A. Edgar

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 15-year-old complainant.

The accused raised the defences of mistake of age and consent.

The court applied the three-step framework from Carbone to assess the mistake of age defence, finding that the accused took virtually no steps to ascertain the complainant's age, thereby negating the defence.

The court also found that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity and that there was no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

During a judge-alone trial for sexual assault and sexual interference, the defence sought an adjournment to retain a new expert witness regarding the accused's cognitive functioning, after their initial proposed expert was rejected.

The Crown opposed the adjournment.

The court granted the application, finding it prudent to reserve determination on the admissibility of the new expert's evidence until a voir dire could be held, as the evidence could potentially be relevant to the mens rea component of the offences.

During a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference, the defence sought to introduce expert opinion evidence regarding the accused's cognitive and intellectual functioning.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing the proposed expert lacked independence and relied on hearsay.

The court found that while the expert was adequately qualified, he acted as an advocate for the accused rather than an independent witness for the court.

Furthermore, the expert's opinions were based almost entirely on inadmissible hearsay from the accused and his mother.

Consequently, the application was dismissed and the expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after 1.44 kilograms of the drug were found in a hidden compartment of his luggage upon arrival at Pearson International Airport from St. Lucia.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge of the drugs.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, as documentary evidence and testimony established that the accused's bag had been lost for two days in St. Lucia, raising the reasonable inference that third parties planted the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference and bail breaches, the court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine whether the admitted intercourse was factually non-consensual for sentencing purposes, and also adjudicated related counts of uttering a threat, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

The court held that the complainant's account of forced intercourse was credible despite significant reliability problems, relying on the contemporaneous video statement, forensic DNA evidence confirming ejaculation, and post-event emotional state evidence used for limited permissible purposes.

The court rejected defence theories of fabrication based on fear of pregnancy, lateness for curfew, and alleged stereotypical expectations of victim behaviour.

The court found the intercourse occurred without actual consent, acquitted on the threat count because the particularized threat was not proven as directed to the complainant, and acquitted on the August 15 touching counts because the sexual nature of the act was not established.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on one count of sexual assault and two counts of breach of probation, the court assessed whether the Crown had proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision emphasized that credibility and reliability remain distinct concepts in sexual assault cases and that ordinary scrutiny applies, while guarding against improper myths about expected victim behaviour.

The court found multiple material inconsistencies between the complainant’s testimony, prior statements, police evidence, and nursing evidence.

Those inconsistencies raised a reasonable doubt, and all charges were dismissed.

The applicants, Brian Nelson and Andrew Ramdass, brought certiorari applications to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing them to stand trial for manslaughter.

The charges arose from a physical altercation between two groups that resulted in a death.

The court dismissed Nelson's application, finding there was direct evidence from a witness that he punched the victim, which was sufficient for committal.

However, the court granted Ramdass' application and quashed his committal, concluding there was no admissible evidence from which a properly instructed jury could infer he intentionally applied force to the victim.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and obstructing police after officers observed what they believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction from her vehicle.

The accused testified she was retrieving a lost cell phone, and her boyfriend testified he had hidden the drugs in her car without her knowledge.

The court found the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding her knowledge of the drugs, resulting in acquittals on the drug charges.

However, the accused was convicted of obstructing police for actively resisting her arrest.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following continued detention after his sureties withdrew.

The court determined that the earlier release order remained valid and that procedural irregularities in the surety-rendering process under s. 766 resulted in unlawful detention.

The justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to impose a new detention order under s. 515(6) while a prior release order remained in effect.

Although the bail review itself was dismissed, the court granted habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to remedy the unlawful detention and restore the applicant’s ability to secure release under the original release order.