Keely Duncan

The accused, facing drug trafficking charges, brought a Garofoli application to challenge the validity of a search warrant executed at his motel room.

The warrant was based on tips from three confidential informants and police surveillance of a suspected drug transaction at a nearby drive-thru.

The court granted the accused limited leave to cross-examine the police affiant.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, finding that the totality of the circumstances, including the informant tips and corroborating police surveillance, provided a reasonable basis for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and robbery arising from an incident with the complainant following the accused’s release from custody.

The complainant alleged that the accused assaulted and sexually assaulted her after she visited his apartment, while the accused testified that the sexual activity was consensual and that the dispute related to drugs and money.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), the court found both the complainant and the accused to be unreliable witnesses.

Elements of the accused’s account were considered plausible and left the court with a reasonable doubt.

In light of inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence and inconclusive corroborative evidence, the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police officers attended a known problem house to check on tenants and observed the accused flee into a bathroom upon seeing them.

The officers detained the accused and conducted a pat-down search, finding crack cocaine in his pocket.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the investigative detention was lawful but the search violated s. 8 based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) because the officers acted in good faith according to the law as it was understood at the time.