Chamberlain v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2016 HRTO 1024

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Maurice Chamberlain, Helder de Freitas, Kaila Feldman, Morgan Holdsworth, Michael Holdsworth, and Dan Aucoin Applicants

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Ministry of Community and Social Services Respondent

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw
Date: August 3, 2016
Citation: 2016 HRTO 1024
Indexed as: Chamberlain v. Ontario (Community and Social Services)

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Maurice Chamberlain, Helder de Freitas, Kaila Feldman, Morgan Holdsworth, Michael Holdsworth, and Dan Aucoin, Applicants

Eric Letts, Counsel

Introduction

1On May 20, 2016, the Tribunal issued its Decision, 2016 HRTO 691 (the “Decision”), dismissing the Applications on the basis that they had no reasonable prospect of success. On June 21, 2016, the applicants filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Decision (“request”).

THE REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

2The applicants’ reasons for the request are:

a. The decision is in conflict with established case law or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; and

b. Other factors exist that outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

the law

3Under section 45.7 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules.

45.7(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.

(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.

4The Tribunal has issued Rules of Procedure, which govern such requests, as well as a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the community on the Tribunal’s exercise of its reconsideration powers (Practice Direction on Reconsideration, January 2008, last amended April 2014). Rule 26 states in part:

26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within (thirty) 30 days of the date of the decision.

26.5 A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that

(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

5The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration begins with the following statements:

Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.

Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.

6As is evident from the above, reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That is, while the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to reopen and reconsider its own decisions, it is not obliged to do so.

7The Tribunal also has stated in Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34, that reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-argue a case. Once the parties to an application have had the opportunity to present their evidence and arguments to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has made a decision disposing of the issues, parties are entitled to treat the matter as closed, subject to limited exceptions.

decision

8The applicants rely on Rule 26.5(c) and (d). The applicants have provided no further reasons for their request other than what is set out above.

9With respect to Rule 26.5(c), the applicants do not explain how the Decision conflicts with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure, and how their request involves a matter of general or public importance. Most of the applicants’ reasons for the reconsideration request are in the nature of an appeal of my Decision, which is not the purpose of a reconsideration request, as is set out in the Practice Decision on Reconsideration.

10The applicants argue that the:

1. Regulations under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997 (ODSPA), do more than recognise the obligation on spouses to support one another and in fact create an obligation on individuals because of their marital status;

2. Family Law Act is a complete system for determining spousal financial obligations and the ODSPA Regulations conflict with it; and

3. ODSPA discriminates with respect to contracts and services by erasing an individual’s legal personality solely based upon protected personal characteristics.

While the applicants clearly disagree with the Decision, it appears they are simply re-arguing their case.

11Specifically, with respect to the applicants’ argument that the ODSPA Regulations do more than recognise the obligation on spouses to support one another and in fact create an obligation on individuals because of their marital status, even if the applicants were correct in their interpretation of the ODSPA, this does not change my Decision, and the applicants do not explain how my finding conflicts with established jurisprudence.

12The respondents also argue that I misstated Falkiner v. Ontario (MCSS), 2002 CanLII 44902 (ON CA), by not including the first four words, “the respondents acknowledge that” before quoting “the government is legally entitled to deliver social assistance benefits to an individual or couple, that is, a spousal benefit unit”. I do not agree that the words omitted from the paragraph support the interpretation the applicants put forward. Further, the fact that I did not include these four words does not change my analysis or the result. In addition, the applicants do not provide any explanation of how my Decision conflicts with established case law.

13Paragraph 59(e) of the Decision in its entirety states:

The court in the Falkiner case, cited in Chamberlain [v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2015 HRTO 31], stated that “the government is legally entitled to deliver social assistance benefits to an individual or to a couple, that is, a spousal benefit unit. Therefore, if the definition of spouse captures only co-residency relationships that are functionally similar to a marriage, that are truly spousal or marriage-like, then I do not see how it can be constitutionally vulnerable

14The applicants did not allege in their Applications that the government was not legally entitled to deliver social assistance benefits to an individual or to a couple, namely, a spousal benefit unit. The issue was whether or not the manner of doing so was discriminatory. As such, the omission of the four words is irrelevant to my Decision.

15With respect to Rule 26.5(d), the applicants again provide no reasons in support of their request other than what is set out in paragraph 10 above.

16In sum, I find that the applicants have not established the existence of any factors as set out in Rule 26.5(c) and (d) that would lead to a reconsideration of the Decision. The Request is denied.