J.C. Corkery

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breath certificate evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 10(b) breach because the arresting officer failed to facilitate the appellant's request to call his girlfriend to obtain a lawyer's name.

The summary conviction appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's Grant analysis, concluding she properly assessed the seriousness of the breach and the officers' conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and suffered a spinal fracture.

Liability was admitted by the defendant.

The court had to determine whether the plaintiff met the statutory threshold for permanent and serious impairment under the Insurance Act, and assess damages.

The court found significant credibility issues with the plaintiff's evidence, noting he had concealed pre-existing conditions and post-accident activities from his assessors.

Despite these credibility issues, the court accepted expert evidence that the plaintiff suffered a permanent serious impairment consisting of chronic left torso/rib pain and an adjustment disorder.

The court awarded $1,067,647 in total damages, applying substantial percentage reductions to the claimed amounts for loss of earning capacity and future care costs due to the unreliability of the plaintiff's self-reported limitations.

Following a twelve-day trial regarding a property boundary and adverse possession dispute, both parties sought costs.

The plaintiffs claimed partial indemnity costs of $150,563.98, while the defendants claimed partial indemnity costs of $248,861.38 and relied on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found that success was equally divided, as the plaintiffs succeeded on the boundary terminus issue and the defendants succeeded on the adverse possession claim.

Consequently, the court ordered that each side bear their own costs.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking an order directing the applicant mother to ensure their 12-year-old daughter is vaccinated against COVID-19, as well as police enforcement of a 2017 parenting order and a finding of contempt.

The mother opposed forcing the child to be vaccinated against her will.

The court dismissed the contempt motion due to improper service.

On the vaccination issue, the court declined to take judicial notice of government information regarding the safety and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine.

The court found the child to be a mature minor capable of making her own medical decisions and strongly opposed to the vaccine.

The motion was dismissed in its entirety.

The parties appeared before the court to request clarification of paragraph 112 in the first Addendum to Judgment.

The defendants proposed an additional sentence to avoid ambiguity regarding the common boundary between the properties.

The plaintiffs took no position, provided the original meaning remained unchanged.

The court agreed to amend the paragraph to clarify that the common boundary terminating at the water's edge is an ambulatory boundary that moves with the water level.

The parties appeared for further submissions to determine the terminus of the common boundary between their waterfront properties, following a previous judgment.

The court amended the judgment to clarify that the common boundary terminates at the water's edge of Balsam Lake.

On consent, the court also amended the judgment to restrict both parties from launching from or occupying land or water on specific sides of the respondent's dock to prevent impairment of each other's riparian rights.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a judgment to replace the parties' initials with their full names, arguing the initials prevented him from enforcing the judgment.

The court held that the mandatory publication ban under s. 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 applied, prohibiting the publication of identifying information.

To balance the statutory privacy requirements with the plaintiff's need to enforce the judgment, the court ordered that letters be used in the public decisions, but directed the administration to prepare a separate, sealed enforcement order using the parties' full names.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to replace 'John Doe Retailer' and 'John Doe Installer' with the names of the specific defendants who sold and installed a furnace that allegedly caused a fire.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing the limitation period had expired and they had no notice of the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the 'litigation finger' clearly pointed at the proposed defendants and that actual notice or due diligence is not required to correct a misnomer under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a previous civil judgment to replace the parties' initials with their full names.

The underlying trial involved the defendants making a false report about the plaintiff to a children's aid society.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the mandatory publication ban under section 45(8) of the Child and Family Services Act (now section 87 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act) applies to civil judgments to protect the privacy of children involved in child protection investigations, even if no formal child protection proceeding was commenced.

The successful self-represented plaintiff sought costs for nearly 800 hours spent preparing for and attending a trial where the defendants were found liable for conspiracy, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court applied the test from Fong v. Chan, which requires a self-represented litigant to demonstrate an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity to be awarded costs.

Finding that the plaintiff failed to prove any lost income or opportunity cost, the court denied the claim for time spent and awarded only $1,000 in disbursements.

The parties settled a personal injury action on the first day of trial after the plaintiff accepted the defendants' offer to settle for $150,000 plus costs to be agreed or assessed.

The defendants brought a motion arguing the plaintiff was only entitled to costs up to the date the offer was served, relying on previous case law.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the plain language of the offer and the Rules of Civil Procedure entitled the plaintiff to partial indemnity costs up to the date the offer was accepted.

The court referred the assessment of costs to an assessment officer and allowed the plaintiff's expert disbursements.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had excluded the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach because the arresting officer failed to follow mandatory procedures for operating the approved screening device, thereby lacking reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the objective basis for the officer's belief was undermined by the failure to follow imperative instructions.

Following a trial to determine the Gross Rentable Area of a leased premises, both parties claimed success and sought partial indemnity costs.

The court found the defendant to be the successful party, as the determined area was significantly higher than the plaintiff's position, resulting in substantial additional rent over the lease term.

The court awarded the defendant costs but reduced the claimed amount due to excessive photocopying disbursements and time spent on an unsuccessful argument regarding BOMA standards.

Police chiefs brought an application under s. 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to enforce arbitration awards ordering a police services board to pay contractual entitlements following the dissolution of a regional police service.

The respondent argued the Arbitration Act did not apply because the arbitration was conducted pursuant to the Police Services Act and that enforcement should be stayed due to a pending judicial review application.

The court held that disputes over remuneration and working conditions of a chief and deputy chief fall outside Part VIII of the Police Services Act, meaning the statutory exclusion of the Arbitration Act did not apply.

Because none of the statutory grounds in s. 50(3) for refusing enforcement were present, the court was required to enforce the awards.

Judgment was therefore granted enforcing the arbitral awards.

Third parties brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a defendant’s third party claim and crossclaims arising from injuries sustained during an assault after a community festival where alcohol was served.

The moving parties argued there was no evidence establishing their liability for allegedly serving alcohol to an intoxicated attendee who later committed the assault.

The court held that granting summary judgment would require determinations overlapping with issues scheduled for trial and could create inconsistent factual findings.

The matter also raised a potentially novel duty of care question regarding volunteers organizing events where alcohol is served.

The court concluded that summary judgment was not the most appropriate or just procedure.