Jean-Denis Bélec

The Workplace Safety & Insurance Board (WSIB) brought a Rule 2.1 motion to dismiss an urgent motion by Paul Taylor, one of the lead plaintiffs in a class action, who sought a contempt finding against WSIB for failing to finance his healthcare and an order compelling healthcare provision and monetary compensation.

The court found Taylor's motion lacked a basis for contempt as no prior court order had been breached.

Furthermore, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction over healthcare funding decisions, which fall under the exclusive authority of workers' compensation tribunals as per the Workplace Compensation Act and Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The WSIB's Rule 2.1 motion was granted, Taylor's motion was dismissed, and WSIB was awarded $250 in costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for judicial review against the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal.

The application concerned the denial of reimbursement for non-prescription pain medication, cessation of coverage for prescription medication, and denial of benefits for certain dates in 1998.

The application judge found no urgency as required by the Judicial Review Procedure Act and dismissed the application as premature, as the appellant had not exhausted the administrative appeal process.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no legal error in the application judge's analysis regarding the reasonableness of the WSIB's request for updated medical information.

The appellant, injured in 1997 while unloading goods from a truck, brought a civil action against the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal seeking compensatory damages of $1,710,455 and punitive damages of $15 million.

The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to strike the pleadings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge granted the motions, holding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against these bodies and that relief must be sought through judicial review.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction and in striking the pleadings for failing to disclose a cause of action for bad faith or misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory scheme under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and Tribunal, and that circumventing this scheme through a civil action constitutes an abuse of process.

The court also held that bad faith is not independently actionable and that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for misfeasance in public office.

The self-represented plaintiff, Paul Taylor, sued the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board (WSIB) and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) for approximately $17 million, alleging bad faith, breaches of the Human Rights Code and the Charter of Rights, and various torts related to the handling of his workplace injury benefits claim.

The WSIAT brought a motion to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, or to strike the pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the WSIAT lacked legal capacity to be sued, the action constituted an abuse of process by attempting to re-litigate issues already decided by the Tribunal, the claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action (including for assault and misfeasance of public office), and the claims were statute-barred.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied, and the statement of claim was struck in its entirety.

The applicant sought declarations that operational policies adopted under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act were unconstitutional and contrary to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to determine the matter by application or whether it had to proceed as a judicial review before the Divisional Court.

The court held that the impugned policies constituted the exercise of statutory power under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Because the applicant sought only declarations regarding the legality of those policies and no civil action was pending, the matter properly fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court by way of judicial review.