Kim Walker

The applicant sought a review of his detention order based on a material change in circumstances after resolving subsequent charges incurred while on bail.

Although the court agreed the resolution of the subsequent charges constituted a material change, it dismissed the application.

The court found that the applicant's extensive criminal record, history of breaching court orders, and the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case demonstrated a substantial likelihood that he would reoffend, making his continued detention necessary on the secondary ground.

The offender was convicted of multiple firearms offences, including possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, which typically attract a penitentiary sentence, the court found exceptional circumstances.

The offender demonstrated extraordinary rehabilitation, securing employment, volunteering extensively, and becoming a role model for at-risk youth.

The court imposed a two-year conditional sentence, finding that the offender's service in the community would not endanger public safety and that denunciation and deterrence could be achieved through strict conditions, including house arrest.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge on charges of impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The trial judge had found that the institutional delay of 11.5 months exceeded the Morin guidelines and breached the respondent's right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

On appeal, the Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by characterizing neutral delay as institutional, reducing the actual institutional delay to 9 months, which falls within the guidelines.

The court also found the trial judge erred by failing to balance society's interest in a trial on the merits against the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had acquitted after finding reasonable doubt as to whether the accused actually had alcohol in her system.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred by conflating the requirement of reasonable suspicion for a roadside demand with proof that alcohol was actually present.

The proper inquiry was whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect alcohol in the accused’s body at the time of the demand.

Because the officer testified that he smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath and the trial judge accepted that evidence, the reasonable suspicion threshold was met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for uttering a death threat under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the accused’s mens rea.

The trial judge had accepted that the words were spoken but concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended the threat to be taken seriously or to intimidate the correctional officer.

On appeal, the court held that acquittals grounded in the presumption of innocence and the Crown’s failure to meet the burden of proof are not findings of fact but conclusions based on the standard of proof.

Such determinations are generally not amenable to appellate intervention absent legal error or palpable and overriding error.

Finding no misapprehension of evidence or other reviewable error, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for attempting to disarm a police officer, assaulting a police officer, assaulting a police officer to prevent arrest, and two counts of breach of probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest contrary to the principles in R. v. W.D., and that the judge shifted the burden of proof by drawing adverse inferences from the absence of defence evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, rejected the appellant’s testimony with reasons, and then considered whether the remaining evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The judge’s comments regarding the absence of corroborating evidence merely observed the evidentiary record and did not shift the burden of proof.

The convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault with a weapon against his girlfriend.

At trial, the judge accepted the complainant's evidence that the appellant smashed a beer glass over her head, rejecting the appellant's denial.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, no misapprehension of evidence, no bias, and rejecting the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the four-month custodial sentence and probation as fit for an act of domestic violence.

A self‑represented applicant sought prerogative relief after a justice of the peace declined to accept a proposed private prosecution information alleging multiple Criminal Code offences against a utility company and its officials.

The court held that the justice of the peace erred in law by refusing to receive the information under s. 504 of the Criminal Code, as the informant had an absolute right to swear an information alleging offences known to law.

However, the court concluded that the error caused no prejudice because the evidence disclosed no prima facie case for any of the alleged offences, meaning process would inevitably have been refused under s. 507.1.

Applying discretionary principles governing mandamus, the court declined to grant relief.

The application for mandamus was therefore dismissed.

The accused appealed convictions for multiple counts of assault and theft under $5,000 arising from two late‑night group robberies of pedestrians.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, and alternatively that the sentence of a suspended sentence with 30 months’ probation was unfit because the trial judge declined to grant a conditional discharge.

The court reviewed the standard governing appellate intervention for unreasonable verdicts and concluded the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence, including eyewitness identification, the discovery of stolen property at the appellant’s feet in the vehicle, and credibility findings rejecting the appellant’s testimony.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to rely on the identification evidence and reject exculpatory testimony from both the appellant and a co‑accused attempting to minimize the appellant’s role.

The sentence was also upheld, with the court finding that a conditional discharge would have been contrary to the public interest given the planned and intimidating nature of the assaults and thefts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault with a weapon following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where an absolute discharge had been imposed.

The case largely turned on the credibility of the complainant, the sole witness.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence suggesting the complainant may have misled the court about whether he had read a letter from his son before providing it to the Crown.

The court admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have been used to impeach the complainant’s credibility and might have created reasonable doubt.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied uneven scrutiny to the testimony of the complainant and the accused, and failed to recognize implausibilities in the complainant’s account.

The Superior Court reviewed the trial judge’s credibility findings and the alleged inconsistency between the complainant’s trial testimony and her prior police statement.

The court held that the discrepancy related only to the timing of events and was reasonably characterized by the trial judge as not material.

The court also found no basis to conclude that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence or failed to apply the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

The conviction was upheld.