Amanda K. Worley

The appellant, a lawyer whose licence was revoked for professional misconduct, appealed the Law Society Tribunal's decision to the Divisional Court.

As part of his appeal, he brought a motion for a sealing order to prevent public access to various medical reports detailing his mental health, which had been filed during the discipline proceedings.

The court applied the Sierra Club test and found that the open court principle should yield to protect the appellant's privacy and dignity, given the serious risk of self-harm and the fact that sufficient information about his misconduct was already public.

The motion for a sealing order was granted.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which affirmed the Hearing Division's findings of professional misconduct and the revocation of his licence.

The appellant had fabricated disbursement invoices and misrepresented billable hours to Legal Aid Ontario.

He argued that his actions were impulsive and caused by mental health disabilities, raising a human rights accommodation defence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and no palpable and overriding error in the Hearing Division's conclusion that the misconduct was calculated and not causally connected to his mental illness.

The self-represented appellant moved to set aside the Divisional Court's decision dismissing his appeal from a Law Society of Ontario disbarment order, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias against the presiding judge.

The appellant argued that the judge's prior refusal to allow a lengthy factum, the scheduling of the appeal, and the conduct during the hearing demonstrated bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that routine procedural directions, standard scheduling practices, and normal appellate questioning do not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding a finding of professional misconduct and a penalty of a seven-month suspension and $50,000 in costs.

The misconduct arose from an estate matter where the appellant provided legal and administrative services, having the client enter into a compensation agreement with his corporation without independent legal advice.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was in a clear conflict of interest and that the penalty was within the reasonable range.