Justice D. C. Shaw

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for want of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs, an inventor and his company, sued multiple foreign corporate and individual defendants for breach of a Non-Disclosure Agreement and intellectual property claims.

The court found that the Non-Disclosure Agreement contained a clear forum selection clause designating Massachusetts.

Furthermore, applying the Van Breda test, the court held it lacked jurisdiction simpliciter as none of the presumptive connecting factors were present in Ontario.

The action was dismissed.

The defendant, a former police officer convicted of dangerous driving causing death, made Facebook posts implying the deceased victim contributed to the fatal collision and criticizing her family.

The plaintiffs (the victim's family) sued for defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and intrusion upon seclusion.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Facebook posts did not relate to a matter of public interest, but rather to the defendant's personal desire to shift blame and criticize private individuals.

The moving parties, a law firm and its senior partner, were successful in a summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff's action against them.

The plaintiff had alleged that the moving parties knowingly assisted in a dishonest and fraudulent act by their client, but provided no evidence to support this claim.

The court found that making such serious, unfounded allegations of fraud and dishonesty against lawyers warranted censure.

Consequently, the court awarded the moving parties their costs of the summary judgment motion on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000 for fees plus disbursements.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from alleged sexual activity with a complainant under 16 years of age.

Applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court found no basis to reject the accused's evidence that the sexual activity was consensual, and held the Crown had not proved lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the complainant's memory gap and the absence of expert evidence on intoxication and capacity.

On the sexual interference count, the court held there was an evidentiary basis for an honest but mistaken belief as to age and that the Crown had not disproved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain age in the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.