Kaitlin Jagersky

The self-represented appellant mother sought leave to appeal a costs order made following a lengthy family law trial in which the respondent father was largely successful.

The trial judge had awarded the father net costs of $20,000 after setting off support arrears, noting the father's reasonable offers to settle and the mother's bad faith conduct.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the costs award was not plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

The applicant brought a motion seeking further financial disclosure from the respondent, specifically bank statements and cancelled cheques, in the context of a motion to change child support.

The applicant argued the disclosure was necessary to ascertain the respondent's true income, noting discrepancies between his hourly rate and reported income.

The court dismissed the motion for bank statements, finding the request disproportionate and akin to a fishing expedition, as the respondent was a unionized T4 employee with reasonable explanations for income fluctuations.

However, the court ordered the respondent to produce a more detailed employment letter.

Following a successful motion regarding a parenting schedule and school enrollment, the applicant sought full recovery costs of $21,425.93.

The respondent opposed, citing limited ability to pay and arguing the costs were excessive.

The court found the applicant was substantially successful and behaved reasonably, while the respondent's position was unreasonable.

Applying the principles of proportionality and reasonableness under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the applicant $14,000 in costs, payable in monthly installments of $400.

The parties separated and the mother unilaterally removed the children from the matrimonial home.

On an interim motion, the father sought to change the parenting schedule from 2-2-3 to 2-2-5-5 and to have the eldest child attend school in his catchment area, relying on an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) report.

The mother opposed the changes and sought to have the child attend school in her catchment area.

The court granted the father's requests, finding that the 2-2-5-5 schedule would reduce conflict through fewer exchanges, and that the mother's unilateral actions and alienating behaviour made the father's proposed school the better choice for the child's stability.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's award that determined it was not in the best interests of the parties' two children to be vaccinated.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator erred in his gatekeeping function by qualifying the respondent's experts, whose evidence on vaccine safety was unreliable and outside their expertise.

The arbitrator also erred by failing to admit government immunization guides under the public documents exception to the hearsay rule.

Having excluded the respondent's expert evidence and admitted the public documents and fresh expert evidence, the court found that the children's best interests required vaccination.

The appellant was granted sole decision-making responsibility for the children's vaccinations, and the respondent was ordered not to tell the children that vaccines are unsafe.

The moving party (respondent mother) brought a motion seeking the recusal of the case management judge from hearing an appeal regarding the vaccination of the parties' children.

The moving party argued that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed based on the judge's prior preliminary rulings in the case, decisions in unrelated family law cases involving public health guidelines, and media coverage of those decisions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prior decisions were based on existing law and did not demonstrate that the judge had entered the fray or predetermined the issues.

The court also held that a reasonable person would not rely on provocative media articles to conclude the judge could not decide the appeal fairly.