I. Mang

Following a successful motion to change child support, the moving party sought costs.

The court found the moving party had made a compliant offer to settle under the Family Law Rules that was more favourable to the opposing party than the final order.

The opposing party argued that costs should be reduced due to the moving party’s pre‑litigation conduct, the impact of costs on adult children still attending university, and allegedly excessive legal fees.

The court held that unreasonable conduct under Rule 24(4) and (5) concerns behaviour during the litigation rather than pre‑litigation conduct.

Finding the moving party’s litigation conduct reasonable and the claimed fees appropriate for the complexity and time span of the issues, the court awarded fixed costs.

The moving party brought a motion to change a 1999 divorce order requiring monthly child support of $762, seeking termination of support effective December 1999 and rescission of accumulated arrears.

The court considered whether a material change in circumstances existed under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and the Child Support Guidelines.

Evidence established that the payor had never earned the income assumed in the original order and had operated a consistently unprofitable business while accumulating significant debt and relying on loans for subsistence.

The court imputed modest income beginning in 2006 and recalculated historical support obligations.

Because the payor had already paid more than what the recalculated guideline amounts required, all arrears were rescinded and prospective support was set based on an imputed income.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking reversal of a prior custody order and a no-contact order against the respondent father, together with orders requiring participation in a reunification program.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside parts of a prior consent order directing attendance at the program.

The court found that the program involved a lengthy process with extensive decision‑making authority delegated to its director and that there was no independent or peer‑reviewed evidence of its efficacy.

The judge held that the court could not cede its statutory responsibility to determine the best interests of the children to a program lacking evidentiary support.

The respondent’s motion to vacate portions of the July 4, 2013 order was granted and the applicant’s motion was dismissed.