Kevin Ludgate

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude DNA and fingerprint evidence, arguing that police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching a public genetic genealogy database (GEDmatch) and seizing cast-off DNA without judicial authorization.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public database search results.

Furthermore, applying horizontal stare decisis, the court held it was bound by prior decisions establishing that the seizure of discarded items for DNA analysis does not violate s. 8.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to adduce evidence that a third party committed the offence.

The court assessed whether there was a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime to establish an air of reality for the defence.

Assuming the proposed evidence to be true, the court found that the third party's opportunity, admissions of guilt, fingerprint evidence, and other circumstantial factors met the air of reality threshold.

The application was granted, permitting the accused to lead the third-party suspect evidence at trial, with admissibility to be determined when tendered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following a first date arranged through an online dating site.

The complainant testified that she became ill after consuming wine, fell asleep, and awoke to the accused having unprotected sexual intercourse with her without her consent.

The accused claimed the complainant initiated the sexual activity and raised the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding he took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent after an initial rejection earlier in the evening.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, sought to exclude statements made to undercover officers during transport and to a detective during an interview.

He argued the statements were involuntary because police provided cigarettes as an inducement and failed to provide his prescribed anti-anxiety and anti-psychotic medication, breaching his section 7 Charter rights.

The court found the statements were voluntary, as the accused was in control and the circumstances were not oppressive.

The court also found no section 7 breach, as there was no causal connection between the lack of medication and the accused's decision to speak or his subsequent suicide attempt.

The motion to exclude the evidence was denied.