David A. Broad

Two tenants of a shopping plaza appealed the dismissal of their applications regarding parking covenants in their respective commercial leases.

Good Life Corporation argued its lease guaranteed unlimited access to all parking spaces and prohibited the landlord from granting exclusive spaces to other tenants.

Royal LePage argued its lease entitled it to 30 exclusive parking spaces.

The Court of Appeal held that Good Life's lease only guaranteed general access to the parking lot, but prohibited the landlord from reducing the number of available spaces by granting additional reserved spaces to other tenants after the lease commenced.

The Court also held that Royal LePage was only entitled to 6 reserved spaces, not 30.

Both appeals were allowed in part to issue declarations clarifying these rights.

The appellant sued her former father-in-law's estate for unjust enrichment, seeking compensation for services she provided to her in-laws during her marriage.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding her contributions were not substantial enough and there was no shared expectation of compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting that the appellant's services were no more than what might reasonably be expected from a loving daughter-in-law, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Two applications for judicial review were brought regarding preliminary awards by a labour arbitrator.

Solidwear sought to review the arbitrator's decision denying it party standing as a potential related employer.

Valleycroft, a bankrupt employer, sought to review the arbitrator's decision refusing to allow it to argue that the union's grievance was untimely.

The Divisional Court dismissed a preliminary motion to quash Solidwear's application for delay.

The Court dismissed Solidwear's application, finding the arbitrator's decision on standing was not patently unreasonable.

However, the Court granted Valleycroft's application, holding that the arbitrator's refusal to hear arguments on the timeliness of the grievance was a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted board of arbitration.

The moving party union sought to quash the responding party employer's application for judicial review of a preliminary arbitration award on the basis of undue delay.

The employer had delayed 16 months in commencing the application and 21 months in perfecting it.

Applying the test for undue delay, the court found that while the delay was substantial, there was no actual prejudice to the union because the underlying employment relationship had ceased years prior due to bankruptcy, and the issue was a pure question of law regarding related employer status.

The motion to quash was dismissed, and the employer's cross-motion to have its application heard together with a related application was granted.

The appellants sought a stay of execution on a default judgment of approximately $57,000 that had stood unchallenged for over twelve years.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay.

The appeal from the Divisional Court order was dismissed.

The appellant, an insurance broker, was dismissed for cause by the respondent employers who alleged incompetence, primarily based on a failure to secure coverage for a client.

The trial judge found no just cause, noting the employers had condoned earlier alleged errors by offering continued employment, and awarded damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Divisional Court overturned the trial decision, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and misapplied the doctrine of condonation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the Divisional Court failed to accord proper deference to the trial judge's findings of mixed fact and law regarding condonation and his assessment of the evidence.

The appellant challenged summary judgment holding him personally liable on a countermanded cheque issued in payment of part of an account for professional services.

The court held that the cheque notation identifying a principal and using the word "per" indicated a representative signature rather than a personal one.

It further held that the trade-name liability provision did not apply because the appellant did not sign in the trade name, but as agent for the identified principal.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment motion was dismissed, and the cross-appeal on costs was dismissed without costs.