Andrew Graham

The appellant, a paramedic, appealed the Minister of Transportation's decision to downgrade her Class F driver's licence to a Class G licence due to an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) implanted following a cardiac arrest.

The Minister relied on CCMTA standards which state commercial drivers are ineligible for a licence with an ICD.

The Tribunal found that the appellant's risk of sudden incapacitation was very low (less than 1%), she had no recurrences since the implant, and her cardiologists supported her fitness to work.

The Tribunal preferred the Canadian Medical Association directives allowing individual assessment for low-risk patients over the strict CCMTA standards.

The Tribunal set aside the Minister's decision and reinstated the Class F licence.

The appellant's request for costs was denied.

The plaintiff, Distinctive by Design Fine Cabinetry Inc., brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, 1226132 Ontario Inc., after the defendant failed to defend a claim alleging negligence and breach of contract.

The claim arose from water damage to the plaintiff's property caused by ruptured pipes during the defendant's installation of a new HVAC system.

The court found the defendant liable based on deemed admissions from the statement of claim and granted judgment to the plaintiff for $153,526.26, plus pre- and post-judgment interest and costs.

The applicant, a surveillance services provider, sought an order compelling its insurers to provide a defence to an underlying action alleging criminal harassment, conspiracy, and negligence related to surveillance, and an automobile incident.

The applicant also sought reimbursement of defence expenses and the right to choose its own counsel.

The court found that the negligence claims related to surveillance were not derivative of intentional torts and triggered the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy's duty to defend.

The court also found that the non-owned automobile (NOA) policy triggered a duty to defend for the auto claims, as the policy's language was broad and not limited to rental cars.

However, the court denied the applicant's request to choose its own counsel, affirming the insurers' contractual right to control the defence in the absence of a conflict of interest.

The court reconsidered its previous decision to decline scheduling a summary judgment motion due to the significant and indefinite delays in civil trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Initially, the court deemed a trial more efficient, but the changed circumstances rendered trial scheduling unrealistic for the foreseeable future.

Consequently, leave was granted to the defendants to bring a summary judgment motion under Rule 20 to test insurance defences, as this mechanism was now considered more efficient for streamlining issues given the prolonged trial backlog.

Directions were provided for electronic filing and virtual hearing protocols.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to add two additional defendants in an action alleging wrongful dismissal and related civil wrongs.

The proposed defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that the applicable two‑year limitation period had expired under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court considered the discoverability doctrine and whether the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the involvement of the proposed defendants more than two years before the motion was served.

Finding the evidentiary record insufficient to determine the discoverability issue conclusively, the court granted leave to amend and permitted the proposed defendants to plead a limitations defence.

Costs of the motion were reserved.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action on the grounds that her re-amended statement of claim was verbose, pleaded evidence, attempted to re-litigate matters finally disposed of, and was an abuse of process.

The appellant also brought a preliminary motion to strike the respondents' affidavits because they were sworn by associates in the same law firms as counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motion, finding the affidavits dealt with facts already on the record.

The Court also dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the underlying basis for the appellant's claims—the trustee's right to proceed with the sale of the matrimonial home after the husband's discharge from bankruptcy—had been conclusively determined in earlier proceedings.

The union filed an unfair labour practice complaint alleging the employer violated section 70 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by refusing to provide the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of bargaining unit employees.

The employer argued it was protecting employee privacy.

The Board held that the union requires this information to fulfill its statutory duty of fair representation and that the employer's refusal, while bona fide, interfered with the union's representation capacity.

The Board ordered the employer to provide the information but dismissed the union's application for consent to prosecute, finding the employer's conduct was not flagrant or egregious.

The union filed an unfair labour practice complaint alleging the employer violated section 70 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by refusing to provide the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of bargaining unit employees.

The employer argued its refusal was based on a policy to protect employee privacy.

The Board found that the union requires this information to fulfill its statutory duty to represent employees fairly and effectively.

The Board held that the employer's refusal, while bona fide, interfered with the union's representation capacity without a sufficient countervailing business purpose, thereby violating section 70.

The employer was ordered to provide the information.

The union's application for consent to prosecute was dismissed as the employer's conduct was not egregious or flagrant.