Brendan Morrison

The plaintiffs commenced a third separate action in Toronto against neonatal care professionals and a hospital for injuries sustained by a newborn, having already commenced two actions in Brampton for the same injuries arising from a car accident and birthing care.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Toronto action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs should have sought leave to add them to the existing Brampton actions.

The court agreed, finding the separate action was a tactical maneuver to avoid the leave requirement and potential limitation period defences.

The court stayed the Toronto action pending a motion to amend in Brampton, while strongly criticizing the parties for engaging in costly and delaying procedural disputes contrary to the culture shift mandated by Hryniak.

The plaintiff sought leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act to bring a statutory cause of action for secondary market misrepresentation against the defendant corporation, and to certify the action as a class proceeding.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant made material misrepresentations in its financial statements, which were later restated.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the plaintiff had no reasonable possibility of success because the specific misrepresentations pleaded were not material to a reasonable investor, and the alleged corrective disclosure did not relate to the pleaded misrepresentations.

Consequently, the certification motion was also dismissed.

The plaintiff sued two doctors for medical malpractice, alleging that a failure to notify her of a referral appointment led to prolonged casting of her fractured fingers and a poorer outcome.

The court found that the referring doctor's office had properly notified the plaintiff of the appointment, which she failed to attend.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert evidence that the prolonged casting met the standard of care given the severity of the fractures, and that any delay in mobilization did not cause the plaintiff's permanent impairment.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants sought costs following a motion for the production of documents.

Both parties claimed success on the motion.

The court found that the applicants were substantially more successful, as the respondent's principal position was that no disclosure should be ordered, forcing the applicants to bring the motion.

The court awarded the applicants costs fixed at $11,500 on an all-inclusive basis, reflecting a reduction for their lack of success on an alternative argument.

On a motion for a stay pending leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada, the moving parties sought to suspend an order holding that Ontario had jurisdiction over an action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment of approximately $9.51 billion.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test as modified for stays pending leave applications, requiring consideration not only of a serious issue but also of the merit and public importance requirements under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act.

The court found serious questions concerning recognition and enforcement jurisdiction, enforcement against a non-party to the foreign judgment, and the possible role of corporate veil-piercing, all of which met the public importance threshold.

Although irreparable harm was shown only weakly, the balance of convenience and interests of justice favoured a temporary pause pending the Supreme Court of Canada’s leave determinations.

The motions were granted and the parties bore their own costs.

The appellants, indigenous Ecuadorian villagers, obtained a multi-billion dollar judgment in Ecuador against the respondent corporation for environmental pollution.

They brought an action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the judgment against the corporation and its Canadian subsidiary.

The motion judge found that Ontario had jurisdiction but stayed the action on his own initiative, finding the corporation had no assets in Ontario and the corporate veil of the subsidiary could not be pierced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the motion judge erred in granting an unrequested discretionary stay and prematurely deciding the merits of the enforcement action.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, confirming that a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and Ontario is not required to establish jurisdiction for an action to enforce a foreign judgment.