Justice A. A. Ghosh

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after cocaine was discovered in her purse during a mandatory security search at her high school prom.

The defendant challenged the search as violating her s. 8 Charter right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that although the search was mandatory and without individualized reasonable grounds, it was reasonable in all the circumstances given the school's duty to ensure student safety at an organized school event.

The court distinguished the case from more intrusive searches and held that students have a diminished expectation of privacy in the school setting.

The defendant's Charter application was denied and a finding of guilt was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to three trafficking-related charges involving significant quantities of carfentanil, fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine.

The court denied the accused's application for bail pending sentence, finding that he posed a substantial likelihood of reoffending and that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court imposed a global sentence of 12 years, with concurrent sentences on remaining counts, after considering mitigating factors including the accused's youth, family support, and employment history, as well as aggravating factors including his prior trafficking conviction, the dangerous nature of the drugs, and the large quantities involved.

The court also granted presentence custody credit, lockdown credit, and COVID-19 related credit.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified and driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the search of the vehicle, and the adequacy of Charter rights warnings, particularly regarding the right to counsel upon a change in jeopardy.

The court found the traffic stop was lawful based on reasonable suspicion and independent authority under the Highway Traffic Act.

Although the court found a violation of the right to counsel upon the change of jeopardy, the breath readings were admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter based on the minimal seriousness of the violation and the societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The applicant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

He applied to stay the charges alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from laying of charges to anticipated trial completion was 18 months and 27 days.

The court applied the new Jordan framework for determining unreasonable delay, finding that after deducting 39 days of defence delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found the defence had not established meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings, as counsel had repeatedly pursued a non-existent witness statement after the Crown and court were ready to set trial dates.

The application was dismissed and trial dates were upheld.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm under s. 272(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved the brutal sexual assault of an eighteen-year-old virgin victim in the early morning hours of January 1, 2016, in Newmarket.

The offender, intoxicated by cocaine and alcohol, followed the victim from a bus, dragged her onto a snow bank, and subjected her to multiple forms of sexual violence including forced oral sex and vaginal intercourse.

The victim suffered physical injuries and profound psychological trauma.

The court imposed a sentence of eight years in the penitentiary, less enhanced credit for presentence custody, resulting in 5 years and 10.5 months remaining to be served.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 20-year Sexual Offender Information Registry Act order, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement of the complainant, Ashley Briscoe, for its truth under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility established in R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The complainant had recanted her allegations during cross-examination after initially adopting her police statement during examination-in-chief.

The court found that both the necessity and reliability criteria were satisfied.

Necessity was established by the complainant's recantation, and reliability was supported by the videotaped nature of the statement, the availability of the declarant for cross-examination, an adequate K.G.B. caution, and corroborative evidence of the alleged injuries.