Brian G. Grant

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking court approval of a settlement in a personal injury action involving a minor plaintiff arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The settlement resolved claims against several municipal defendants responsible for roadway maintenance and resulted in dismissal of the action, including related third party claims.

Third parties opposed the settlement on the basis that they wished the municipality to remain in the litigation, but the court held they had previously chosen not to advance a third party claim and had provided no sufficient basis to reject the settlement.

After reviewing the supporting materials and affidavits, the court concluded the settlement was reasonable and in the best interests of the minor plaintiff.

The settlement was therefore approved and the action dismissed as against the settling parties.

During a jury trial for damages arising from a police dog bite, the plaintiff brought a supplementary motion to admit photographs of his injuries and medical records.

The plaintiff argued the evidence was relevant to the issue of excessive force and to challenge the credibility of the police officers regarding the number of times he was bitten.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the photographs required expert interpretation to be probative and that the medical records contained hearsay regarding the circumstances of the incident.

In a civil jury trial arising from injuries suffered when a police canine apprehended the plaintiff, the moving party sought to admit photographs of his injuries, medical records, and medical testimony describing the nature and severity of the injuries.

The parties had already settled the quantum of damages, leaving only liability and contributory negligence to be determined.

The court held that the severity of the injuries was not relevant to whether the police acted reasonably in deploying the canine or whether the officers could rely on s. 25 of the Criminal Code.

Even if marginally relevant, the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect and the risk of distracting the jury.

The court therefore excluded the photographs, medical records, and medical evidence but permitted a brief general description of the injuries to avoid speculation by the jury.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of a police officer defendant’s Crown brief relating to later criminal charges and the officer’s full personnel file in a civil action alleging negligent deployment of a police canine.

The court held that documentary production under the Rules of Civil Procedure requires relevance to matters pleaded in the action.

The criminal charges arose after the incident and were unrelated to the officer’s duties as a police canine handler, rendering the Crown brief irrelevant.

The court further held that disciplinary materials under the Police Services Act were protected by statutory privilege and that the plaintiff had not established grounds for additional production after the action had been set down for trial.

The motion for production and leave for further production were denied.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement, arguing in part that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias because of comments made by the motion judge at a previous adjournment hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's comments were merely efforts to assist an unrepresented litigant and did not meet the test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also found no reason to interfere with the order enforcing the settlement, noting that a rehearing would yield the same result.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the claim, and the applicant commenced arbitration.

However, the applicant subsequently moved without notifying his counsel or the Commission, failed to attend the pre-hearing, and failed to attend the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's conduct amounted to a constructive withdrawal and an abuse of process.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's $3,000 assessment fee and its expenses of the arbitration.