J. Janiuk

The 19-year-old first-time offender was found guilty of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of 28.58 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 4 years, while the defence sought a net sentence of 2 years and 1 month after enhanced credit.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the danger of combining drugs and loaded firearms.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years (3 years for the firearm and 1 year consecutive for the drugs), less 200 days of pre-sentence and Downes credit, resulting in a remnant sentence of 3 years and 165 days.

The applicant, charged with firearm and drug offences, brought a Charter application seeking the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

He argued that his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated during a high-risk police takedown where he was detained, searched, and his satchel was found to contain a loaded handgun and drugs.

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds for an investigative detention and that the search of the satchel was a lawful search incident to that detention due to safety concerns.

The court also held that the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was justified by the need to secure the scene.

The application was dismissed.

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit numerous ante‑mortem statements made by the deceased to friends and family describing the accused’s conduct and the deteriorating relationship between them.

The court reviewed the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the traditional “state of mind” exception and the principled hearsay exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

While acknowledging the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice associated with prior discreditable conduct and repetitive hearsay, the court held that most statements were relevant to motive, animus, planning and deliberation, and the criminal harassment component of constructive first degree murder.

The court excluded certain statements lacking sufficient reliability or probative value but admitted the majority of the evidence as part of the unfolding narrative of the relationship.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to introduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual may have committed the homicide.

The defence argued that the third party had the opportunity to commit the offence and had connections with individuals associated with the deceased.

The Crown opposed the motion, submitting the proposed theory was speculative and unsupported by evidence linking the third party to the crime.

Applying the principles governing third party suspect evidence, including the requirement of a sufficient evidentiary nexus, the court held that the proposed theory lacked an air of reality and would invite speculation.

The prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct involving two former spouses in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included allegations of jealousy, controlling behaviour, criminal harassment, and assault.

The Crown argued this similar fact evidence would assist in proving motive, identity, and the elements of first-degree murder.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Handy and concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, particularly moral and reasoning prejudice, outweighed its probative value.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a voir dire application seeking exclusion of photographs recovered from a seized Blackberry phone on the basis that they were inadmissible and prejudicial.

The Crown sought to rely on the photographs to show the accused possessed a handgun consistent with the firearm used in a shooting incident.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect framework, the court held that one photograph depicting incompatible ammunition lacked relevance and constituted impermissible propensity evidence.

However, two photographs depicting a handgun compatible with cartridge cases recovered at the scene were highly probative of the central issues of firearm possession and identity.

The potential prejudice could be mitigated by jury instructions and cross‑examination.

The court excluded the first photograph but admitted the other two at trial.