HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Haruyo Taucar
Applicant
-and-
The University of Western Ontario,
Donna Pennee and Lisa Ann Korab
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Mark Hart
Indexed as: Taucar v. University of Western Ontario
APPEARANCES
Haruyo Taucar, Applicant
C.E. Taucar, Counsel
The University of Western Ontario, Donna Pennee and Lisa Ann Korab, Respondents
Barry Brown, Counsel
1This is an Application dated April 17, 2010 and filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability and reprisal.
2By Case Assessment Direction dated June 13, 2013, the Tribunal directed that a half-day teleconference hearing be held to determine: whether those portions of the Application described as Complaints #2 and #3 should be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success; whether Ms. Korab should be removed as a personal respondent; and whether paras. 110 to 128 of the Application should be struck.
3The teleconference hearing was held on August 12, 2013, and the parties filed written materials in advance of the hearing.
Nature of summary hearing process
4The summary hearing process is described in Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure as well as the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Summary Hearing Requests. The purpose of a summary hearing is to consider, early in the proceeding, whether an application should be dismissed in whole or in part because there is no reasonable prospect that the application will succeed.
5The Tribunal cannot address general allegations of unfairness, unrelated to the Code, in areas such as employment, services or accommodation. It is important that this be determined at the earliest opportunity, where appropriate. Discrimination generally involves an allegation of unfair treatment on the basis of one or more of the grounds under the Code, such as race, gender or disability. Unfair treatment is not discriminatory in the legal sense unless there is proof that one or more of these personal characteristics was a factor in the treatment the applicant experienced.
6The test that is applied at a summary hearing is whether an application should be dismissed in whole or in part because it has no reasonable prospect of success. At the summary hearing stage, the Tribunal is not determining whether the applicant is telling the truth or assessing the impact of the treatment they experienced. Indeed, many experiences of unfairness, which are not defined as discrimination in the legal sense, can leave a person with significant financial and emotional damage.
7The test of no reasonable prospect of success is determined by assuming the applicant’s version of events is true unless there is some clear evidence to the contrary. In some cases, for example, the applicant will not dispute the respondent’s version of one or more of the facts.
8Accepting the facts alleged by the applicant does not include accepting the applicant’s assumptions about why they were treated unfairly. The purpose of the summary hearing is to determine if reasonable inferences can be drawn from the any facts or evidence the applicant is able to point to which tend to support the applicant’s belief that they have experienced discrimination.
9The question that the Tribunal must decide at a summary hearing is whether there is likely to be sufficient direct or indirect evidence available to connect the unfair treatment experienced by the applicant with the applicant’s personal characteristics.
10Support for that connection may come in a variety of forms: the timing of a person’s dismissal or discipline; comments alleged to have been made by the respondent; comparisons with how other people were treated. These are just some examples of the circumstances, which are often contained in the narrative to the application, that play a role in assisting the Tribunal in determining whether the application has a reasonable prospect of success. However, if the applicant is unable to point to circumstances beyond their own assumptions or belief, the application may be found to have no reasonable prospect of success.
11The parties are given an opportunity to make submissions, usually on a telephone conference call, during a summary hearing. These submissions are often helpful in clarifying the nature of the allegations.
12The primary focus in the summary hearing is on the applicant’s evidence. The respondent’s explanation may be considered where there is no dispute about the facts or where it is plainly obvious that a fact must be true. However, the Tribunal is very careful to ensure that an application is not dismissed at the summary hearing stage simply because the respondent has an alternative explanation of the events.
13The Tribunal is also mindful of the fact that in some cases the application must proceed further in the hearing process because the respondent is the party who has control over the evidence which could favour the applicant’s case.
Analysis and Decision
14I will first address the issue of whether Complaints #2 and #3, as set out in the Application, have a reasonable prospect of success. After that, I will address whether Ms. Korab should be removed as a personal respondent. Finally, I will address whether paras. 110 to 128 of the Application should be struck.
15Before doing so, I wish briefly to address one point raised by applicant’s counsel. In his factum, applicant’s counsel asserts that the issue of whether this Application should be the subject of a summary hearing already was decided by decision dated July 27, 2012.
16Originally, two applications were filed by this applicant. These two applications were consolidated and then deferred pending a judicial review. Once the judicial review was completed, the applications were reactivated. By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated July 27, 2012, the Tribunal referred the other application for a summary hearing. With regard to the instant Application, it was noted that the parties had agreed to mediation, and so this matter was referred for mediation. When the matter was not resolved at mediation, a summary hearing was directed as set out above.
17There is no support for the applicant’s position that the Tribunal already had decided not to hold a summary hearing with regard to the instant Application. Nothing of the kind is stated in the CAD dated July 27, 2012. Rather, the CAD simply refers the instant Application to mediation. In any event, this Tribunal has the power to direct a summary hearing on its own initiative at any time, and has exercised that power in this case.
Complaint #2
18There are two components to Complaint #2. The first is the allegation that Ms. Korab contacted the applicant directly when she was aware that, as an accommodation for her disability, the applicant required that all contacts be through her husband, who was acting as her legal counsel. The second component is that, during a telephone conversation between Ms. Korab and the applicant’s counsel, and where the applicant’s evidence is that she was present, Ms. Korab referred to the applicant as “paranoid”.
19I first will address the first component of Complaint #2. I have the relevant documents, and have considered the written and oral submissions of the parties. Applicant’s counsel wrote a letter dated June 4, 2009, addressed to a number of individuals at the respondent University, raising allegations of harassment and a toxic work environment. In this correspondence, counsel stated that the impact of this conduct on the applicant had been to cause health, stress and sleeping disorders over a lengthy period. The letter concludes by asking that specific steps be taken by the University and others to address the alleged harassment and toxic work environment and their impact on the applicant’s health. None of these specific steps refers to any requirement for the University or Ms. Korab not to contact the applicant directly as an accommodation for her disability. While the letter was sent with a covering e-mail, the covering e-mail merely requested that all correspondence be sent to applicant’s counsel. This was expressed as a courtesy, and not as a need for accommodation.
20On June 17, 2009, Ms. Korab sent e-mail correspondence to the applicant and the alleged harasser, with a copy to applicant’s counsel among others. In this e-mail correspondence, Ms. Korab set out steps that were to be taken to address the alleged harassment issues and also to address certain copyright issues that had been raised by applicant’s counsel. I find that there is no reasonable prospect that this e-mail correspondence could be found to be in violation of the Code, since at this point no request for accommodation of a disability had been made by or on behalf of the applicant regarding communications directly with her.
21Applicant’s counsel responded by letter dated June 20, 2009. In this letter, applicant’s counsel took issue with Ms. Korab having communicated with the applicant directly on June 17, 2009, and stated that as a result of receiving Ms. Korab’s correspondence, the applicant’s condition had worsened until it was necessary for her to obtain treatment at a hospital emergency department. Applicant’s counsel requested that Ms. Korab provide an undertaking not to contact the applicant directly.
22On July 13, 2009, applicant’s counsel sent further correspondence to Ms. Korab, this time attaching a draft claim. This draft claim includes an allegation that the University itself created an environment of harassment with significant negative health effects on the applicant when, among other things, Ms. Korab contacted the applicant directly on June 17, 2009.
23On July 14, 2009, Ms. Korab responded to applicant’s counsel by voicemail and e-mail requesting that applicant’s counsel call her to discuss the status of the matter and the proper procedure to follow. Applicant’s counsel responded that same day to advise that he was presently in Toronto, but could speak with Ms. Korab that Friday afternoon (July 17). Ms. Korab replied that same day to say that she had limited availability on Friday afternoon, but also to indicate that she had availability the following afternoon (July 15) or on Thursday morning (July 16).
24There appears to be no dispute that Ms. Korab left a further voicemail message for applicant’s counsel on Wednesday, July 15, 2009, and that this voicemail message was heard or retrieved directly by the applicant. The applicant personally responded to Ms. Korab by e-mail on July 15, 2009 stating: “It seems that you left a message for Mr. Taucar on the answering machine. Unfortunately, he works in Toronto from Tuesday to Thursday. Would you please e-mail him … instead?” The applicant provided her counsel’s e-mail address as part of her message.
25Ms. Korab responded by e-mail correspondence directly to the applicant, with a copy to her counsel, on July 15, 2009. [The materials before me show this e-mail as dated July 14, 2009 even though it was sent in response to the applicant’s e-mail dated July 15, 2009. There is a second copy of this same e-mail from the applicant which is dated July 14, 2009. For the purpose of this Decision, I will treat Ms. Korab’s e-mail as having been sent on July 15, 2009, although nothing in my mind turns on whether it was sent on July 14 or 15.] Ms. Korab advised that she was trying to arrange a time to speak with her husband [who also was her legal counsel] on the telephone. She also stated to the applicant that she was pleased that the applicant had e-mailed her, because one of the issues she needed to discuss with her husband is obtaining a signed consent from the applicant in order to speak with him about these confidential matters. There is an indication in the materials that Ms. Korab may also have tried to call the applicant directly, although the applicant did not answer the phone.
26Applicant’s counsel responded by letter dated July 19, 2009 to state that Ms. Korab was “strictly forbidden to contact [the applicant] directly”. It was stated that the applicant did not contact Ms. Korab because she wanted to be contacted directly, but because she did not want to communicate with Ms. Korab. It also was suggested in this letter that the request for a consent was a contrivance, as Ms. Korab and others at the University already had been speaking with applicant’s counsel about these matters. Applicant’s counsel took the position that no consent was required from the applicant, but nonetheless attached a “statement” from the applicant demanding that Ms. Korab refrain from contacting her any more with respect to the workplace complaints, and to continue to deal with her lawyer.
27The question for me to determine is whether there is any reasonable prospect of success of the applicant establishing that her right under the Code to be free from discrimination and harassment because of disability was infringed arising from these events.
28Generally speaking, an employer has a right to communicate directly with its employees, and is not required to communicate through an employee’s husband or legal counsel. Indeed, during the relevant period of time, the material before me indicates that there continued to be direct communications between University representatives and the applicant. For example, on June 25, 2009, an e-mail was sent by a University representative directly to the applicant regarding the office arrangements to be made for the upcoming academic year for her and the alleged harasser. This e-mail also was sent directly to the alleged harasser and was copied to Ms. Korab, among others. No exception was taken by the applicant to receipt of this e-mail.
29Applicant’s counsel takes the position that, at least by the time of his June 20, 2009 correspondence, Ms. Korab knew or ought reasonably to have known that not contacting the applicant directly was an accommodation required because of the applicant’s disability. I disagree. What was stated in that letter is that Ms. Korab’s June 15, 2009 e-mail correspondence had caused the applicant significant medical distress, and a request was made for an “undertaking” that Ms. Korab would cease contacting the applicant directly. It was later alleged on July 13, 2009 that Ms. Korab’s direct communication to the applicant was “harassment”. But the primary basis of the assertions made by applicant’s counsel that Ms. Korab was not to contact the applicant are based upon his misunderstanding that Ms. Korab was required to contact him as counsel pursuant to the Law Society’s Rules of Professional Conduct. In addition, there is an assertion that this direct communication was made “knowing of the significant health and stress problems … suffered by [the applicant], due to [the alleged harasser’s] harassment and discrimination”.
30With respect, that is not a sufficient basis upon which to support an allegation that a specific need for accommodation because of disability had been communicated by the applicant or on her behalf. The problem derives from a failure to articulate the scope and nature of the communications caught by any such accommodation. As stated above, there was a request that University representatives communicate with legal counsel by letter dated June 4, 2009, which was not tied to any request for accommodation of the applicant’s disability. Following the June 15, 2009 e-mail correspondence from Ms. Korab, there was a specific assertion that Ms. Korab’s communication to the applicant had caused significant health impacts and a request for an undertaking not to communicate directly with the applicant in future. Then there was an e-mail directly to the applicant and the alleged harasser about office assignments, to which no exception was or is taken and which was copied to Ms. Korab.
31In such circumstances, the question is whether Ms. Korab knew or ought reasonably to have known that communicating directly with the applicant about obtaining a consent to speak with her husband / legal counsel was the kind of communication that was captured by any request for accommodation of the applicant’s disability, particularly where the applicant herself had initiated the communication. In my view, it was not. Applicant’s counsel submitted that the scope of the accommodation request as it related to direct communications with the applicant extended to any communications dealing with the applicant’s harassment allegations or other dealings with the alleged harasser. As the need for a consent was directly related to the ability of Ms. Korab to discuss these matters with applicant’s counsel, it is said that this means the communication was related to the harassment allegations and so was or ought to have been understood to fall within the scope of the accommodation request. In my view, the connection is tenuous at best. The communication about the need for a consent is arguably more indirectly related to the harassment allegations than e-mail correspondence addressed to the applicant and the alleged harasser regarding office arrangements for the upcoming year, which were being offered in the context of the applicant’s harassment complaint.
32Applicant’s counsel submits that the e-mail from Ms. Korab on July 15, 2009 was a contrivance, as she already had spoken to him about the harassment issue without the need for any consent from the applicant. In my view, this submission is beside the point. Unless Ms. Korab knew or ought reasonably to have known that a communication of the nature she made on July 15, 2009 was contraindicated due to an accommodation need arising from the applicant’s disability, there is simply no basis to engage the Code.
33Applicant’s counsel relies upon the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, (2002) 2002 CanLII 45005 (ON CA), 60 O.R.(3d) 474, for the proposition that an employer’s common law liberty to communicate directly with an employee about workplace matters is limited in circumstances where the employer knows or ought reasonably to know causes emotional upset, including when the employee’s lawyer states the stress and anxiety that was being caused and requests all communications be directed to him. Whether or not that is an accurate statement of what was found by the Court of Appeal, this proposition fails to address the issue of whether Ms. Korab knew or ought reasonably to have known that her July 15, 2009 communication was contrary to an accommodation need arising from the applicant’s disability, in circumstances where at least one other recent direct communication had taken place without exception and where Ms. Korab’s communication was in response to an e-mail directly from the applicant. Further, the Prinzo case dealt with a claim for damages for the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering, and it was expressly found in that case that the defendant’s repeated phone calls to the plaintiff even after it knew that this was causing emotional distress and even after being requested not to do so by plaintiff’s counsel, along with other conduct, “were so extreme and insensitive that they constituted a reckless and wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s health” (see para. 60). I find no support in the material or submissions before me to indicate that Ms. Korab’s July 15, 2009 e-mail came anywhere close to such a characterization.
34Accordingly, with regard to the first component of Complaint #2, I find that the material and submissions before me do not support that Ms. Korab knew or ought reasonably to have known that her July 15, 2009 e-mail was contrary to an accommodation need arising from the applicant’s disability, and therefore find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of succeeding with this allegation at a hearing. As a result, this allegation is dismissed.
35The second component of Complaint #2 relates to a telephone conversation between Ms. Korab and applicant’s counsel on July 23, 2009. Para. 68 of the Application alleges that during that conversation, Ms. Korab made the comment that the applicant was “paranoid”. The Application states that the applicant was present during this conversation and heard the comment, which affected her deeply. She states that her psychiatrist and counsellor both stated that she is not paranoid. By letter dated July 23, 2009, applicant’s counsel confirmed with Ms. Korab that this comment had been made.
36For the purpose of the summary hearing, I need to assume that the “paranoid” comment was made as alleged. Respondent counsel submitted that the term “paranoid” may be used in a non-medical way simply to refer to a set of behaviours whereby a person sees enemies where there are none, and that it is in this context that the term was used to refer to a set of behaviours exhibited by the applicant as opposed to attributing to her a specific mental disability. In my view, whether or not that is the case is a matter best addressed in the context of all of the evidence at a hearing. In this regard, however, I note that it is not necessarily Ms. Korab’s intention in using the term that is the issue, but rather the term’s impact or effect on the applicant.
37It is submitted that Ms. Korab understood that she was simply speaking with applicant’s counsel, and did not know that the applicant was in the room. I understand that this is in dispute, as the applicant’s evidence will be that she spoke at one point during the conversation such that Ms. Korab was aware of her presence. Once again, it is not clear to me whether it makes a difference whether or not Ms. Korab knew that the applicant was present, but in any event it is not the purpose of a summary hearing to resolve disputed facts. That too is a matter best left for determination at a hearing.
38There are circumstances where a single comment has been found to constitute a violation of the Code. Whether or not Ms. Korab’s comment, if she is found to have made it, rises to this level is, in my view, a matter best left for determination at a hearing, in the full context of the conversation on July 23, 2009 and in the context of surrounding events.
39Accordingly, this aspect of Complaint #2 is not dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success at a hearing.
Complaint #3
40The nature of this allegation is that the respondents discriminated against the applicant because of disability due to the imposition of a short deadline to submit materials regarding an alleged copyright infringement and due to a delay in responding to a request for an extension to submit these materials.
41The matter of an alleged copyright infringement was raised by applicant’s letter dated June 4, 2009. Ms. Korab responded by e-mail correspondence dated June 8, 2009 to say that she was in the process of reviewing the matter in order to determine what response, if any, was required from the University and that she would endeavour to respond as soon as possible. Applicant’s counsel replied that same day to state that the applicant would provide the University with her full cooperation and assistance, and to request a just and expeditious resolution.
42By e-mail correspondence dated June 17, 2009, Ms. Korab set out the materials required from the interested parties in order to review and assess the alleged copyright infringement, and indicated that these materials should be sent to Dean Pennee by no later than 5 p.m. on Thursday, June 25, 2009. Applicant’s counsel describes this as a “short fuse” deadline, which the respondents knew or ought to have known the applicant would be unable to meet due to her disability. In my view, there is no basis in the materials and submissions before me to support this allegation. While the June 4, 2009 letter states that, due to the alleged harassing behaviour of another instructor, the applicant had suffered from stress, a prolonged sleep disorder and breathing difficulties and had been deeply affected by the alleged harassment, there is no indication in this letter that due to her disability the applicant would be unable to meet an eight-day deadline to submit material.
43On Friday, June 19, 2009, at 4:54 p.m., applicant’s counsel sent a letter to Ms. Korab requesting a one-day extension (to June 26) to submit the copyright materials, on the basis that the applicant had been ill and mostly in bed for the previous couple of weeks and because he would be on business in Toronto from June 23 to 25. This was followed by a further letter from applicant’s counsel sent on Saturday, June 20, 2009, at 10:11 p.m. advising, among other things, that the applicant’s condition had worsened and it was necessary for her to obtain treatment at a hospital emergency department that day. As a result, applicant’s counsel requested a further extension until Monday, June 29, 2009. Counsel requested that Ms. Korab provide him with the University’s agreement to the extension as soon as possible.
44Applicant’s counsel received an automated reply from Ms. Korab indicating that she was out of the office at a conference and would have no access to e-mail until June 25, 2009. If the matter was urgent, recipients were advised to contact a specified person, who works as an administrative assistant in Ms. Korab’s office. Applicant’s counsel forwarded his June 20, 2009 letter to this assistant that evening at 10:17 p.m., stating that Ms. Korab had indicated that urgent matters were to be addressed to this person’s attention in Ms. Korab’s absence.
45Applicant’s counsel sent e-mail correspondence again on Wednesday, June 24, 2009, at 2:09 p.m. stating that he had not yet received a response to his request for an extension. He stated that the University not providing an extension was abusive and harassing in the circumstances given that the applicant was ill and had been taking medication. He alleged that this may very well constitute a human rights discrimination violation and a failure to provide reasonable accommodation. This once again prompted the automated message from Ms. Korab advising that she was out of the office.
46Notwithstanding that Ms. Korab had indicated that she would not have access to e-mail until the following day, Ms. Korab responded to applicant’s counsel by e-mail correspondence on June 24, 2009, at 6:36 p.m. to grant the requested extension. Ms. Korab stated in this e-mail that she had no access to phone or e-mail until getting back to London one hour earlier. Ms. Korab stated that she had been out of the office since the previous Thursday night and had not had access to e-mail. She stated that the person identified in her automated message was an administrative assistant in the Office of Faculty Relations who was instructed to contact Ms. Korab, or refer matters to others in the office, in case of emergencies only.
47In the end, we have a request for an extension sent very late in the day on a Friday afternoon, at a time when Ms. Korab was already gone from the office. This was followed by a further request late in the evening on a Saturday. The applicant, through her counsel, was aware that Ms. Korab was out of the office at a conference until the following Thursday, and would have no access to e-mail. Ms. Korab responded as soon as she returned to London and was able to access her e-mail, and granted the extension requested. This all occurred prior to the expiry of the original deadline.
48There is no question in my mind that no allegation of discrimination because of disability or failure to accommodate properly can be levied against Ms. Korab in these circumstances. Further, while the June 19 and 20, 2009 letters from applicant’s counsel also were copied to two other individuals at the University, there is no reason to believe that they would not have expected Ms. Korab to address the extension request, which she did immediately upon her return.
49At its highest, the most that can be said is that at some point on the morning of Monday, June 22, 2009, an administrative assistant in Ms. Korab’s office became aware of the applicant’s request and did not deem it to be sufficiently urgent to require a response prior to Ms. Korab’s return. In my view, that assessment was not unreasonable. Ms. Korab was scheduled to return to the office on June 25, 2009, prior to the expiry of the deadline, which did not expire until close of business that day. This was known to the applicant through her counsel. Ms. Korab in fact responded at an earlier time to grant the extension. In my view, these circumstances do not support that there was any discrimination because of the applicant’s disability or denial of accommodation for her disability.
50Accordingly, I find that Complaint #3 has no reasonable prospect of success, and this part of the Application is dismissed.
Request for removal of Ms. Korab as a personal respondent
51With regard to the issue of the request for removal of Ms. Korab as a personal respondent, I have considered the factors set out in Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31. As is typical in addressing this issue, the real question comes down to the fourth factor, which is whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found.
52With regard to Ms. Korab, the one remaining allegation against her relates to the alleged “paranoid” comment. In relation to this alleged comment, Ms. Korab’s alleged conduct obviously is the central issue. If Ms. Korab were found to have made this alleged comment and if this were found to be in violation of the Code, I also cannot say with certainty at this time that it may not be appropriate for some remedy to be made against her personally.
53Accordingly, in the circumstances, I decline to remove Ms. Korab as a personal respondent at this time.
Paragraphs 110 to 128 of the Application
54Paragraphs 110 to 128 of the Application describe an objection raised by the applicant regarding the University’s internal process for dealing with discrimination and harassment complaints. In particular, the applicant objected to the composition of a panel of inquiry on the grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias. These paragraphs describe the University’s response to the raising of this allegation, and make allegations of abusive and bad faith treatment. However, it is conceded that these paragraphs in and of themselves do not purport to set out any alleged infringement of a right of the applicant’s under the Code.
55Rather, it is stated that these paragraphs provide further context for the applicant’s allegations of discrimination and harassment, and are in aggravation of the remedies she seeks.
56It is difficult for me to understand how the matters described in paras. 110 to 128 of the Application provide further context for the applicant’s allegations. The allegations with regard to Complaint #1 relate to the applicant’s request for accommodation by having no direct contact with, and not being scheduled to work on the same days as, the alleged harasser. The last incident of alleged discrimination referenced in Complaint #1 is a letter dated September 16, 2009. The only other remaining allegation relates to the alleged comment on July 23, 2009. The reasonable apprehension of bias issue was first raised applicant’s counsel on December 16, 2009, and the ensuing events continue until March 2010. I fail to see how this subsequent issue provides any useful context for the earlier allegations of discrimination and harassment.
57I also fail to see how these alleged events are relevant to any alleged aggravation of remedy. If a violation of the Code is found, the Tribunal will award remedies arising out of the infringement. Paragraphs 110 to 128 of the Application do not raise any alleged infringement of the Code, and so there is nothing in these alleged events that would be relevant to remedy.
58Accordingly, I find that paras. 110 to 128 of the Application are irrelevant to this proceeding, and these paragraphs are hereby struck.
Next steps
59This matter will now be scheduled for a hearing into the allegations described in the Application as Complaint #1 and the allegation regarding the comment alleged to have been made by Ms. Korab on July 23, 2009.
60I am not seized.
ORDER
61For all of the foregoing reasons, I hereby make the following order:
a. The allegations described in the Application as Complaint #2 are dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success, with the exception of the allegation regarding the comment alleged to have been made by Ms. Korab on July 23, 2009;
b. The allegations described in the Application as Complaint #3 are dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success;
c. The request for removal of Ms. Korab as a personal respondent is denied; and
d. Paragraphs 110 to 128 of the Application are struck as irrelevant.
Dated at Toronto, this 11th day of October, 2013.
“Signed by” ________________________________
Mark Hart
Vice-chair