David Delagran

The applicant challenged the validity of her mother's 2016 Will and an inter vivos transfer of the mother's home to the respondent sister, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence.

The mother had a history of cognitive decline and was highly dependent on the respondent, who isolated her from the applicant.

The court found that the mother lacked testamentary capacity at the time the documents were executed and was subjected to undue influence by the respondent.

The 2016 Will and the property transfer were set aside, and the mother's prior 2007 Will was reinstated.

The appellant owns a cottage lot with a right-of-way over the respondents' beach lot for 'all the usual purposes'.

The appellant sought a declaration that this included the right to launch and retrieve watercraft using a motor vehicle.

The application judge held that the right-of-way was limited to pedestrian access and the portaging of small craft, based on historical use and the intention of the original grantor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the easement did not permit motorized vehicles to cross the beach.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation, the successful plaintiffs sought costs of $19,726.56, arguing for substantial indemnity based on an offer to settle.

The court found the offer was arguably not timely under Rule 49 and doubted whether a responding party on a motion is entitled to the same costs consequences as a plaintiff in an action.

Applying principles of proportionality and Rule 57, the court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs fixed at $10,187.30.

At a trial management conference for a will challenge and related gift challenge, the court directed that the two proceedings be tried together to avoid duplicating evidence regarding the deceased's capacity.

The court ordered that evidence in chief be given primarily by affidavit, with limited oral examination, and set a timetable for the exchange of materials and a pre-trial conference.

The applicants sought to remove the respondent as attorney for personal care and to obtain injunctive relief requiring reinstatement of PEG feeding for an incapable parent with end-stage Alzheimer's Disease.

After hearing evidence from the treating palliative care physician and submissions from all parties, the court applied the incapable person's best interests and prior wishes under the governing statutory scheme.

The court concluded that continued PEG feeds provided no benefit, had become burdensome, and that discontinuance was consistent with the authority granted under the power of attorney for personal care.

The temporary injunction was lifted and the respondent was permitted to discontinue PEG feeds in accordance with the medical opinion.