R. Prihar

The accused was tried for two counts of first-degree murder in the stabbing deaths of his wife and mother-in-law.

The Crown argued for constructive first-degree murder on the basis that the killings occurred during a forcible confinement.

The accused conceded he killed the victims but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to intoxication and denied forcible confinement.

The court rejected the intoxication defence, finding the accused had the intent to murder based on his actions, the extent of the injuries, and his post-offence conduct.

The court also found that the accused forcibly confined the victims by dragging them from an upstairs bedroom to the kitchen where the fatal wounds were inflicted.

The accused was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

In a criminal trial involving charges related to sexual services, the defence requested several specific jury instructions during a pre-charge conference.

The trial judge declined to give a Vetrovec warning, finding the complainant was not an inherently unreliable witness.

The judge also refused to instruct the jury on the material benefit exception under s. 286.2(4) of the Criminal Code, as the evidence did not support its application.

The judge agreed to provide a specific instruction regarding the frailty of text message evidence due to the complainant's admission of deleting texts.

Finally, the judge ruled that 'control, direction, or influence over the movements of a person' under s. 286.3(1) includes non-physical movements such as setting prices for sexual services.

During a trial involving allegations of selling sexual services, the Crown sought to introduce the accused's hotel registration cards as business records.

The Crown conceded it failed to meet the notice requirements under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act but argued the records were admissible under the common law exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the records met the common law requirements for reliability and necessity.

However, the court excluded the accused's records because the Crown had explicitly stated in its pre-trial conference form that it would not rely on hearsay or its exceptions, and had never amended the form.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit the accused's police statement as voluntary, while the accused sought its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The accused was arrested for uttering threats in front of his family but was not advised of his right to counsel or the additional procuring charges until 11 minutes later in a separate room.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the accused had an operating mind.

Although the court found breaches of s. 10(a) and 10(b) due to the 11-minute delay, it declined to exclude the statement under s. 24(2), concluding the breach was minor and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the impact of the breach.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with a 17-year-old complainant in a motel room.

The complainant alleged that she was intoxicated by alcohol and marijuana and was sexually assaulted despite expressing non-consent.

The accused maintained that the sexual activity was entirely consensual.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the conflicting testimony.

While the court found the accused's evidence to be incredible and incapable of raising a reasonable doubt, it also found significant reliability issues with the complainant's evidence, including memory gaps and inconsistencies.

Consequently, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The offender was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after losing control of her vehicle on a highway and striking another car, causing a broken clavicle to a passenger.

The offender had a prior conviction for driving over 80.

The court sentenced the offender to 15 months' imprisonment, a three-year driving prohibition, and one year of probation, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a late‑night highway collision that injured an occupant of another vehicle.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including erratic driving behaviour, the presence of alcohol containers in the vehicle, witness observations of alcohol odour and slurred speech, and the accused’s statement to a treating nurse that she had consumed alcohol and was fatigued.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that she had not consumed alcohol that day and found the defence evidence not credible under the W.(D.) framework.

The court concluded that alcohol impaired the accused’s ability to drive and that her driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

Convictions were entered on both counts.