G. Dorsz

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit numerous ante‑mortem statements made by the deceased to friends and family describing the accused’s conduct and the deteriorating relationship between them.

The court reviewed the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the traditional “state of mind” exception and the principled hearsay exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

While acknowledging the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice associated with prior discreditable conduct and repetitive hearsay, the court held that most statements were relevant to motive, animus, planning and deliberation, and the criminal harassment component of constructive first degree murder.

The court excluded certain statements lacking sufficient reliability or probative value but admitted the majority of the evidence as part of the unfolding narrative of the relationship.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to introduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual may have committed the homicide.

The defence argued that the third party had the opportunity to commit the offence and had connections with individuals associated with the deceased.

The Crown opposed the motion, submitting the proposed theory was speculative and unsupported by evidence linking the third party to the crime.

Applying the principles governing third party suspect evidence, including the requirement of a sufficient evidentiary nexus, the court held that the proposed theory lacked an air of reality and would invite speculation.

The prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct involving two former spouses in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included allegations of jealousy, controlling behaviour, criminal harassment, and assault.

The Crown argued this similar fact evidence would assist in proving motive, identity, and the elements of first-degree murder.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Handy and concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, particularly moral and reasoning prejudice, outweighed its probative value.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.