability be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Code, arguing the substance was dealt with by the WSIB.

The Tribunal declined to dismiss the application because the WSIB adjudication was ongoing, with an objection pending before an Appeals Resolution Officer.

However, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the WSIB Appeals Resolution Officer's decision, as the issue of whether the applicant refused suitable work was virtually identical in both proceedings.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights application after he failed to attend a scheduled summary hearing.

The applicant argued his failure to attend was due to an acute viral illness and a belief that he would be arrested if he participated.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had not provided an adequate explanation for his failure to participate, even by telephone, and had not met the criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The respondents' positions in the Alberta public service were privatized, and they accepted employment with a new private association.

A letter of intent between the government and the union stated that employees accepting such employment would not be entitled to severance pay under the collective agreement.

The respondents brought a civil action seeking a declaration of entitlement to severance pay, alleging their resignations were procured under duress.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement.

Therefore, the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator, and the civil action was properly struck.