I. F. Leach

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations of possessory title over a strip of land between her property and the defendant's property, based on adverse possession.

The plaintiff argued that her predecessors in title had exclusively occupied and maintained the strip for over 29 years before the properties were converted to the Land Titles system in 1992.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the uncontradicted evidence established the requisite open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive possession by the plaintiff's predecessors.

The court granted the declarations of possessory title and issued mandatory orders and a permanent injunction requiring the defendant to remove a newly constructed fence and refrain from further trespassing on the strip.

The accused attended a birthday party where the hosts enforced a strict rule against drinking and driving.

When the intoxicated accused attempted to leave in his vehicle, the host confronted him and a physical altercation ensued.

During the struggle, the accused repeatedly stabbed the host with a pocket knife, causing severe injuries.

The accused fled the scene and participated in hiding the weapon and his bloody clothes.

At trial, the accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the defence, finding that while the accused had a reasonable belief that force was being used against him to prevent him from driving, his response of repeatedly stabbing the host was unreasonable and excessive.

The accused was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her statement of claim to add Middlesex County as a defendant in a motor vehicle accident claim involving alleged negligent road maintenance.

The motion was brought after the presumptive two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued misnomer and discoverability.

The court rejected the misnomer argument because Middlesex County did not have notice of the claim within the limitation period.

However, the court granted leave to amend based on discoverability, finding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of due diligence to raise a triable issue as to whether the claim against the County was discoverable earlier.

The court also held that the plaintiff's alleged failure to provide timely statutory notice under the Municipal Act should be resolved on a full evidentiary record rather than at the pleadings stage.

The defendant brought a motion to stay a writ of possession and notice to vacate his residential property, and sought an extension of time to perfect a long-dormant Divisional Court appeal of a summary judgment granting possession to the plaintiff.

The court found the defendant had not maintained an intention to appeal, provided no satisfactory explanation for a 19-month delay, and engaged in deceptive conduct including relying on a fabricated consent letter.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed, the appeal was dismissed for delay, and the stay was denied, save for a brief extension to allow the defendant's family to relocate.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a full indemnity basis due to the defendant's reprehensible conduct.

The self-represented applicant commenced an application seeking economic entitlements and recognition of his 'self-determination', employing concepts typical of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigants.

The respondent requested a summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant attempted to unilaterally discontinue the proceeding to avoid dismissal.

The court held that the proceeding had not been properly abandoned under Rule 38.08 and refused to allow abandonment to circumvent the Rule 2.1.01 process.

The court dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, stayed a related application, and prohibited the applicant from commencing further proceedings without leave.

During a lengthy criminal trial that significantly exceeded its original time estimate, the accused brought a mid-trial application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused sought to have the application heard immediately.

The Crown opposed, arguing the application was not ready and should be heard after the trial concluded.

The court exercised its discretion to delay hearing the s. 11(b) application until the conclusion of the trial on the merits, citing the need for a complete factual record, fairness to the Crown, and the policy against fragmenting criminal proceedings.

The plaintiff brought an action against her nephew and his wife, claiming a proprietary constructive trust and equitable mortgage over a farm property based on an oral agreement with her late brother to reimburse her for renovation expenses.

The defendants, who inherited the property subject to the plaintiff's life estate, moved for summary judgment.

The court found that while the plaintiff had an enforceable equitable claim against her late brother, the defendants were bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

The court dismissed the claims for a constructive trust, equitable mortgage, and partition and sale, but allowed the plaintiff's claim for an accounting of farm profits based on her life estate to proceed to trial.

The applicants successfully obtained an order declaring the respondents vexatious litigants.

The court then considered the applicants' request for costs.

The respondents did not file any responding costs submissions.

The court found that the respondents' underlying litigious conduct involved abuse of process and reprehensible conduct, which justified an elevated costs award.

The court awarded the applicants costs on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $10,000, noting that parties who successfully bring vexatious litigant applications perform a service for the court and other litigants.

The accused parents were charged with abducting their child from the care of the Children's Aid Society during a supervised access visit.

Prior to trial, the accused brought an application seeking to challenge the validity of the initial apprehension warrant issued under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court dismissed the application, holding that challenging the warrant at the criminal trial would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on a judicial order.

The court found that the statutory scheme provided an adequate remedial mechanism to challenge the apprehension, and allowing a collateral attack would jeopardize the orderly administration of child protection matters.

The accused was charged with possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000 after a stolen pick-up truck was found at a remote farm.

The accused's fingerprints were found on the exterior passenger door of the stolen vehicle.

Shortly after the vehicle was discovered, the accused and a companion were found walking nearby, dressed in feedbags to protect against the cold.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory testimony that she had been abandoned by a designated driver, finding it implausible and inconsistent.

Relying on circumstantial evidence, including the fingerprint evidence and the accused's suspicious conduct, the court found the accused guilty.

The plaintiff in a defamation action sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add allegations of further defamatory statements by the existing defendant and to add a psychiatrist as a new defendant for negligence and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court denied leave to add the new defamation allegations against the existing defendant, finding them barred by the two-year limitation period and lacking sufficient particulars.

However, the court granted leave to add the claims against the psychiatrist, finding that although the negligence claim based on a third-party duty of care was novel, it was not plain and obvious that it would fail.

The court also allowed the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim to proceed.

Following a substantive decision under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 appointing family members as guardians of an incapable adult, the court determined costs arising from competing guardianship applications.

The successful parties sought elevated costs due to the applicant’s conduct in initiating and pursuing the litigation.

The court held that costs in SDA proceedings follow the general civil litigation principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the applicant’s conduct precipitous, belligerent, and motivated by collateral dissatisfaction with estate arrangements rather than concern for the incapable person’s welfare, the court ordered costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Fixed costs were awarded to the successful parties, payable by the unsuccessful applicant.

The applicant brother brought an application to be appointed the sole guardian of property and personal care for his developmentally disabled sister.

The respondent mother and sister brought a counter-application seeking joint guardianship.

The court found the sister incapable of managing property and personal care.

Applying the best interests test under the Substitute Decisions Act, the court dismissed the brother's application, finding he acted in bad faith and was motivated by financial interests.

The court appointed the mother and sister as joint guardians, noting the mother's lifelong devotion to the incapable person's care.

The applicant brother brought an application to be appointed as the sole guardian of property and personal care for his sister, who has significant cognitive and developmental limitations.

The respondent mother and sister brought a counter-application seeking joint guardianship.

The court found the sister incapable of managing property and personal care.

After reviewing the history of care and the conduct of the parties, the court dismissed the applicant's application and appointed the mother and sister as joint guardians, finding it was in the incapable person's best interests to remain in the care of her mother with a transition plan to her sister.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an arbitrator's decision regarding a construction dispute.

The arbitrator had granted partial summary judgment to the respondent and dismissed the applicant's counterclaim, finding the applicant failed to provide a 'claim made in writing' as required by the contract.

The applicant also sought leave to appeal the arbitrator's award of contractual interest.

The Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the correspondence constituted a 'claim made in writing', finding it raised an extricable question of law.

However, the court denied leave to appeal the interest award, concluding it involved a question of mixed fact and law regarding contractual interpretation.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual interference involving a child under the age of 16, with the sexual assault count conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court determined at sentencing that the evidence established two incidents of sexual touching of a very young child but that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offences occurred after legislative amendments increasing the mandatory minimum penalty.

Applying sentencing principles emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences involving abuse of children and breach of trust, the court considered aggravating factors including the victim’s age and the offender’s position of trust, as well as mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record, positive background, and some indications of remorse.

After reviewing comparative authorities, the court concluded that a custodial sentence of 14 months was appropriate, followed by probation and several ancillary orders including SOIRA registration and a weapons prohibition.

Following a highly acrimonious 23-year marriage and subsequent litigation, the parties reached a settlement on the eve of trial but reserved the issue of costs for the court.

The respondent sought nearly $100,000 in full reimbursement, while the applicant primarily argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding that attempting to apply cost recovery rules after a substantive settlement is fundamentally misconceived and inappropriate, as it lacks objective benchmarks for assessing success and reasonableness.

During a criminal jury trial for arson with disregard for human life under s. 433(a) of the Criminal Code, the Crown sought to have the jury also consider arson causing damage to property under s. 434 as a lesser and included offence, or alternatively, to amend the indictment to add a s. 434 charge.

The court ruled that s. 434 is not a lesser and included offence of s. 433(a) because it contains distinct elements, such as the property not being wholly owned by the accused.

The court denied the Crown's motion to amend the indictment mid-trial, finding it would prejudice the accused and risk confusing the jury.

However, the court permitted the offence of mischief to be put to the jury as a valid included offence.

The accused was charged with possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking after being observed by police carrying a garbage bag containing 8.5 kg of marihuana.

The bag had been handed to him by a known drug trafficker during police surveillance.

The accused argued he was merely assisting an acquaintance and did not know the contents of the bag.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite knowledge or intent to possess the drugs, or that he knowingly aided the trafficker.

The accused was acquitted.

The responding party moved at the outset of trial to dismiss the moving party’s motion to change spousal support obligations.

The moving party had failed to provide updated financial disclosure required under the Family Law Rules, including a current financial statement, tax return and notice of assessment, and financial information relating to his current spouse.

The court held that such disclosure was essential to determine whether a material change in circumstances existed under s. 37(2) of the Family Law Act and to assess the parties’ means under s. 33(9).

The court found the disclosure failures unjustified and noted the moving party had also ignored a prior direction from a trial management conference judge to provide updated disclosure.

Because the absence of disclosure prevented a fair adjudication of the motion to change, the court dismissed the motion.