HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
William Sheehan
Applicant
-and-
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Ministry of the Attorney General
Respondent
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Adjudicator: Josée Bouchard
Indexed as: Sheehan v. Ontario (Attorney General)
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
William Sheehan, Applicant
Self-represented
Introduction
1On April 5, 2016, the Tribunal issued its Decision, 2016 HRTO 427, dismissing the Application. The applicant has asked the Tribunal to reconsider its Decision.
BACKGROUND
2The Tribunal’s Decision found as follows:
a. The definition of disability under the Code relates to either physical and/or mental impairment. A corporation is a legal entity and not a person capable of having a physical and/or mental impairment as contemplated by the Code.
b. The applicant’s allegations relate to poverty and poverty is not an enumerated ground under the Code.
c. The distinctions relied upon by the applicant relate to the status of corporations and are not based on a prohibited ground under the Code.
d. The Application relates to the applicant’s perception of the unfairness of various rules and laws that distinguish rights and obligations between personal and corporate litigants. Though the applicant attempted to characterize these allegations as falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it is plain and obvious that a prohibited ground as defined by the Code is not engaged in the Application.
THE REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
3The Request for Reconsideration provides the following reason why the Tribunal should reconsider its Decision:
The decision or order that is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance.
THE LAW
4Under section 45.7 of the Code, the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules.
45.7(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.
(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.
5The Tribunal has issued Rules governing such requests as well as a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the community on the Tribunal’s exercise of its reconsideration powers (Practice Direction on Reconsideration, effective as of January 2014, ). Most relevant to this Decision is Rule 26 which states:
26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within (thirty) 30 days of the date of the decision.
26.5. A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or
(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or
(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or
(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.
6The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration includes the following statements:
Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to change the way it presented its case.
7As is evident from the above, reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That is, while the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to reopen and reconsider its own decisions, it is not obliged to do so. It may decide when reconsideration is advisable, both through the promulgation of rules setting out conditions for the exercise of its discretion, and through the application of its discretion on a case-by-case basis.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
8I find that the applicant has not met the burden of establishing any of the threshold criteria justifying reconsideration.
9As indicated above, the applicant relies on Rule 26.5(c). He submits the Tribunal,
a. did not apply caselaw showing that corporations are interchangeable with certain natural humans and enjoy all the same protections under the Code;
b. erred in finding that poverty is not an enumerated ground under the Code;
c. erred in finding that this Tribunal has never interpreted the term “disability” to include poverty.
10On April 29, 2016, the applicant also filed a Notice of Constitutional Question (“NCQ”) requesting a consideration of whether “corporations, like 1265589 Ontario Limited, have the same rights as certain individuals?” The applicant provided a Statement of Delivery indicating that the NCQ was delivered to the Attorney General of Ontario. It is unclear whether the NCQ was delivered to the Attorney General of Canada, but in light of my findings, delivery is unnecessary. The Attorney General of Ontario and the Attorney General of Canada have not responded to the Notice.
11In support of his Request, the applicant essentially repeats arguments made in his Response to the February 4, 2016 Notice of Intent to Dismiss and Response to the March 14, 2016 Case Assessment Direction. A request for reconsideration is not an opportunity to restate or re-argue a position already advanced and considered.
12I am not convinced that any findings made in the Decision are in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration does not involve a matter of general or public importance.
13It is important to note that the issues raised in this Request were the subject of submissions before the Tribunal, and dealt with in its Decision. In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34 (“Sigrist”), the Tribunal stated that reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-argue a case. Once the parties have had the opportunity to present their arguments to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has made a decision disposing of the issues, parties are entitled to treat the matter as closed, subject to limited exceptions. I find that the submissions in this Request amount to arguments on issues already fully canvassed before the Tribunal.
14The Tribunal also stated in Sigrist, above, that a “conflict with established jurisprudence or procedure” requires (at a minimum) that there be a settled understanding about the legal rules that apply, and a clear and surprising departure from those legal rules. While the applicant clearly disagrees with the conclusions of the Tribunal, I am satisfied that its submissions on this Request do not establish the Decision conflicts with established jurisprudence.
15I also find that the applicant’s NCQ is an attempt to re-argue a case. See Sigrist, above. The applicant failed to file a NCQ with his Application, his Response to the February 4, 2016 Notice of Intent to Dismiss and Response to the March 14, 2016 Case Assessment Direction. In my view it is not appropriate to attempt to revive an Application by the filing of a NCQ. I would also observe that the NCQ has no merit and would not affect the result. Even if I were to accept the applicant’s contention that corporations should be treated the same as certain individuals in some circumstances, that would not alter my conclusion that poverty is not a protected ground under the Code. In sum, I find that the applicant has not established the existence of any of the criteria in Rule 26 that would lead to reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Decision. The Request is denied.
16The applicant noted in his Request for Reconsideration a typographical error in the spelling of his name in the indexing of the Decision. The typographical error has been corrected.
Dated at Toronto, this 22th day of June, 2016.
“Signed By”
Josée Bouchard
Vice-chair