Jean-Pierre v. Office of the Ontario Ombudsman, 2014 HRTO 1512

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Edwige Jean-Pierre Applicant

-and-

Office of the Ontario Ombudsman Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Mark Hart Date: October 9, 2014 Citation: 2014 HRTO 1512 Indexed as: Jean-Pierre v. Office of the Ontario Ombudsman

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Edwige Jean-Pierre, Applicant Corinne Muccilli, Counsel

Office of the Ontario Ombudsman, Respondent Glenn Christie, Counsel

1This is an Application filed on September 19, 2012, alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of race, colour, ancestry and place of origin contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2The hearing in this matter commenced on August 14, 2014. At the outset of the hearing, I addressed preliminary issues raised by the respondent regarding the applicant’s proposed witnesses. After hearing submissions from the parties, I issued a brief oral ruling as follows:

1. Having considered the parties’ submissions, I have determined that I will not hear from the witnesses proposed by the applicant, except for Ms. Lucas to the limited extent that she can speak to the human rights policies in place and her knowledge of these policies.

2. I make this decision for several reasons. First, I am concerned that the applicant has not complied with the requirement under the Tribunal’s Rules to provide a summary of these witnesses’ anticipated evidence and further failed to comply with the Case Assessment Direction I issued. While in response to my Direction, the applicant did identify these proposed witnesses by name and provided a general statement as to the nature of their evidence, this in my view was not sufficient to comply with the Rules and particularly not sufficient to give the respondent adequate notice of what evidence these witnesses were being called to provide so that it had a proper opportunity to respond to this proposed evidence. Specifics regarding the nature of these witnesses’ proposed evidence only emerged as a result of my questions at the outset of the hearing.

3. Second, while I appreciate that the surrounding context may be a relevant consideration in the context of an allegation of racial discrimination, this needs to be weighed against the need for this Tribunal to focus the parties on the specific issue before it. Here, the two proposed witnesses are intended to be called to speak generally to the nature of the work environment at the Ombudsman Office and provide evidence regarding their own experiences as members of a racialized group and their observations of the treatment of other employees who were members of racialized groups. I am concerned about the extremely vague nature of this proposed evidence which is lacking in specificity, and am further concerned about the potential for the admission of such evidence to require the respondent to call additional evidence in response to demonstrate that these witnesses’ experiences and observations were not caused by racial discrimination, especially given the lack of advance notice regarding the specific evidence that these witnesses are expected to provide. In my view, the probative value of such evidence to the issue before me is minimal and is outweighed by the prejudice to the respondent due to lack of notice and to the hearing process in terms of lengthening the proceeding.

4. Third, I also am concerned about the lack of temporal connection between these witnesses and the events at issue before me. One witness last actively worked at the Ombudsman office some four years prior and the second proposed witness last actively worked there over one year prior.

5. Having said that, it is an issue in this proceeding whether the respondent took reasonable steps proactively to inform its employees of its human rights policies. Given that Ms. Lucas was employed up until a little over a year prior to the events in question, I am prepared to hear from her on that point.

6. For all of these reasons, I am disallowing Ms. Hutchison from testifying in this proceeding and will hear Ms. Lucas only to the limited extent indicated.

3After issuing this ruling and prior to commencing with the parties’ opening statements and evidence, it was discovered that, through inadvertence, the respondent’s witness statements had not been served on the applicant. After hearing the parties’ submissions about how to proceed in light of this development, I determined that it made the most sense simply to adjourn the hearing to new dates so that the applicant could have a proper opportunity to review the respondent’s witness statements prior to giving her evidence and so that the hearing could proceed in an orderly fashion. The hearing is currently scheduled to resume on December 1 and 2, 2014.

4On the basis of the parties’ submissions before me on August 14, 2014, it became clear to me that there was an issue between the parties as to the proper scope of the allegations and evidence to be heard in this proceeding in light of Interim Decision, 2013 HRTO 1884, dated November 13, 2013. Accordingly, I established the following schedule for the parties to file written submissions:

a. By September 2, 2014, the applicant shall serve and file the following materials:

i. A detailed statement from the applicant setting out with specifics and particulars all evidence that she proposes to provide regarding work environment and context;

ii. The applicant’s position on how allegations in the Application other than the “Haiti” and “slave for a day” comments were addressed at the summary hearing and in the Interim Decision;

iii. Whether the applicant is asserting that these other allegations in the Application form part of racially poisoned work environment and if so what specifically she is relying upon as forming part of a racially poisoned work environment and why any such allegations are not barred by the Tribunal’s Interim Decision; and

iv. If this matter is limited only to the “slave for a day” comment, submissions as to how the applicant’s proposed evidence regarding work environment and context is relevant to the issues before me.

b. By September 19, 2014, the respondent shall serve and file submissions in response, including any objections to the applicant’s proposed evidence.

c. By September 26, 2014, the applicant shall serve and file any written submissions in reply.

5The parties filed their materials and submissions in accordance with the foregoing schedule, and I have reviewed and considered them for the purpose of rendering this Interim Decision.

The scope of the issues to be addressed

6As previously stated, the Application was filed on September 19, 2012. In Part 8 of the Application form, an applicant is asked to describe “what happened” and is specifically directed to “describe each event you believe was discriminatory” and to “be sure to give details of every incident of discrimination you want to raise in the hearing”. The form asks the applicant to provide details for each event, including what happened, who was involved, when it happened (day, month, year), and where it happened, and applicants are directed to be as complete and accurate as possible.

7The applicant was not represented by legal counsel at the time she filed her Application. In Part 8 of the Application form, the applicant broadly can be considered to have raised three sets of allegations: (1) there is an allegation about the term “slave for a day” having been used in an e-mail sent to staff on June 27, 2012 to solicit ideas for a charity auction (the “slave for a day” allegation); (2) there is an allegation about an assistant manager having made a comment on January 25, 2010 that he was going on a cruise that would “make a quick stop in Haiti, but not where all that cholera stuff is happening” (the “Haiti” allegation); and (3) there are further allegations that are not supported by details or particulars, including that systemic discrimination in the office has been an ongoing problem since 2007, that the applicant was targeted by management and certain staff members from November 2009 to June 2010, that the applicant was criticized for the way she looks (her features, complexion and attire), that the Deputy Ombudsman looks down on the applicant and refuses to acknowledge her presence, and that a manager and an assistant manager glare at the applicant for no reason (the “work environment” allegations).

8The Application was delivered to the respondent on December 17, 2012, and the respondent filed its Response on January 21, 2013. In its Response, the respondent raised issues about the applicant’s allegations, including that many allegations were untimely, that the allegations did not support a finding of any violation of the Code, and that the work environment allegations were vague and lacking in particularity. The applicant filed a Reply to the respondent’s Response on February 12, 2013. By this time, the applicant was represented by legal counsel. While the Reply itself does not directly address the respondent’s concerns regarding the vague and unparticularized work environment allegations, a “chronology” was attached to the Reply which provided a significant amount of detail regarding events dating back to when the applicant first started working at the Ombudsman Office on September 21, 2009, up to January 14, 2013 when the applicant filed a second Application with the Tribunal (the “reprisal Application”). I note that while some of the details set out in the applicant’s chronology relate to the work environment allegations as set out in the Application, there is a significant amount of additional details about various events which bear no relation to these allegations.

9The respondent filed a Request for a Summary Hearing dated March 8, 2013, in which it sought dismissal of the Application on various bases, including: that the “slave for a day” allegation did not support a basis for finding a violation of the Code; that the “Haiti” allegation was untimely and also did not support a finding of a Code violation; and that all other allegations in the Application were vague and untimely. In her Response to the respondent’s Request dated March 25, 2013, the applicant only briefly addresses the work environment allegations, stating that the applicant “repeats that there was a history of inappropriate conduct and comments, as outlined in the Chronology included with the Reply. The Ombudsman condoned this action by ignoring it, allowing individuals to act with impunity and establishing a toxic environment.”

10By Case Assessment Direction dated March 26, 2013, the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held to determine whether all or part of the Application and/or the reprisal Application should be dismissed for delay or as having no reasonable prospect of success. The summary hearing was held on July 4, 2013.

11Interim Decision, 2013 HRTO 1884, dated November 13, 2013, states (at paras. 5 and 6) that the applicant alleges two primary incidents of discrimination, which are identified as: the “Haiti” allegation from January 26, 2010; and the “slave for a day” allegation from June 27, 2012. With regard to the “slave for a day” allegation, reference also is made in the Interim Decision to a subsequent e-mail sent by the same co-worker on July 24, 2012 (see para. 8). No specific reference is made in the Interim Decision to the work environment allegations having been identified as “incidents” of discrimination, although reference is made to a submission by the applicant that the “slave for a day” incident “also has to be looked at in the overall context of the treatment of the applicant within the workplace” (see para. 21), in support of the proposition that the “slave for a day” allegation should not be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

12With regard to the “Haiti” allegation, the Tribunal found that a mere statement that one is not going to the parts of Haiti where there is cholera raises no connection to a Code ground, and dismissed this allegation as having no reasonable prospect of success. While not needing to decide the delay issue, the Tribunal also noted that this allegation in any event appeared to be untimely.

13With regard to the “slave for a day” allegation, the Tribunal stated that it could not find that there is no reasonable prospect that this allegation would succeed. No issue of timeliness arose in respect of this allegation, as the Application had been filed within one year of the alleged incident. The critical passage from the Tribunal’s decision appears at paras. 20 to 24 of the Interim Decision:

In order to proceed to a hearing, the applicant must satisfy me that she may be able to demonstrate that the comment (and follow-up email) poisoned her environment on the basis of the grounds enumerated in her Application. The applicant has satisfied me that she may be able to demonstrate that her right to work in an environment free from racial discrimination was infringed. I cannot find, therefore, that there is no reasonable prospect that this Application will not succeed.

The key allegation is about the “slave for a day” e-mail sent out by an employee of the respondent about which another black employee complained. The applicant submits that although “an offhanded comment” about “slave for a day” may not be discriminatory, in this case the “entire context” is problematic because the poster not only was in colour and had Caucasian men holding dollar bills, but this incident also has to be looked at in the overall context of the treatment of the applicant within the workplace.

In this case, taking the e-mail at face value, it contained potentially discriminatory language, and in fact was recalled and amended to exclude the “slave for a day” phrase. That, however, appeared to not be the end of the matter as evidenced by the follow up e-mail sent out by the same employee on July 24, 2012 that stated, among other things, “Why anyone would take offense [sic] is BEYOND ME and if you can’t see that, then you clearly have ISSUES”.

Given the tone of this follow-up e-mail, the Tribunal will need to hear evidence about the circumstances under which it was sent, the reason(s) for sending it and the impact on the persons hearing it. As noted by the Tribunal in Dabic, sometimes the explanation for why a respondent acted in the manner that it did is in the mind of the individual taking the action, and requires an explanation from that person or persons.

14In the Interim Decision, the reprisal Application was dismissed in its entirety as having no reasonable prospect of success.

15The Interim Decision concludes with regard to the first Application (at para. 31):

• The allegations with respect to the 2010 comment are dismissed;

• The Application will proceed with respect to the remaining allegations.

16The question before me is to determine what is meant by “the remaining allegations” that were allowed to proceed, and whether this statement includes the work environment allegations. In my view, the Interim Decision cannot reasonably be interpreted to conclude that the work environment allegations were allowed to proceed. Rather, what was allowed to proceed by virtue of the Interim Decision was the “slave for a day” allegation from June 27, 2012, including the import of the subsequent e-mail dated July 24, 2012. In my view, this is why the Interim Decision refers to “the remaining allegations” (plural), since the remaining allegations were understood by the Tribunal not just to be limited to the June 27, 2012 e-mail but also to encompass the subsequent July 24, 2012 e-mail. In my view, it is not reasonable to interpret “the remaining allegations” to encompass the work environment allegations.

17I reach this conclusion for a number of reasons. First, the work environment allegations were not identified in the Interim Decision as an alleged incident of discrimination. At its highest, the work environment allegations were understood in the Interim Decision as being advanced by the applicant as “context” to support an allegation of discrimination in relation to the “slave for a day” allegation. Second, if the work environment allegations had been understood as alleged incidents of discrimination, the Tribunal would have needed to consider whether these allegations were timely, given that they extended back over three years prior to the filing of the Application, whether they formed part of a “series of incidents” that extended to and encompassed a timely allegation, and whether there was a sufficient basis to support a link or connection to the grounds of discrimination alleged to support a conclusion that there was at least some reasonable prospect of success in relation to these allegations. In my view, the fact that the Tribunal did not engage these issues in the Interim Decision supports the conclusion that the work environment allegations were not understood as alleged incidents of discrimination. Third, I note that the applicant, in the time since the Interim Decision was issued, did not seek any clarification of the Interim Decision as it related to the work environment allegations, nor did the applicant file any Request for Reconsideration to challenge the Interim Decision. While the Interim Decision was an “interim” decision in the sense that it did not finally dispose of the entirety of the first Application, it was nonetheless a “final” decision within the meaning of the Tribunal’s Rules regarding reconsideration in that it finally determined an important aspect of the Application: see Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34 at para. 41.

18As a result, I conclude that the only alleged “incident” of discrimination before me for determination as to whether or not there has been a violation of the Code relates to the “slave for a day” allegation and the subsequent e-mail dated July 24, 2012, and does not include the work environment allegations. Below, I will consider whether the work environment allegations are nonetheless relevant to context for the “slave for a day” allegation, as submitted by applicant’s counsel at the summary hearing.

The relevance of the applicant’s proposed evidence

19Having reached that conclusion, I next need to consider whether the applicant’s proposed evidence with respect to work environment is relevant to the issue before me and not barred as a result of the Interim Decision. I will separate out the portions of the applicant’s proposed evidence to what is alleged to have occurred prior to the “slave for a day” incident, and what is alleged to have occurred afterwards.

20With regard to proposed evidence regarding events that occurred prior to the “slave for a day” incident, the proposed evidence includes:

a. that an incident occurred in the first few months of the applicant working at the Ombudsman’s Office when she was asked to perform work beyond her job duties as a receptionist, was required to work overtime to complete this work for which she was not paid, and the person who assigned the work took issue with the applicant for having called her agency to report this. Based upon the applicant’s chronology, this occurred between November 19 and 25, 2009;

b. that she was only permitted brief conversations with her co-workers. This is referenced in the applicant’s chronology under the date of November 25, 2009;

c. that on December 10, 2009, there was a cigarette butt on the floor in the reception area and the applicant understood from a manager that she was supposed to pick it up;

d. that there were several incidents of employees commenting on how sick the applicant looked, that she had bags under her eyes, and about her clothing, and that co-workers would pass the applicant’s desk and make exaggerated yawning sounds. This appears in the applicant’s chronology under the dates of January 18, 2010, February 16, 2010, June 1, 2010 and October 26, 2012. The only time any specific individual is identified as having engaged in this alleged conduct is in relation to alleged incidents on January 18, 2010, June 1, 2010 and October 26, 2012;

e. that the applicant was called out for transferring calls to individuals when she should not have done so, when this had been done by someone else. According to the chronology, this occurred on March 24, 2010 and January 6, 2012;

f. that there was an instance where the fact that the applicant took her lunch 15 minutes early was reported as the applicant taking the afternoon off without authorization. This incident does not appear in the chronology and no date is provided in the applicant’s proposed evidence, or identification as to who is alleged to have reported her or to whom;

g. that on or about July 16, 2010, the applicant found all of her deleted work e-mails in a folder entitled “public folder”, and that in 2012 an e-mail arrived in the applicant’s inbox purporting to be from the applicant but which the applicant says she did not send. In the chronology, this latter incident is alleged to have occurred on August 8, 2011 and pertains to the applicant’s personal “yahoo” account;

h. that on or about October 21, 2010, the head of human resources made a comment about the applicant’s appearance and commented that the applicant “looked nervous”;

i. that the applicant was constantly the target of sneering, glaring and condescending tones. No specifics are provided in the applicant’s proposed evidence as to when this is alleged to have occurred, who is alleged to have engaged in this conduct, or what specifically they are alleged to have done. Specific references to this kind of conduct in the applicant’s chronology appear on the following dates: December 10, 2009, December 16, 2009, January 12, 2010, July 16, 2010, August 29, 2012, and October 16, 2012; and

j. that there were numerous incidents where the applicant was not permitted her break or lunch and was never compensated. No specific examples of this appear in the chronology, and no specifics or particulars are provided in the applicant’s proposed evidence.

21The applicant submits that, if the hearing is limited to the “slave for a day” allegation, her evidence regarding the work environment is nonetheless important in demonstrating a context for this comment. It is submitted that her evidence regarding other conduct in the workplace describes the work environment and demonstrates an environment in which such conduct could be permitted. It is further submitted that the context in which the comment arose also explains the applicant’s reaction and chosen method of response.

22I have three problems with these submissions. First, the applicant’s proposed evidence regarding the work environment only provides relevant context for the “slave for a day” allegation to the extent that it is established that the applicant’s race, colour, ancestry or place of origin was a factor in how she alleges she was treated in the workplace. The only relevant connection to be drawn between the proposed evidence regarding the work environment and the “slave for a day” allegation is for the applicant to assert that her race was a factor in how she was otherwise treated in the workplace, that this provides evidence of a racially poisoned work environment, and that this created the context in which the “slave for a day” comment was made and how it was responded to.

23The problem with this submission is that, in order to establish relevance, the work environment allegations necessarily would be required to be examined through the lens of whether or not the applicant’s race was a factor in how she was treated in relation to these various events, which is the test for determining whether or not her rights under the Code were violated. In other words, all of the work environment allegations are necessarily transformed into alleged incidents of discrimination which would need to be proven in order to establish relevance. However, in my view, if the work environment allegations are de facto being advanced as alleged incidents of discrimination, then they would have needed to be understood in that manner for the purpose of the summary hearing and in the Interim Decision, which they were not. In my view, it is not appropriate to advance alleged incidents of discrimination that were not allowed to continue following the summary hearing process under the guise of contextual evidence regarding the “slave for a day” allegation.

24Second, I am greatly concerned about the age of the bulk of the alleged incidents regarding the work environment. Of those allegations for which specifics or particulars are provided either in the chronology or proposed evidence, the vast majority of the alleged incidents occurred during the period from November 2009 to October 2010, between 20 months to over two and a half years prior to the “slave for a day” comment in late June 2012. In my view, workplace events that occurred so long in advance of the alleged comment simply are not relevant as contextual evidence in relation to the comment itself without some stronger factual connection. The alleged incident that occurred in relation to the applicant’s personal yahoo account took place in August 2011, which also is not proximate in time to the “slave for a day” comment, is unconnected to the workplace except for the applicant’s speculation, and does not provide any relevant contextual evidence. The alleged incident from early January 2012 where the applicant was accused of having improperly transferred a call also is not proximate in time to the “slave for a day” comment, does not involve the author of that comment, and does not provide any relevant contextual evidence. The only other alleged events from the applicant’s proposed evidence for which particulars are provided occurred after the “slave for a day” comment, which also do not provide any relevant contextual evidence.

25Third, the probative value of the alleged workplace incidents is, in my view, tenuous. The proposed evidence does not relate to the actions or conduct of the co-worker responsible for the “slave for a day” comment or indicate evidence regarding any events or comments of a similar or related nature. In assessing whether to admit this evidence, I need to weigh any minimal and tenuous probative value against the prejudicial impact on the hearing process and to the respondent. In order to respond to the alleged workplace incidents and any connection the applicant tries to make to her race, colour, ancestry or place of origin, the respondent would need to call a multitude of additional witnesses who otherwise have no connection to the “slave for a day” comment to provide their version of the events and to respond to any suggested link to the applicant’s race. This would serve to greatly prolong the hearing, and require the Tribunal to engage in an assessment of a large number of unrelated incidents in order to make findings of fact as to what occurred and what if any relation this has to the applicant’s race and the determination as to whether the “slave for a day” comment violated the applicant’s rights under the Code. In my view, the prejudicial impact of allowing this evidence in would greatly outweigh any probative value of the workplace evidence to the issue before me.

26The applicant’s proposed evidence also includes reference to a number of events that are alleged to have occurred after the “slave for a day” comment in late June 2012 and the e-mail from July 2012. These include allegations that the applicant was being given the “cold shoulder” by about October 2012; that she was denied three days off to care for her mother in early October 2012; that comments were made to the applicant about her smell and a subtle alleged reference to her sexual orientation on October 4, 2012; that the applicant began receiving “crank calls” at home or on her cellphone in the fall of 2012; that the applicant saw other employees at the same places as her, whether at lunch or near her home (the only specific reference I could find in the chronology relates to an incident on October 9, 2012); that the applicant was left alone with dangerous clients in the reception area on October 15, 2012 and on October 24, 2012; and that a comment was made to the applicant about growing a mustache for “Movember” on October 26, 2012.

27In my view, this proposed evidence is not relevant to the allegation before me for several reasons. First, as these alleged events occurred after the comment at issue and do not relate to the alleged comment, this proposed evidence cannot be relevant to providing context regarding the comment at issue before me. Second, I am of the same view with regard to these allegations as I am with regard to the allegations about prior workplace events. In order for the subsequent alleged events to have any possible relevance, the applicant would need to establish that her race, colour, ancestry or place of origin was a factor in relation to all or any of these alleged events, which in essence makes them alleged incidents of discrimination which were not understood in the Interim Decision to form part of the incidents of discrimination as alleged in the Application. Third, once again the tenuous probative value of these events is greatly outweighed by the prejudicial impact on the hearing process.

28In addition, there are other events included in the applicant’s proposed evidence that were the subject-matter of the reprisal Application, which has already been dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success. These include the respondent’s request for information about the applicant’s medical condition when the applicant was off work in November and December 2012, the termination of the applicant’s disability benefits, and the letter received by the applicant from the respondent in December 2012. These are not matters before me and I will not hear evidence about these events.

29The proposed evidence of the applicant that “minority individuals were treated significantly differently and worse than their co-workers” is unsupported by any specifics or particulars and in any event is opinion evidence and is not admissible.

30In addition to her evidence about the “slave for a day” comment and the subsequent e-mail of July 24, 2012, I am prepared to allow the applicant to testify about the representation of members of racialized groups among employees at the Ombudsman’s Office, as this is relevant contextual evidence. I also am prepared to allow the applicant to testify about the workplace discrimination and harassment policy at the Ombudsman’s Office and what training she and other employees received. I also will hear evidence from the applicant about the impact of the “slave for a day” comment on her, which may include reference to the panic attacks she says she experienced in late October 2012 and her subsequent need to be off work to the extent that these are alleged to have resulted from the impact of the comment. For the reasons set out above, I will not hear evidence regarding the remainder of the matters set out in the applicant’s proposed evidence.

Proposed evidence of the applicant’s witness

31The applicant also included a statement of the proposed evidence of the witness (Ms. Lucas) that I allowed to testify on a limited basis. This proposed evidence includes reference to a number of matters that I already have ruled to be inadmissible, including an alleged change in the atmosphere and work environment in 2005, the rate at which “non-Caucasians” were leaving the Ombudsman’s Office, the alleged difference between how people were treated there, an alleged “push” to push people out of the office, any decline in her performance ratings after she declined a retirement package, and an allegation that performance management was not universally applied and became a way of encouraging people to leave. The only evidence that I have allowed Ms. Lucas to provide relates to human rights policies in place and her knowledge of these policies. The matters raised by the respondent, including Ms. Lucas’ attendance at training in 2009, are matters properly addressed in cross-examination. Given that I have allowed Ms. Lucas to testify to this limited extent, any documents in the possession of either party or Ms. Lucas that are relevant to her knowledge of human rights policies in place at the Ombudsman’s Office and any training provided are relevant to an issue in this proceeding, and subject to the parties’ continuing obligation to disclose arguably relevant documents.

Next steps

32As previously stated, the hearing is scheduled to resume on December 1 and 2, 2014, at which time I will hear brief opening statements from the parties and then proceed to hear evidence from the parties’ witnesses. It is my expectation that the hearing will be concluded within these two days, including final submissions, so the respondent should have its witnesses prepared to begin giving their evidence on the afternoon of December 1, 2014. As indicated, I propose to have the respondent’s witnesses affirm the truth of the contents of their witness statements, and only need any supplementary examination-in-chief to elaborate upon what is contained in the statements, to address any issues of credibility, or to respond to new matters raised by the applicant or her witness.

33At the last hearing day, I indicated that I would set a schedule for the parties to file any additional or supplementary witness statements to address the matters determined on August 14, 2014, or in this Interim Decision, and specifically to afford the applicant an opportunity to provide any supplementary witness statement or identify any additional witnesses to respond to the contents of the respondent’s witness statements which had not previously been disclosed to her and to afford the respondent the opportunity to identify any additional witness and documents regarding its human rights policies and training. Any supplementary or additional witness statements or documents to be relied on by the parties are to be disclosed to the opposing party and filed with the Tribunal by no later than November 3, 2014.

ORDER

34For all of the foregoing reasons, I hereby make the following order:

a. The only alleged “incident” of discrimination before me for determination as to whether or not there has been a violation of the Code relates to the “slave for a day” allegation and the subsequent e-mail dated July 24, 2012, and does not include the work environment allegations;

b. The applicant’s evidence at the hearing in this matter is restricted to the matters set out at para. 30 above;

c. The evidence of Ms. Lucas is restricted to human rights policies in place at the Ombudsman’s Office and her knowledge of these polices;

d. By no later than November 3, 2014:

i. Any documents in the possession of either party or Ms. Lucas that are relevant to her knowledge of human rights policies in place at the Ombudsman’s Office and any training provided are to be disclosed to the opposing party and filed with the Tribunal;

ii. Any supplementary or additional witness statements or documents to be relied on by the parties are to be disclosed to the opposing party and filed with the Tribunal.